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Understanding a normative concept like oppression requires attention to not only its 
harms but also the causes of those harms. In other words, a complete understanding of such a 
concept requires a proper causal explanation. This causal explanation can also inform and 
constrain our moral response to such harms. Therefore, the conceptual explanatory framework 
that we use to inform our moral diagnosis and our moral response becomes significant. The first 
goal of this dissertation is to propose complexity theory as the proper framework for not only 
explaining a social phenomenon like oppression but also understanding the proper sites for social 
change. The second goal of this dissertation is to answer three interrelated questions about how 
we should respond, morally, to a chronic and complex social problem like racial or gender 
inequality: (1) Why do the current interventions to address these problems fail? (2) Do social 
movements play any unique role in addressing these problems? (3) What is our individual 
responsibility to participate in social movements? In response, I argue that the explanatory 
frameworks that we choose to understand the cause(s) of social problems can be the source of the 
inadequacy of our intervention. I argue that a proper social and moral intervention needs to 
capture the complex and dynamic nature of the social world. I also show that changing the 
explanatory framework allows us to see the unique role social movements play in making 
effective and sustainable social change possible. Finally, I conclude supporting such movements 
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Chapter One: Social Inequality and Frameworks of Explanation 
 
1. Introduction 
Ask any American who is racialized as Black and they will likely have many stories of 
harassment, discrimination, maltreatment, and unjust harm that would not have taken place if 
they were not Black. There are books, movies, articles, movements, and personal anecdotes that 
make it almost impossible to ignore these stories. The sad truth about the stories is that none of 
us knows what exactly we ought to do to stop them from happening; however, we feel the pain 
and urgency for action. In her book, The New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander relates an 
abundance of stories in which individuals are unjustly harmed, and the best explanation has to do 
with their race. In one of these stories, she invites us to put ourselves in Clifford Runoalds’ 
shoes. He is an African American victim of policies that exist in a society in which being 
regarded as dangerous is dangerous and some people are regarded as dangerous no matter what 
they do. The policies that Alexander refers to in this story enable the police to seize the 
belongings of people accused of drug crimes. However, reclaiming their belongings requires 
resources that poor people simply do not have.  
… place yourself in the shoes of Clifford Runoalds, another African American victim of 
the Hearne drug bust. You returned home to Bryan, Texas, to attend the funeral of your 
eighteen-month-old daughter. Before the funeral services begin, the police show up and 
handcuff you. You beg the officers to let you take one last look at your daughter before 
she is buried. The police refuse. You are told by prosecutors that you are needed to testify 
against one of the defendants in a recent drug bust. You deny witnessing any drug 
transaction; you don’t know what they are talking about. Because of your refusal to 
cooperate, you are indicted on felony charges. After a month of being held in jail, the 
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charges against you are dropped. You are technically free, but as a result of your arrest 
and period of incarceration, you lose your job, your apartment, your furniture, and your 
car. Not to mention the chance to say good-bye to your baby girl (Alexander, 2010, p. 
98). 
 Alexander aims to challenge the idea that we live in a “post-racial” society by pointing 
out how the lives of people of color are negatively affected by criminal justice policy and how 
endorsing the “post-racial” idea belittles the harm and injustice that they bear. Tommie Shelby 
(2014) distinguishes four ways of defining a post-racial society. First, a society is post-racial 
when the concept of race is viewed as empirically unsound and incoherent (Appiah, 1990). 
Second, it can also refer to a society in which racial differences are not a legitimate basis for 
treating people differently even to support and strengthen the disadvantaged (Wasserstrom, 
1976). Third, a society in which racism ceased to negatively impact people’s lives is another way 
of understanding a post-racial society. And finally, and ironically, a society in which charges of 
racism might not be worth taking seriously can be taken as post-racial (Shelby, 2014).  
Alexander and many others1 bring our attention to the fact that even if the dominant 
scientific method does not allow for a concept like race or racism, and although many believe 
that we live in a post-racial society, race and racism have tangible causal power that negatively 
impacts people’s lives. They emphasize the detrimental effects of race and racism to argue that 
we ought to do something to mitigate these effects. This obligation, however, is not diminished 
by the fact that “race” as we know it might not exist at all and the “social fiction of race defies 
rigorous definition” (Roediger, 2001, p. 325).  
 
1 See for example, Lebron (2017), Anderson (2010), Shelby (2014), Stanley (2015), and Mills (2017) 
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 Conservative commentators2 tend to explain away the claim of racial inequality by 
arguing that the claimed instances of racial inequality are in fact not related to race and that even 
if they are, the cause is not racism. To back this claim up, they concede that white racism was the 
reason for black disadvantage before the Civil Rights Movement. However, they claim that Civil 
Rights legislation and New Deal programs removed the structural barriers for Blacks. Thus, the 
background condition for everyone is just and equal. Any residual disadvantage is either 
attributable to individual attributes and behavior, or due to pathologies internal to Black 
communities (Young, 2011).  
Three interrelated lines of argument are recognizable in the approach that conservative 
commentators have taken so far. The first argument is that there is no such thing as racial 
disadvantage. The second argument is that if there is such a disadvantage or discrimination, it is 
the fault of Black individuals or Black communities. The third argument is that “we”—Whites or 
non-Black individuals or communities—do not have any responsibility to help victims of racial 
disadvantage and discrimination. However, individuals’ testimony and empirical evidence shows 
that racial disadvantage and inequality are real. Such disadvantages and inequalities are not the 
fault of Black individuals or communities. And the choice not to help is often a result of racist 
motives, and even where such motives are not present, it is arguably a serious moral failing that 
perpetuates racist harms.3 In fact, denials of racial inequality and racist discrimination have a 
sociopolitical function. These denials mark “social boundaries and reaffirm social and ethnic 
identities” (van Dijk, 2001, p. 310). The members of the dominant groups use such denials to 
further establish the moral superiority of their own groups.  
 
2 There are a variety of examples for such commentators, but ones addressed in this literature are Mead (1986) and 
Murray (1984).   
3 Of course, racism and its problems are not limited to black-white racial tensions. However, I focus on the black-
white issue as the most obvious one.  
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The central goal of this dissertation is to show that for some social problems social 
movements are necessary for social change and that individuals have a responsibility to support 
such movements. In the remainder of this chapter, I motivate the project by discussing the two 
conservative or “skeptical” arguments just mentioned to highlight the limitations of the 
traditional explanatory frameworks in addressing chronic and complex social problems. I argue 
that there is a need for a paradigm shift in the framing of the problem to an alternative that does 
not require a well-defined notion of race, culture, or community, yet allows us to explain racial 
and other forms of inequality. I propose a new framing that focuses on the complex and dynamic 
nature of social problems even when they seem stagnant.  
The remaining chapters of this project flesh out my proposed new framework. I start with 
the limitations of the alternative frameworks of explanation. Then, I argue that my proposed 
complexity framework resolves such problems and allows us to conceptualize groups as a 
heterogenous and fluid cluster of social interactions. I also show that the complexity framework 
can explain durable inequalities and guide our moral response to address them. I conclude that 
my alternative framework explains why social movements are necessary to address chronic, 
complex, and persistent social problems. I use this conclusion to further argue that supporting 
such movements is a moral imperative. At the end of this Introduction, I offer a precis of the 
five-central chapter of this project and what each contributes to my overall argument. But for 
now, let us turn to the debate over the causes of racial inequality. 
2. It Is Not About Race: The First Skeptical Argument 
In her book, The Imperative of Integration, Elizabeth Anderson (2010) gathers a wealth 
of empirical studies to show that not only are racial discrimination and inequality alive and well, 
but they affect all the major objective measures of well-being. For example, in the United States, 
the life expectancy of the Black population has always been lower than average when we control 
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for income (Arias, 2007). The Black infant mortality rate and the rate of death from diseases like 
asthma, kidney disease, diabetes, and infectious diseases, as well as heart disease and cancer, are 
much higher than whites (Mathews & MacDorman, 2008). Since the 1960s, the poverty rate of 
Black communities has been steadily three times higher than that of non-Hispanic whites 
(DeNavas-Wait, Proctor, & Smith, 2008). One third of black children, compared to one tenth of 
white children, will experience poverty for more than ten years (Corcoran, 2001). The median 
household income for Black families is two thirds of whites, a ratio that is larger than it was in 
1967 (DeNavas-Wait, Proctor, & Smith, 2008). Compared to middle-class white parents, Black 
parents from the same class are less likely to transfer their class status to their children 
(Gouskova & Stafford, 2007). 
Anderson traces some of these problems to unequal employment, unequal education, less 
protection from the state, and the weaker public standing of Black communities. The Black 
unemployment rate is double that of whites and has been so for decades (Williams & Chiquita, 
2001). Black children enter schools with lower reading and mathematics skills and fall behind 
white counterparts who have the same initial scores in those skills (Laird, Kienzl, & DeBell, 
2007). Black youth are twice as likely as white youth to drop out of school (Laird, Kienzl, & 
DeBell, 2007). Moreover, they are less protected by the state and police force and subject to 
higher rates of criminal punishment compared to whites (West & Sabol, 2009). In fact, the 
lifetime chance of a Black man being imprisoned is four times that of a white man, a situation 
that has worsened since the 1970s due to punitive criminal justice policies (Western & 
Wildeman, 2009). And finally, it is important to remember that these inequalities do not only 
affect the incarcerated or high school-dropouts. White Americans stereotype Blacks as “lazy, 
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stupid, ignorant, violent, and criminal” (Anderson, 2010, p.25).4 Their tendency to explain the 
inferior material conditions of Blacks by positing their personal, cultural, or biological inferiority 
reinforces Blacks’ marginalization and isolation from the rest of the society and multiplies their 
disadvantages (Anderson, 2000).  
Other than material inequality, the mere experience of discrimination has negative effects 
on well-being. There are abundant studies that show a strong relationship between the chronic 
experience of discrimination and health. For example, Dole et al. (2004) and Collins et al. (2004) 
point to an increased risk of premature birth among women who report a chronic experience of 
discrimination in the workplace or in other social interactions. This effect is, of course, present 
for all marginalized racial and ethnic groups. A recent study emphasizes the change in the rate of 
premature birth for Arabic-named women in California after September 11th, 2001 (Lauderdale, 
2006). The consensus in these studies is that after controlling for all other factors like biological, 
cultural, and environmental differences, the mere experience of unjust treatment due to group 
membership universally affects health.  
Racial discrimination and disadvantage exist, and the problem is urgent and severe. The 
common conclusion among studies in the literature on racial inequality and disadvantage is that 
race as a category seems to have a causal role that brings about the phenomenon that is the focus 
of study. For instance, when controlling for the type of crime that is the only relevant factor in 
ascribing punishment, Black men receive harsher sentences (Alexander, 2010). In other words, 
the way that people are perceived and grouped together in the society by racial categories 
changes their well-being, their life expectancy, the way they are treated, and the way they are 
punished. It is important to point out that this kind of grouping is life-threatening and dangerous, 
 
4 For more in dept analysis of such stereotyping also see Fiske (1998).  
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so it is appropriate for the victims to claim that they have been seriously wronged and for 
bystanders or the rest of the community to act with urgency.   
3. It Is Their Responsibility: The Second Skeptical Argument 
If recognizing the problem that racial discrimination and disadvantage are still common 
in the United States is the first step to mitigating the problem, the second step is recognizing the 
cause of the problem and who should be responsible for it. One side of the debate around the 
cause of the problem argues that individuals, their behavior, and their attributes create racial 
inequality. And since each of us is responsible for our own conditions, victims of racial 
inequality should be held morally responsible for the actions and decisions that lead to their 
disadvantage. This argument relies on the assumption that making individuals responsible gives 
them incentives to change their situation. For most people who agree with this argument, the 
main reason to care about disadvantaged people is the negative effect of their irresponsible 
behavior on the rest of us. However, the other side of the debate relies on the background 
conditions, structural injustices, and things outside of individuals’ control to explain the cause of 
the problem. They argue that it is unfair and unjust to hold the victims responsible for something 
that is beyond their control.  
In her book, Responsibility for Justice, Iris Marion Young discusses an influential debate 
over the cause of inequality. She elaborates the position of two eminent conservative welfare 
policy theorists, Charles Murray (1984) and Lawrence Mead (2006), who ridicule the so called 
“sociological” approach to explaining poverty (Young, 2012). They argue that this approach 
relies on the environment and structural social processes to explain why the lives of poor and 
disadvantaged people are insecure and difficult. For example, Mead states that “the poor and 
disadvantaged were understood to be so conditioned by their environment that to expect better 
functioning from them, such as work, became almost inconceivable. The responsibility for their 
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difficulties, even behavioral ones, was transferred entirely to government and society” (Mead, 
1986, p. 55). Thus, according to Mead the sociological approach makes the mistake of 
identifying the hostile environment as the cause of the problem instead of the problematic 
behavior of poor and disadvantaged people.   
 Mead, Murray, and other conservative commentators argue that we should hold the 
individuals responsible for their disadvantage since they are themselves the cause of their 
problem. They argue that the “deterministic” approach of structural explanations dismisses the 
individuals’ role and agency in their circumstances. Young, however, argues that this 
argument—which influenced the dominant approach to welfare policy—relies on two mistaken 
assumptions: first, that the background conditions are just, and second, that either the structural 
reality or the individual is responsible for the problem, not both. She states that “it is 
disingenuous to suggest that persons living in neighborhoods with poor schools, few stores, and 
dilapidated housing, miles away from the closest job opportunities, have an equal opportunity 
with other persons in the same metropolitan area” (Young, 2011, p. 11). Thus, she argues against 
the assumption that everyone’s background conditions are just.  
According to Young, our society fails to provide equal opportunity for people from 
different races or socioeconomic backgrounds. Moreover, she argues against a dichotomy 
between the individual and structural responsibility for an explanation of inequality. Young 
argues that while granting the individual responsibility in choosing wisely among their salient 
options, the structure of society still constrains the available options for different people in 
different groups. The individual and structural factors are both necessary to explain and to 
remedy the problem of inequality and disadvantage. 
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The assumption that we live in a post-racial or an “equal opportunity society” leads to the 
false conclusion that the personal attributes of individuals are at fault. The advocates of this 
conclusion argue that needy people who depend on public support refuse to work or acquire 
skills when they can, also that they have babies out of wedlock when they are young, 
demonstrating lack of respect for family values (Young, 2011). They also argue that this 
proportionally small and deviant group needs to be given some incentives since their 
irresponsibility brings costs to the rest of us. However, this rhetoric, Young argues, encourages 
an individualistic approach to responsibility that defines responsibility as independence. It is 
individualistic because the unit of responsibility is the individual and not the society or a group 
of people. It also undermines relationships among individuals. The biggest unit of responsibility 
in this account is the family, since children are necessarily dependent on their parents, but 
nothing beyond that unit can be either the cause of the individual’s problem or held responsible 
to undo the harm. Moreover, on this view, someone dependent on public assistance is by 
definition irresponsible and not being dependent on it is sufficient to be responsible. In other 
words, someone is irresponsible if and only if she is independent of others.  
Young points out that the individualistic account of responsibility implies that poor and 
disadvantaged people are, by definition, irresponsible. However, she argues against the identity 
relationship between irresponsibility and poverty and the idea that personal attributes, like 
character traits, are the cause of poverty and disadvantage. Young argues that since a majority of 
Americans at some point in their life live below the poverty line, we cannot separate poor people 
from others “based on their character traits, dispositions, or failings that they have” (Young, 
2011). Moreover, she points out that people from all socioeconomic classes make mistakes and 
act irresponsibly. In fact, the irresponsible behavior of people in power who have money usually 
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has a stronger negative impact on society. Therefore, she concludes that character traits and 
dispositions cannot be the only causes of disadvantage. If neither the character traits nor the 
personal choices of the individual are sufficient to explain their disadvantage, then it is necessary 
to use structural elements to explain the problem.  
Some conservative commentators locate the cause of the problem in the culture of Black 
communities, and they believe that individuals should be held responsible for endorsing elements 
of this culture. However, Elizabeth Anderson, in her book, The Imperative of Integration, argues 
that it is the particular framing of the concept of culture that leads to this idea and that there are 
moral and explanatory reasons to avoid such a framework. She acknowledges the intuition that 
there are some common dysfunctional behaviors in some Black communities.   
Conservatives are not wrong to point to numerous imprudent and harmful activities by 
blacks in “underclass” communities—especially, involvement in gangs and crime, the 
dominance of single-parent families, often started by financially insecure youth in 
unstable relationships, and poor school work—as important proximate causes of black 
disadvantage. If poor blacks would stay out of trouble, delay child birthing until they are 
financially secure and committed to raising their children with their partners, and study 
diligently until graduating from high school, then, their children, and their neighbors 
would be much better off. (Anderson, 2010, p. 75) 
However, she argues that even if a group of people habitually engages in these self-destructive 
behaviors, this does not mean that the community should bear the cost without outside help. 
Abandoning them is morally reprehensible since there are innocents, including children and 
people without the destructive behavior of the community, who have to bear the lethal 
consequence of others’ bad behavior.  
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Anderson emphasizes that the framework in which we embed the self-undermining 
behavior within the Black community affects our moral response. Thus, we need to be aware of 
the framework that we choose. According to Anderson, the collective behavior of a community 
is usually understood as “culture,” which in the folk anthropological framework, is the 
immediate expression of a community’s shared values. In this framework, culture is a “sui 
generis, autonomous product of a distinctive, self-contained, community” (Anderson, 2010, p. 
78). However, she argues for an “economic” framework in which culture is “the equilibrium of 
individual strategic responses to each other’s conduct, within the constraints of their resources 
and opportunities” (Anderson, 2010, p. 78). In this alternative framework, individuals can be 
members of more than one community, and each community has flexible boundaries.  
The folk anthropological framework leads to two moral responses that differ depending 
on background assumptions. If based on egalitarian assumptions, the anthropological framework 
of culture leans to a celebration of diversity, a tendency to allow each community to live in 
accordance with its own cultural norms, and allowance of self-segregationist impulses for 
cultural preservation against outside influence. However, with inegalitarian assumptions, such a 
framework allows hostility toward integration with others except when others assimilate with 
one’s own culture and supports disdain and alienation from groups to which one does not belong. 
Moreover, it “holds the segregated groups wholly responsible for advantage or disadvantage 
accruing to their cultures, to evaluate cultural differences moralistically, on a single scale 
value—as “pathological” or “worthy,” “savage” or “civilized”—and to neglect the causal 
importance of intergroup relations on outcomes for each group” (Anderson, 2010, p. 82). 
The “economic” approach, however, defines culture as a set of instrumentally valuable 
behavioral resources. According to this approach to culture, environmental contingencies and 
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interaction among individuals create a set of strategies that can be used to coordinate 
expectations and actions. Thus, this approach is neither limited to nor undermines personal taste 
and decisions. In successive rounds of interaction with others and with the environment, 
individuals come up with strategies that work best for them by adjusting them in response to 
payoffs they have experienced in previous rounds until they reach an equilibrium. Hence, instead 
of a linear atemporal aggregate of personal beliefs or values that are dominant in a community, 
the economic approach relies on a dynamic and complex model of strategies to define culture.  
The economic approach to culture is not usually favored among moral and social 
philosophers. This approach to culture and cultural norms has been criticized for its overly 
rationalistic, instrumental, and egoistic presumptions about individuals and their motives. There 
is a consensus that norms survive only when people accept them non-strategically as valid 
standard of conduct (Haidt, 2012) (Anderson, 2000). A better understanding of norms then needs 
to “incorporate the effects of cognitive, motivational, and behavioral biases and consider what 
they mean to the agents that follow them” (Anderson, 2010, p. 214). However, the model’s 
shortcomings do not imply that we need to reject the model altogether (Anderson, 2010). The 
most interesting and relevant features of this model are its dynamic nature and complexity that 
free us from the problems of traditional models. Moreover, for the economic model to serve the 
purpose that Anderson has in mind, individuals do not have to be consciously aware of the 
instrumentality of their strategies. Also, the model creates space for altruistic and seemingly 
irrational motivations.  
Anderson (2010) relies on the economic model to show that it is not individual’s taste in 
values that determines the cultural norms one endorses. Rather, if we only take into account 
universal human needs, the economic model can explain why people conform to dysfunctional 
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norms. In addition to a background of universal needs, this model considers relationships among 
individuals within and between groups as well as the pattern of their interactions with others. 
Moreover, it takes into consideration the available opportunities for and constraints on 
individuals and communities. According to this model, “The frequency of a behavioral strategy 
in a population is a function of its payoffs, which are largely determined by how many 
individuals adopt it and rival strategies in interacting with one another” (Anderson, 2010, p. 
78).  Thus, culture in this account is adaptable, tradable, alienable, and mobile (Anderson, 2010).  
The economic account implies that a common humanity and pragmatic orientation create 
what we understand as culture. Thus, the claims of “authenticity” and “purity” of cultures and 
any inherent advantages of one culture over another are absurd. This account is also open to 
differences within groups since the state of equilibrium in strategies can contain different 
proportions of people adopting different strategies. Thus, stereotyping and stigmatization is 
discouraged in this account due to their inaccuracy and redundancy. Finally, the economic 
account explains how some groups can be trapped in collectively dysfunctional norms and what 
the possible ways out of such a state are. Empirical studies as well as simulations show the 
futility of exhorting individuals to change their strategies when everything else in their 
environment confirms that their strategy works the best. 
According to the economic account of culture, poverty alone is not enough to create 
dysfunctional collective behavior. Concentrated disadvantage for a group of people in terms of 
high levels of chronic unemployment, deprivation of public goods, and isolation from groups 
with cultural and social capital is also necessary to explain the existence of self-destructive 
norms (Wilson, 2009). “Cultural capital” refers to cultural habits that help individuals succeed in 
their school, work, and community. Individuals develop these habits together in the course of 
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their adaptation to their environment. Segregation, however, causes differences in codes of 
conduct and communication that hold individuals back from succeeding in an integrated and 
more advantaged environment if they are only adapted to the segregated and disadvantaged 
communities. “Social capital” refers to a network of people in social relationships that serves as a 
resource for individual and collective action by providing information channels, supporting 
cooperation and reciprocity, and sustaining other norms that coordinate people’s behavior 
(Coleman, 1988). In sum, dysfunctional behavior is a result of highly constrained options and 
lack of access to better strategies rather than of bad values or bad taste.   
Cultural norms that are in fact dysfunctional may be the only feasible option for members 
of a deprived community. In a neighborhood with an alarmingly low level of social and cultural 
capital, the only person a young mother can love may be her own child. Thus, becoming a single 
mother looks like an attractive option when the pool of men with steady employment and 
without criminal backgrounds or drug problems is very small (Wilson, 1987). Also, when the 
cost of encountering violence is high in a neighborhood and relying on police does not seem to 
be a viable option, being responsible for protecting oneself may mean that one needs to be ready 
to act violently and adapt an appearance that communicates that capability to others. In such a 
neighborhood, civility can be a sign of weakness and invitation for criminals to abuse one. The 
most plausible option in this situation is to hide behind a mask of aggression (Anderson, 1999). 
In other words, people in such communities are trapped in a highly unfavorable equilibrium.  
The economic approach to culture provides a response to the claim that the culture of 
Black communities is responsible for the racial inequality and disadvantage affecting them. In 
the economic framework, culture emerges from the interaction of individuals who try to make 
the best of their resources to satisfy their needs. According to this framework, segregation and 
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marginalization play a much more significant role than the decisions of individuals. Without 
segregation and its consequences, like a high level of chronic unemployment and lack of access 
to public resources or jobs, inner city residents, for instance, would have better options to choose 
from and construct better strategies to deal with their problems. Thus, the agents who enforce 
segregation or benefit from it should hold at least some responsibility. Moreover, it is important 
to remember that the members of these communities have to pay a high price regardless of what 
their decisions are. If they stay committed to norms of civility, they are vulnerable to criminals 
who dominate their neighborhood. If they don’t commit to those norms, they will be punished, 
incarcerated, and taken away from their children and family. Thus, it seems unfair and futile to 
hold them entirely responsible for their actions or for the culture they live in.  
Moving away from a framework that views each culture as the autonomous creator of its 
norms, namely the folk anthropological account of culture, enables us to see what is wrong with 
an approach that considers the culture of Black communities to be the only problem. It takes 
much more than the will of individuals who are trapped in dysfunctional cultural norms to 
change them. Thus, it is patently unfair to expect the individuals who are the most vulnerable to 
these norms and who have the least amount of resources to be the prime instruments of reform. 
Instead, as the economic framework posits, it is right to recognize involvement in gangs and 
crime, poor school work, and dominance of single parent and/or unstable families as influential 
factors of Black disadvantage. However, these factors on their own are still insufficient to 
explain the existence of the problem nor can they alone determine what we can do to solve it. A 
more comprehensive account of culture implies that “no one escapes substantive responsibility 
for remedying the problems of disadvantages” (Anderson, 2010, p. 84).      
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In sum, in response to the influence of structural norms, conservative commentators have 
had two main arguments, one moral and the other causal. The moral argument is that relying on 
external causes to explain Black disadvantage fails to hold individuals responsible for their 
behavior or give them incentives to change. This failure reinforces what in fact is the cause of 
Black disadvantage. However, recognizing the dysfunctional behavior of individuals, as 
discussed before, does not imply that no one else is responsible for its existence. And the causal 
argument is that since other racial groups, like Asian immigrants, overcame their difficulties 
despite their disadvantaged background, the only possible explanation for persisting black 
disadvantage can be defective Black cultural values. However, Blacks and Asian immigrants are 
similarly situated neither in economic circumstances nor in their interaction with whites 
(Hollinger, 2005). Moreover, the dysfunctional values of the “ghettos” that conservatives refer to 
only came into existence after the unemployment rate increased in the United States (Wilson, 
1996). Finally, the same dysfunctional norms tend to appear in any community that experiences 
high unemployment in advanced capitalist economies, regardless of its race (Lyall, 2007).  
The framing of the problem, then, is at fault.  Anderson argues that the reaction of 
conservative commentators is unsurprising since “When dysfunctional behaviors of the 
disadvantaged are represented as the autonomous product of alien, pathological cultures, value 
systems, and identities, the advantaged are likely to respond with neglect at best and punitive 
measures at worst” (Anderson, 2010). The economic model grants that individuals have a role to 
play, and that they might choose dysfunctional behaviors and norms. However, it allows for 
external elements like segregation to be a part of the problem. In this account, victims are not 
only those harmed by crime, but also those who are forced to live in an environment in which 
fear and distrust are prevalent. These latter victims lose their social and cultural capital and have 
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to deal with the stigmatization of their race and social group. Finally, the economic account 
explains why it is unjust and futile to ask individuals to act cooperatively when they are 
intimidated into self-defense.  
4. Complex and Dynamic Models and Social Explanation 
So far, I have discussed the problem of racial discrimination and inequality and engaged 
with a debate that challenges its very existence of such inequalities. These challenges aim to 
undermine the legitimacy of the victims and their standing to make moral claims (Carbonell, 
2017). Some argue that racism and racial inequality belong to the past and that no one’s life is 
negatively affected by them (Bobo, 2011). Thus, they argue, antiracist movements at any level 
are redundant and counterproductive. They consider the claim of racism to be empty rhetoric 
with the purpose of extracting “guilt from Whites and, through this, so called special treatment 
from government for victim-minded racial minorities” (Shelby, 2014). Blacks are accused of 
“playing the race card” as a method of extortion and an excuse for their irresponsible behavior 
(Ford, 2008). 
I distinguished three interrelated arguments in the debate about racial inequality and 
discussed two of them in more detail. The first argument denies the factual claim that racial 
inequality and discrimination exist, and the second holds Black individuals and communities 
responsible for being disadvantaged. The common core of both these arguments is the 
ontological and methodological commitments that allows dismissing claims of injustice when it 
is not easily traceable in the immediate actions of individuals. For instance, the justification for 
grouping individuals based on the color of their skin or some other shared feature is the point of 
contention for denying racial inequality. In Chapter 2, I discuss such a grouping justification 
problem and its methodological implications.  
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Showing that individuals can bear systematic harms in virtue of their group membership 
is necessary for explaining social inequalities and injustices. However, there are nuances that 
needs to be addressed. For example, individuals simultaneously experience different forms of 
injustice because of their membership in various groups (see for example Crenshaw, 1989; 
Young, 1988; Walby, 2007). Moreover, as many Black and “Third Word” feminist scholars 
argue, groups are not best represented by the experience of their average member (Mohanty, 
1988). Therefore, attending to the interconnectedness of individuals and their groups is necessary 
to provide a proper explanation for their experiences. Failing to acknowledge such 
interconnection leads to descriptive and normative problems.  
Not only the explanation of racial inequality, but also its moral analysis calls for 
consideration of emergent properties. I discussed Young’s objection to the individualistic 
account of responsibility that fails to see the role of higher level, structural features of society 
that constrain an individual’s options. I also discussed Anderson’s argument about framing the 
problem in a way that fails to see the dynamic nature of culture and the undefined boundary of 
communities. Anderson agrees with Young that limiting the scope of explanation to the 
individuals prevents us from explaining the existence of the problem and from recognizing who 
is responsible for it. Moreover, Anderson argues that merely bringing in some higher-level 
features, like culture, can be insufficient. She discusses the shortcomings of the folk 
anthropological framework of culture mixed with inegalitarian assumptions in the analysis of the 
morally relevant features of racial disadvantage.  
Some technical terms in this debate need further explanation. I start with a strong form of 
methodological individualism, atomism, which indicates that an agent who is and always has 
been isolated from others is nevertheless capable, in principle, of displaying all distinctive 
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human capacities. The objection to methodological individualism, holism, however, argues for a 
connection between enjoying social relations with others and exercising certain distinctive 
human capacities. The main idea is that “living in society is a necessary condition of the 
development of rationality, in some sense of this property, or of becoming a moral agent in the 
full sense of the term, or of becoming a fully responsible, autonomous being” (Taylor, 1975, p. 
191). Thus, holism objects to discussing an individual and her problems without addressing the 
influence of others, the history of that influence, etc.  
The individualism/holism distinction is about the issue of how far people depend on their 
relations with one another for the enjoyment of proper human capacities. Pettit (2007) calls this 
issue a horizontal one since the relations in question are collateral and among people. He 
distinguishes this issue of how far people depend on their relations from the distinction between 
social individualism and collectivism that is vertical and is about how far the autonomy of people 
is compromised from the above by “aggregate social forces and regularities” (Pettit, 2007). 
Individualism denies the existence of any compromise while collectivists believe that we are 
controlled and constrained in a way that diminishes our agency. Individualists and holists, 
however, conform to a folk psychological account of autonomy and agency while arguing about 
the extent to which human capacities require social relations.  
Individualists believe that the isolated individual can give a relevant perspective on what 
is a good social or political arrangement. In a similar way, philosophers of science and scientists 
have traditionally thought that an isolated cell and its anatomy can give us what we need to know 
about how a network of cells works. The failure of this approach in science leads to two 
important debates (Bechtel & Richardson, 1993). The first debate focuses on the importance of 
the relationship between the parts (neurons), and the second is about the explanatory role that the 
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collective features of the parts can play. These collective features, also known as higher level 
properties, seem not to be easily reducible to a linear aggregation of the features of the parts. 
Thus, the isolated individuals, although necessary, are insufficient to explain how an organism 
works. However, the relationship between higher level and lower level facts might not be easy to 
determine.  
Many philosophers have engaged in the debate about the relationship between the higher 
and lower level features (see Churchland, 1985; Craver & Bechtel, 2007; Fodor, 1974; Kim, 
1999; Nagel, 1961; and Wimsatt, 2000). The debate revolves around the articulation of how the 
properties, activities, and interrelations of lower level elements lead to a higher level or systemic 
phenomenon. This debate is especially important in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of 
cognitive science in which the question is how neural activity can lead to psychological 
experiences or what elements need to be considered to explain how psychological experiences or 
intelligent interactions with the environment emerge.  
The relationship between micro-level elements and macro-level events as a philosophical 
problem has been discussed in many fields, including sociology, which focuses on the 
relationship between individuals and social collectives. In fact, drawing inferences from the 
higher-lower level discussion in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of biology and applying 
them to the micro-macro relationship in social sciences is a particularly popular move (Kincaid, 
1986, 1996; List & Spiekermann, 2013; Sawyer, 2001; Sawyer, 2002, 2003; and Vromen, 2010). 
For example, in support of the application of the debate to social sciences, Sawyer states that 
“although philosophical arguments about emergence and reducibility have focused on the mind-
brain relation, they can be generalized to apply to any hierarchically ordered sets of properties” 
(Sawyer, 2001, p. 65). 
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In Chapter 3, I argue first that higher level (macro) properties are necessary to enable 
discussion of racial disadvantage and explanation of the problem’s cause. Moreover, to remedy 
the problem, we need to talk about relationships, contexts, history, etc. I conclude that an 
individualistic approach that does not allow for any intervention of the higher level forces is 
explanatorily insufficient and morally inadequate. Second, I argue that the alternative approach 
that is used by scholars who endorse a collective and holistic account is also problematic. I 
criticize the dominance of the functionalist approach in what social philosophers call structural 
explanation (see Haslanger, 2003, 2016, 2017; Jackson & Pettit, 1992; and List & Spiekermann, 
2013). 
 I discuss the insufficiency of the structural/functional approach on three grounds: 
descriptive, normative, and practical. I argue that the functional approach is descriptively 
insufficient since it assumes a set of temporally linear and modular functions that are almost non-
existent in a socially complex problem like racial inequality. This approach is normatively 
problematic since assuming a unit with a certain function that causes the problem implies that the 
morally appropriate response must target that unit. However, the most, or the only, effective 
response might not have to do with the problem at all. For instance, conservative commentators 
argue that the culture of Black communities is the cause of their disadvantage while the 
unemployment rate may be the variable that we ought to change in order to effectively remedy 
the problem. Finally, the functional approach has proved to be practically insufficient in the 
discussion about race since it has led to policies that have failed to see the interconnectedness of 
individuals, their expectations, and their resistance to change. Many of these policies have been 
futile or caused backlash, and in some cases, they have worsened racial inequality.    
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5. Complexity Theory and Social Change 
My arguments in Chapters 4 and 5 rely on a similar discussion in philosophy of science:  
I suggest an alternative account of explanation that is derived from complex dynamical systems 
theory. I discuss the implications of this account for social inequalities related to race and 
gender. This account captures the essence of the economic frame of culture. I defend this account 
of explanation and its use in the conversation about social inequalities on descriptive and 
normative grounds. I discuss the explanatory and predictive power and limitation of this model.  
The aim of Chapter 4 is to suggest an alternative explanatory framework for not only a 
social phenomenon like oppression and social inequalities but also for understanding the proper 
sites for social change. I argue that chronic and complex social problems like racial and gender 
inequality have the key characteristics of complex and dynamical systems. I conclude that the 
best approach to understanding such problems is complexity theory. I further show that 
dismissing the complex and dynamic nature of such problems misguides our collective moral 
response to them. 
In Chapter 5, I use complexity theory to make a rather controversial claim: that 
participating in social movements is a moral imperative. I argue that participating in social 
movements is the proper moral response to oppression. I first show that the traditional 
approaches to explaining oppression and social progress are unhelpful and that their emphasis on 
equilibrium states in social theorizing leads to moral paralysis. As an example of such a 
paralysis, I use Manne’s systems approach to misogyny and patriarchy. I show that her approach 
leads to a moral dilemma when it comes to resisting oppression and fighting for social change. I 
argue that a paradigm shift in our theory of explanation towards complexity theory can (1) 
resolve the dilemma, (2) explain the role of social movements in social change, and (3) show that 
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in response to the harms of oppression, participating in a social movement is the only morally 







Chapter Two: Problems with Holistic Social Explanation 
 
“What is considered theory in the dominant academic community is not necessarily what 
counts as theory for women-of-color.  Theory produces effects that change people and the 
way they perceive the world.  Thus we need teorías that will enable us to interpret what 
happens in the world, that will explain how and why we relate to certain people in specific 
ways, that will reflect what goes on between inner, outer and peripheral ‘I’s within a 
person and between the personal ‘I’s and the collective ‘we’ of our ethnic communities.”  
           Gloria Anzaldúa, “Haciendo Teorias”, Borderlands, p. 25   
 
1. Introduction 
In her paper, “Five Faces of Oppression,” Iris Marion Young speaks of a need for a whole 
new mode of analysis in political discourse that enables individuals to make sense of their own 
social and political experiences. In particular, she uses insights from “socialists, radical 
feminists, American Indian activists, black activists, gay and lesbian activists, and others 
identifying with new left social movements of the 1960s and '70s” who see the shortcomings of 
individualistic frameworks in explaining or understanding experiences of oppression (Young I. 
M., Five Faces of Oppression, 1988, p. 270). Young makes two insightful claims that guide her 
analysis: first, that grouping individuals by race and/or gender carries more significance than 
grouping by some other individual features and second, that identifying the intentional actions by 
one or a few with centralized power is not necessary for explaining the existence and persistence 
of oppression. For Young, however, neither of these intuitions justifies believing that social 
groups are always homogenous and static. 
According to the first intuition, grouping individuals based on race, gender, class, 
religion, and the like in explaining social inequalities carries more significance than some other 
shared attributes, like the model of car or favorite color. For instance, claims about being 
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working class involve information that goes beyond aggregating the characteristics of individuals 
who fall under a certain income bracket. Nor does being grouped as working class resemble a 
formal association of independently formed individuals who join a group. The difference, Young 
argues, is that some social groups maintain a mutual relationship with individuals. Young spells 
out a mutual dependency between individuals and groups that is a result of the interdependence 
and malleability of individuals and their attributes. Such interdependence and malleability is 
evident in a variety of ways in her explanation of oppression. For instance, when it comes to 
group identities, Young states that “a person’s identity is defined in relation to how others 
identify him or her, and they do so in terms of groups which always already have specific 
attributes, stereotypes, and norms associated with them, in reference to which a person’s identity 
will be formed” (Young, 1988, p. 274).  
The idea of mutual dependency does not sit well with most dominant accounts of social 
explanation. If groups and individuals are mutually dependent, then contrary to the basic 
commitments of most individualistic explanatory frameworks, groups are distinct entities with 
causal relevance to social explanation. Thus, accepting the mutual dependence of individuals and 
groups has distinctive ontological and methodological implications. For instance, the idea that 
groups are distinct entities is an ontological deviation from any individualistic explanatory 
framework. Yet Young shows that we have good reason to tolerate such a deviation. She argues 
that explaining oppression requires us to recognize that not only do individuals constitute groups 
but, in a sense, groups also constitute individuals. In Young’s words, “A subject’s particular 
sense of history, sense of identity, affinity, and separateness, even the person’s mode of 
reasoning, evaluating, and expressing feeling are constituted at least partly by her or his group 
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affinities” (Young, 1988, p. 273).5 Groups that are mutually dependent on their individual 
members have “emergent” properties in its strong sense. Such groups are distinct from the 
aggregate of individual members because they have novel properties that are not identical with 
an aggregation of independent and inflexible attributes of generic individuals. I elaborate this 
strong form of emergence shortly.  
Accepting a mutual dependence between individuals and groups also has methodological 
implications. It implies that groups and the description of their features can be relevant and even 
indispensable to the causal explanation of a social phenomenon. Therefore, grouping based on 
race, gender, and the like is not only justified but also necessary in some cases to explain social 
inequalities. Thus, it is no wonder that social inequalities seem like pseudo problems when we 
categorically dismiss information about group affiliations in social explanation. In fact, the 
causal relevance of group descriptions is an important point of departure for individualistic 
accounts of explanation.6 For instance, methodological individualists deny the legitimacy of such 
higher/group level causal explanation and any form of mutual dependence all together.  
For methodological individualism, denying the relevance of group descriptions to causal 
explanation is a problem. In fact, the research strategies of methodological individualism are 
inapplicable to a wide range of macro social phenomena, such as power and economic crisis. 
However, the non-reductive alternative to methodological individualism does not fare any better. 
Non-reductive individualism remains committed to individuals as the primary causal actors in 
the social world but argues that sometimes group descriptions are necessary for causal 
 
5 In a broader sense, individuals’ identities and even their cognitive and physical capacities are shaped by social 
practices. As McGeer (2019) puts it, “Human beings are able to acquire new cognitive capacities because our more 
basic capacities are open to being ‘augmented and transformed’ through the acquisition of communally share and 
enacted cultural practices” (p. 49). However, these cultural practices are normatively regulated in the sense that the 
tools or routes to acquiring some capacities. For instance, some of the practices are assumed to be “impossible” or 
“unnatural” for certain groups of people. 
6 For instance, it distinguishes methodological and non-reductive explanation. 
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explanation. Non-reductive individualists’ response to individualistic challenges has weaknesses 
that lead to downstream problems when applied to real-world issues. In this chapter, I discuss the 
weakness of such responses and use the broken window theory of policing as an example of such 
downstream problems.   
2. Background 
The debate between methodological individualism and holism in the philosophy of social 
sciences includes a variety of individualistic and holistic claims with very different ontological, 
epistemological, and explanatory commitments. Methodological individualism is the view that 
social entities/properties/explanations are reducible to individual-level counterparts. Holism is 
best understood as a response to this view. An important class of holist responses to 
methodological individualism takes issue with the reducibility of social to individual properties 
to show that social explanations are not reducible to individual explanations.  
The holist idea is that if social properties are not identical to individual properties then 
they are indispensable from social explanation and, more importantly, they are causally effective. 
The challenge for these arguments is to show that social properties are causally effective without 
denying the metaphysical priority of the individuals in the social world. Thus, the arguments in 
favor of social explanatory holism or the causally effective social properties have two main 
tenets: supervenience individualism and the non-identity relationship between social and 
individual properties. Supervenience individualism is rarely contested in this particular debate. 
Negating the identity of social and individual properties (i.e., negating the “property identity 
thesis”) is often the focus of holistic arguments.  
 Since this literature involves a lot of jargon, let me lay out below the central terms and 
theses at issue in the following discussion, and their definitions. 
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Supervenience individualism: Individuals and their attributes exhaust and determine the 
social world. (If a set of social properties supervenes upon a set of individual properties, 
there can be no difference in the social properties without some difference in the 
individual properties.) 
 
Property Identity Thesis: Social properties are identical to some individual-level 
property.  
 
Reductionism/ Methodological Individualism: If the supervenience and property 
identity theses are true, then every social explanation is reducible to individual 
explanation.  
 
Holistic Causal Explanation: Although supervenience is true, the property identity 
thesis is not. Therefore, social properties are not indispensable form of social explanation.  
 
My goal in this chapter is to favor one class of arguments for causal explanatory holism 
over another based on how effectively they can negate the identity thesis. The common core of 
arguments for causal explanatory holism is that although the social world is composed of 
individuals and no mysterious supernatural elements (supervenience individualism), social 
properties are not identical to individual properties (rejection of property identity thesis). The 
distinguishing factor among such arguments is the reason behind the non-identity of social and 
individual properties. A very influential and widely accepted class of arguments, which I call 
multiple realizability (MR) arguments, deny the property identity thesis by making the claim that 
since social properties are multiply realizable, they are not identical to individual properties. 
However, I will favor a somewhat unsung alternative that relies on the concept of emergence to 
deny the property identity thesis. I ground this alternative on the emergence argument.   
MR Arguments: Social properties are multiply realizable by individual properties and 
therefore social and individual properties are not identical.  
 
Emergence Arguments: Social properties are not identical to individual properties 




In denying the identity thesis, the tricky point about MR arguments is that MR properties 
cannot be identical either to individual properties or to a disjunction of such properties. The 
importance of this point is most salient to the definition of social properties and to the 
justification for grouping individual realizations under a social kind. By focusing on the 
justification for grouping social properties, I show that MR arguments face a dilemma. If they 
rely on causally relevant justifications for grouping, they will run into the so-called exclusion 
problem7, and if they allow non-causal justifications for grouping social properties, the social 
properties will lack any causal power. I argue that even the “difference-making” approach to 
causation cannot resolve this dilemma.  
The Grouping Justification Dilemma:  
First Horn: If causally relevant properties are what justify grouping individuals together, 
then we run into the exclusion problem. 
Second Horn: If things other than causally relevant properties justify grouping 
individuals together, then social properties will lack causal power.   
 
The dilemma for grouping justification might sound like a metaphysical disagreement 
that not very many need to worry about. However, on the one hand, explaining many social 
problems including different social inequalities demand grouping individuals based on certain 
social categories, like race, gender, disability status, class, etc. On the other, hasty 
generalizations that seek minimal criteria for common features that justify grouping individuals 
based on some shared properties lead to serious problems with normative significance. In what 
follows, I argue that without an adequate response to the grouping justification dilemma, we can 
end up with such hasty generalization with adverse downstream consequences. Such 
 
7 I will explain this problem shortly, but the gist of the problem is that if an individual property is causally sufficient 
for an effect, then a social property cannot be the cause of the same effect. In sum, the causally sufficient individual 
property excludes the causal relevancy of the social property.  
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generalizations assume homogenous and static groups in which the interdependence and 
malleability of members is irrelevant to the causal explanation of the phenomenon at the 
aggregate level.  
3. Points of Agreement 
As I mentioned in the previous section, endorsing causal explanatory holism often 
requires endorsing supervenience individualism and rejecting the property identity thesis. 
Although these endorsements seem abstract and far away from real applications, it is important 
to note that they come from the concerns of researchers in fields like economics who see the 
limitations and advantages of such endorsements. For instance, the success of micro-reduction 
strategies at least partially explains the resistance to holistic approaches to explanation (Kim, 
1984) (Bickle, 2010). Similarly, the realization that these strategies are not enough to explain the 
success of science was and is an important issue to address. Kenneth J. Arrow, a game theorist, 
famously criticizes the assumption in economics that “in principle the behavior we explain and 
the policies that we propose are explicable in terms of individuals, not of other social categories” 
(Arrow, 1994, p. 1). 
Strict reductionistic expectations even in fields that are the most successful in their 
micro-reduction strategies are problematic. According to Arrow, the assumption that all social 
phenomena is explicable in terms of individuals and their attributes leads to the unreasonable 
expectation that “all explanations must run in terms of the actions and reactions of individuals” 
(p.1). However, Arrow contends that “social categories are in fact used in economic analysis all 
the time and that they appear to be absolute necessities of the analysis, not just figures of speech 
that can be eliminated if need be” (p.1). More importantly, as Arrow suggests and shows in his 
own work, even the closest realization of individualism in economic theory, namely game 
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theory, relies on social categories to produce successful explanations.8 Indeed, these concerns 
have been magnified by a new wave of game theorists who argue that analyzing networks and 
complex social systems without relying on social proprieties is a hopeless endeavor (Epstein, 
1999).  
Although the debate between individualism and holism in social sciences is not settled, 
with some qualifications all sides of the debate agree on a few points. Supervenience 
individualism is one of those points that has been immune to criticism. In fact, supervenience 
was originally a way for philosophers to admit the priority of individuals over non-individuals 
without making any further reductive claims. It refers to the idea that individuals can exhaust and 
determine the social world (Kincaid, 1986). This determination relationship is not necessarily 
causal, it can be a metaphysical necessity and can involve individuals’ relations and their 
environment in some interpretations. But the most important implication is that if a set of social 
properties supervenes upon a set of individual properties, there can be no difference in the social 
properties without some difference in the individual properties.  
Unlike supervenience, the property identity thesis is a key point of disagreement. The 
social and individual properties are identical in the sense that they have the same extension. In 
other words, the realizations of two identical properties are the same and grouped together 
because of the characteristics that are relevant to those properties. Thus, such realizations need 
not be exactly like one another in all respects. For example, the social properties that group 
individuals in terms of their income level are identical to their individual-level properties. For 
instance, low-income individuals are often grouped together because of their actual individual-
 
8 Arrow argues that it is difficult to define competitive equilibrium as the outcome s of a non-cooperative game. But 
it is not hard to construct such a game with such an outcome. (p. 4) 
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level income. But this identity relationship is not in place when we talk about low-income 
communities because things other than individuals’ actual income is relevant to their 
membership to the community. For instance, a high-/middle-income individual might be a 
member of a low-income community because of her strong familial ties and shared concerns, 
beliefs, etc.  
Various examples and fallacies occur when the property identity thesis is assumed 
without qualification. For instance, we know that an individual’s lower income is highly 
correlated with a higher chance of heart disease. If, regarding the relationship between heart 
disease and income, the individual and social properties were identical, then by knowing the 
individuals’ income and its effect on risk for heart disease one could conclude that wealthier 
nations, controlling for the distribution of income, have a lower rate of heart disease. However, 
empirical evidence indicates that wealthier nations have a higher rate of heart disease comparing 
to nations with a lower average income. This example shows how the property of belonging to 
low-income groups at the individual, community, and national levels are not identical. However, 
whether this kind of non-identity demands a distinct framework of explanation is highly 
contested. In fact, even if one agrees that holism is the right response to address such non-
identity, more needs to be said about the metaphysical and methodological commitments of a 
proper holistic approach that can distinguish such non-identity and avoid the relevant fallacies.9  
4. MR Arguments and Grouping Justification 
MR arguments rely on the multiple realizability thesis to reject the identity of social and 
individual properties. The concepts of supervenience and MR are well-known to many 
philosophers of social science who advocate some form of social explanatory holism (Currie 
 
9 Examples of such fallacies are the atomistic and ecological fallacies.  
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1984; Kincaid 1997; Mellor 1982; MacDonald and Pettit 1981; Pettit 1993). The prevalence of 
MR arguments in the philosophy of social science is at least partially explainable by a consensus 
in the philosophy of mind that the MR thesis successfully shows that the mental is not reducible 
to the physical (see for example, Sawyer, 2002; Kincaid, 2986; and List & Spiekermann, 2013). 
According to the MR argument in the philosophy of mind, all mental properties are MR and all 
MR properties are non-identical to individual properties; therefore, the property identity thesis is 
false (see Fodor, 1974; Putnam, 1967). Similarly, in the philosophy of social sciences, the 
general assumptions are that social properties are MR at the individual level and that MR 
properties are not identical to their individual level10 physical realizations (see Sawyer, 2002; 
Kincaid, 1986; List and Spiekermann, 2013). 
MR Thesis: a social property is MR if and only if it can be realized by many distinct 
individual properties.  
MR Argument Reconstructed: 
P1. Some social properties are MR.  
 
P2. MR thesis (a social property is MR if and only if it can be realized by many distinct 
individual properties).  
P3. A social property that is MR, given that it is realizable by distinct kinds of individual 
realizers, is not identical to any individual property/kind.  
Conclusion: The Property Identity thesis is not always true.  
 
According to the MR thesis, a social kind/type/property, say “the working class”, can be 
realized by many distinct individual kinds/types/properties. Thus, at least two type/kind distinct 
realizers are necessary for a social property to be MR. In other words, if a social property is 
 
10 Kincaid, 1997, p. 17-20. Similarly, Sawyer states that “For example, the property of ‘being a church’ can be 
realized by a wide range of organizational structures, cultural practices, and individual beliefs and dispositions. The 
same is true of properties such as ‘being a family,’ ‘being an organization,’ and ‘being an institution.’ Microsocial 
properties are no less multiply realizable: examples include ‘being an argument,’ ‘being a conversation,’ and ‘being 
an act of discrimination.’” (2002, p. 547) 
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realizable by two or even an infinite number of realizers that all belong to the same kind, that 
property is not MR. Obviously, whether or not the individual realizers belong to the same 
kind/type or not is dependent on the way we define kinds or types. Often the assumption is that a 
group of entities/events/processes fall under a shared property, a kind, or a type because of their 
shared causal powers or their relevancy to an explanation.11 That is to say, the justification for 
grouping distinct realizers under a kind often has to do with their causal power or their relevancy 
to the desired explanation.  
 The belonging of the realizers to the same kind/type also depends on the way we define 
identity and dissimilarity. The common understanding is that two properties that group the same 
set of realizers because of their same causal power or role in explanation are identical. Two 
properties are distinct when they do not. In sum, the definition of MR properties and whether 
there exists a property that is MR is highly dependent on the justification for grouping different 
realizers or properties under a single property/type/kind. A social property is MR when its 
realizers belong to type distinct individual properties but can be justifiably grouped together 
under a single social property (see Shapiro, 2000; Polger & Shapiro, 2016; and Couch, 2004).  
Recognizing the role of grouping justification helps to see why not all social properties 
are MR. In fact, some paradigmatic examples of MR thesis are not obviously MR when the 
justifications for their groupings are not taken for granted. For instance, List and Spiekermann 
(2013) follow Fodor (1974) who argues that “owning 20 dollars” is MR since it can be realized 
by many distinct realizers, such as owning coins, dollar bills, credit in the bank, etc. The idea is 
that although the property of being in a certain contractual relationship with others can be 
 
11 For more information about how types or kinds do or should be defined see Polger & Shapiro (2016), Kim (1993), 
and Couch (2004).  
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identical to or defined in terms of the property of owning 20 dollars, neither properties are 
identical to any of their realizations such as having coins or dollar bills in one's pocket. In other 
words, the justification for grouping together the individual realizers such as having coins or 
dollar bills in one’s pocket is the higher-level contractual relationship and not the properties of 
the individual realizations. The reason is that owning 20 dollars can be realized by an infinite 
number of distinct realizers that have nothing in common that justifies their grouping under one 
kind. In other words, the realizers of “owning 20 dollars” are not type distinct. However, if the 
realizers are not type distinct, their justification for grouping is identical to the contractual 
relationship. Thus, “owning 20 dollars” is not MR.12  The idea is that if the material or shape of 
coins and dollar bills are causally irrelevant for what they can do, then they do not belong to 
distinct kinds of realization.13  
The grouping justifications also determine whether a social property is reducible/identical 
to individual properties. It is helpful to distinguish a vertical and a horizontal condition for 
identity. The vertical condition for identity/non-identity concerns properties at two different 
levels when one level supervenes on the other, like the supervenience of social on individual 
properties. The horizontal condition for identity/non-identity concerns two or more properties at 
the same level without any supervenience relation. Two properties are vertically identical when 
the justification for grouping at the lower level groups the same realizers as the justification for 
 
12 Similar to the property of owning 20 dollars, many statistical properties are not automatically MR just because 
they can have distinct realizers. For statistical and aggregate properties to be MR, there should be at least two 
distinct kinds of individual realizers that their grouping is explanatorily relevant to the phenomenon of interest. Thus 
examples like unemployment rate are not automatically MR in the way that is portrayed in the literature in social 
explanation just in virtue of having different distributions or realizers if there is no reason to believe that the 
distribution or the actual realizers are causally relevant. For instance, in support of the multiple realizability of 
unemployment, List and Menzies (2013) simply invite us to “Think of all the different possible distributions of jobs 
and job-seekers that would correspond to an unemployment rate of 8%” (p. 36). However, the relevant question to 
ask is whether those possible distributions create distinct kinds of unemployment or realizers for unemployment, or 
even distribution is relevant for the purposes that unemployment is used. 
13 For more on this see Shapiro (2007).  
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grouping at the higher level. Failing to show that there are at least two distinct and relevant 
grouping justification for individual realizers implies that the social and individual properties are 
identical. For instance, the grouping of individuals at the social level and by their income can be 
identical if it is done just for the purpose of, for example, understanding what portion of the 
population earns less than a threshold level. Similarly, when “low income” as a property is 
linked to the risk for cardiovascular disease, the social and individual justification for grouping is 
one and the same because low income is the only causally relevant property. 
Two properties are horizontally identical when they have the same justification for 
grouping at two levels. Failing to show that there are at least two type-distinct realizations of a 
given social property in fact belong to one social kind implies that the social property is 
reducible to individual properties, in a local sense. In other words, two distinct kinds of 
individual realizations that are in fact distinct in a causally relative sense require some 
independent justification for grouping under a single social property. For instance, an 
independent justification for grouping is necessary if one groups together the civil rights protests 
in the 1960s with other kinds of disorderly behavior such as dealing drugs, loitering, and 
prostitution.14 Even if the protests are in fact breaking the order in some sense, they have distinct 
mechanisms, intentions, causes, and even level of endorsement. Thus, at best, a notion of 
disorder that covers all forms of behavior mentioned above is a disjunctive kind without a further 
justification for why they in fact belong to the same group.  
 
14 I will discuss this example more later in this paper. But the advocates of the broken window theory of policing 
suggest something similar by arguing that the role of police is to minimize any kind of disorderly behavior to keep 
neighborhoods safe. For instance, Jeffery Walker (2011) states that “In the l960s, when urban riots were a major 
problem, social scientists began to explore carefully the order maintenance function of the police, and to suggest 
ways of improving it—not to make streets safer (its original function) but to reduce the incidence of mass violence” 
(p. 173).  
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A successful rejection of the property identity thesis cannot allow disjunctive kinds 
because they are locally reducible. Disjunctive kinds are the ones that are horizontally distinct 
both at the individual level and social level. Thus, even if we name the disjunction of the social 
properties in the same way, like calling protesting for civil rights and loitering “disorder”, the 
social properties and their causal relations remain locally reducible. The problem is that distinct 
lower level properties with distinct causal mechanisms relevant to a causal explanation need 
some further justification for grouping under the higher-level property.  
In sum, the core problem with the MR argument is that it is tricky to find social 
properties that are not disjunctive but have distinct kinds of realizers. In other words, types or 
kinds are a bundle of explanatorily relevant properties. Thus, for a causal explanation at the 
social level, individual properties that are not causally effective cannot create distinct causal 
kinds or types. Without distinct types, a social property cannot be MR. With distinct types, the 
social property is just a disjunction of two irrelevant properties. In this case, not only does 
grouping these distinct kinds require some independent justification, but also the social property 
is locally reducible to individual properties. Thus, for MR properties to be possible and for us to 
reject the identity thesis, the individual realizers need to be type-distinct and the social property 
should be type-identical. There should be some independent reason for grouping CH1 and CH2 






Figure 1. On the left, you can see a disjunctive kind with horizontally distinct social properties 
as well as individual properties. Thus, the social property CH1 and individual property CH2. On 
the right, you can see an MR property that is horizontally distinct at the individual level but not 
at the social level. Thus, the social property and individual properties are vertically non-
identical.  
5. The Grouping Justification Dilemma 
The success of MR arguments and the plausibility of MR thesis is dependent on the way 
we justify the grouping of realizers under the same or distinct kinds of properties. If we avoid 
taking for granted such justifications, the MR arguments face a dilemma that summarizes the 
main problems with MR arguments. According to this dilemma, the justification for grouping 
under a social property can be causal or non-causal and either way, the implications will be 
implausible. On the one hand, if grouping justification for a social property is causal, then 
denying the identity relationship between social and individual level properties implies that a 
given effect has more than one sufficient cause, which is counterintuitive if we exclude 
overdetermination cases. More importantly, if we accept that the individuals and their actions are 
causally sufficient for explaining the social world, then it seems obvious that social properties 
lack any causal power. On the other hand, if the grouping justification for a social property is 
non-causal, then either the social property will be identical to individual properties, or there is a 
need for an independent reason that explains why non-causally grouped realizers all produce the 
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given effect. More importantly, MR arguments often provide a circular logic instead of an 
independent reason to justify such groupings.  
 A justification for grouping under a social property is causal when the members of the 
group, in virtue of a shared trait, can make a difference in an effect. For instance, the grouping of 
lower-income individuals is causal when, in virtue of their low income, these individuals have a 
higher risk of cardiovascular disease. However, there are a few risk factors that explain the 
higher rate of heart problems, say diet and stress. For the sake of simplicity, I assume only these 
two factors are causally relevant and each is causally sufficient for a higher rate of heart disease. 
Thus, individuals can be grouped together in virtue of their dietary habits, or in virtue of their 
overall stress level. Since each of these groupings are sufficient for the increase in occurrence of 
heart disease, then it seems plausible to divide individuals based on the causal mechanisms that 
bring about their higher risk of heart disease. In other words, grouping individuals based on their 
income leads to a disjunctive social kind that is reducible to two distinct kinds.  
 Individuals' income on its own cannot be the risk factor for heart disease because as I 
mentioned in the previous sections, grouping individuals based on their income level has the 
same extension and the same justification for grouping at the social level. But talking about 
“low-income communities” for instance involves more than individuals with low income and is 
not easily reducible. Thus, one might say low-income at the community level is the cause of the 
higher risk of cardiovascular disease in that community or for individuals who live in that 
community. However, according to the first horn of the dilemma, if it is in fact possible for the 
community income to be a distinct causally relevant grouping of individual causes, then we have 
two distinct and sufficient causes for the effect. For instance, at the individual level, one cause is 
membership of low-income community and another cause is high-stress level. Both causes are 
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sufficient to bring about the effect. The problem is since one causally sufficient reason is enough 
and it is already given at the individual level, then the membership of the community becomes 
irrelevant. The same goes for individuals who have unhealthy diets. Therefore, the social 
property lacks any causal role in the explanation.  
According to the second horn of the dilemma, if individuals are grouped under a social 
property for non-causal reasons, then the social property is causally irrelevant. For instance, the 
justification for grouping individuals who have poor diet and higher stress can be the efficiency 
in talking about individuals who have one of the two conditions or any other causally irrelevant 
reason. Then, instead of the low-income community as an explanatory variable, we could just 
have a disjunction of diet and stress. In this case, the low-income community as a property is 
locally reducible to groups of individuals who have a bad diet and individuals who have high 
stress. However, I already showed that disjunctive properties are locally reducible. Also, one 
might argue that there are two kinds of heart disease and each corresponds to the mechanism by 
which it is induced: one that is induced by bad diet and another that is induced by stress. Thus, 
there are two causal relations and for a given individual we can distinguish which kind of heart 
disease is in effect.  
Causally irrelevant grouping justifications deprive social properties of causal explanatory 
relevance. Such a grouping justification for a social property implies that it is a disjunctive kind. 
Such a disjunctive social property not only is locally reducible, but also fails to maintain causal 
relation with other properties under the manipulation of the cause and effects. For instance, if 
somehow the income level of a given community increases, although the heart-related problems 
due to stress might go down, the problems due to diet might remain unchanged or even increase. 
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Higher consumption of and access to food with saturated fat and added sugar can be the culprit 
in this hypothetical case.  
The problem in the first horn of the dilemma is best described by Jeagwon Kim (2005) as 
the exclusion argument. Kim argues that endorsing supervenience individualism and the causal 
closure of individuals15 implies that there is an individual-level16 property that is causally 
sufficient for the existence of any social property.17  Thus, since an effect cannot have two 
distinct causes, the individual-level property excludes the social property from being causally 
effective.18  This argument can also be summarized in terms of three premises Invalid source 
specified.. The first premise is just supervenience individualism, which is compatible with the 
presumptions of MR arguments. The second premise is the closure principle, which indicates 
that every social-level effect has an individual-level cause. The third and final premise is the 
exclusion principle, according to which an effect cannot have two distinct and non-identical 
causes that are both sufficient for its occurrence (excluding over-determination cases).  
MR arguments have a circular logic in responding to the second horn of the dilemma. For 
instance, Fodor (1974) rejects the property identity thesis by distinguishing nomic kinds and 
disjunctive (non-)kinds. In other words, he suggests that the justification for grouping individual 
 
15 The idea is that the physical world is causally enough for the occurrences of all phenomena. 
16 In Kim’s version of this argument, the comparison is between mental and physical not between social and 
individual. But in the literature on social explanation, often the mental is replaced by social and the physical by 
individual. If one endorses that individuals are the only actors in the social world the argument will work, but this is 
not an obvious and easy endorsement. However, since the advocates of MR arguments in social explanation share 
this endorsement, the grouping justification dilemma is valid.  
17 The original argument by Kim was introduced in the philosophy of mind. The concern is to determine whether the 
mind is anything above and beyond neurological and physical. The idea is that causal relationships only exist among 
physical entities, so thinking that the mind can be causally efficient is not justified. In the parallel conversation in the 
philosophy of social sciences, the concern is whether individuals are the only causally effective components of the 
social world. Although many who engage with the former discussion might disagree with the latter, I follow the way 
that this conversation is set up in the methodological individualism and holism debate, by which physical is replaced 
by individual and mental by social.  
18 The original form of this argument is that if a lower level property is causally sufficient for the effect to happen, 
then a higher level property that supervenes on the lower level property cannot be the cause. 
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properties under a social property has to do with the law-like generalizations in which the social 
property can appear. According to Fodor, pain is a nomic kind since it appears in a law-like 
predicate while the disjunction of distinct neural states that realize pain cannot have a law 
because they create a disjunctive kind. However, as Kim (1998) argues, this line of reasoning 
smacks of circularity: “‘Q->R’ is not a law because a non-kind, Q, occurs in it, and Q is a non-
kind because it cannot occur in a law and ‘Q->R’ in particular is not a law” (Kim, 1992, p. 10). 
In other words, the justification for grouping cannot be the existence under a law-like 
generalization because the requirement for the generalization to be valid is a solid justification 
for grouping.  
The grouping justification dilemma is another way of talking about old problems with 
MR arguments. However, there are new arguments that rely on MR thesis to support causal 
explanatory holism and claim that they are immune to these decades’ old problems. In what 
follows, I consider one of such arguments that claim a difference-making approach to causation 
can resolve the first horn of the grouping justification dilemma. I explain how this argument 
works and argue that grouping justification remains a main issue even when causation is 
understood in a difference making sense. In fact, the difference making approach to MR 
arguments can successfully address neither of the two horns of the grouping justification 
dilemma.  
6. The Difference-Making Approach to MR Arguments  
List and Spiekermann argue that MR arguments can successfully respond to the exclusion 
argument by replacing the “mechanism-based approaches” to causation with a difference-making 
approach. The difference-making approach to causation interprets causal claims as claims about 
the relationship between variables. Thus, if A causes B, then changing the values of A should 
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lead to a change in variable B.19 Binary variables20 are often used to represent the presence and 
absence of properties at different levels.  But the scope of the difference-making approach is not 
limited to binaries. According to List and Spiekermann, the difference-making approach avoids 
the mechanism or process talk and focuses on the “regularities that certain events or event types 
stand.” (p. 636). A causal relationship in the difference making account is best understood as 
“robust regularities between certain variables or properties” (p. 636). In other words, the robust 
regularities occur when the property C (or the cause property) systematically makes a difference 
to E (or the effect property). Two conditions are necessary for a robust regularity: a positive 
tracking condition, which implies that in closest possible worlds, if C occurs then E occurs, and a 
negative tracking condition, which implies that without C, there will be no E. 
List and Spiekermann argue that the exclusion argument is flawed since “when causation 
is understood as difference-making….it is an empirical question whether the most systematic 
regularities in which some effect E in a social system stand can be found at the lower-level or at 
the higher-level of description” (p.630). In other words, they suggest that if we accept the 
difference-making approach to causation, then the exclusion principle is not always true. The key 
point about difference making regularities is that they are robust to variations at the lower levels. 
In other words, the difference making approach is a holistic claim as long as the MR thesis is 
true and can support the non-identity relation between the social and individual properties and 
thereby causal relations. They state the following:  
Suppose we find a robust correlation between a higher-level ‘cause’ property (e.g. the 
interest rate set by the central bank and some ‘effect’ property (e.g. inflation) in a system 
 
19 This formulation has been introduced by Woodward (2003) and used by List and Menzies (2009).  
20 Assuming that variables are binary, then the presence of A should make B be present and vice versa. 
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(here the economy). We can then ask whether the effect would continue to occur across 
variations in the lower-level realization of its putative higher-level cause. If the effect 
continues to occur under at least some such variations (other things being equal), we call 
the higher-level causal relation ‘robust to changes in its micro-realization,’ for short 
‘micro-realization robust.’ (List & Spiekermann, 2013, p. 637) 
To illustrate their point, List and Spiekermann rely on the diagram below. In the diagram, 
every point in the two-dimensional space is a possible world or possible scenario. The center 
point represents the observed data in the actual world, and the distance of every point/world from 
the center represents how far away or how different are the other possible worlds that can be 
imagined in the counterfactual scenario. Thus, the concentric circles around the center represent 
equally distanced possible worlds. The goal is to show the cause of some effect E, which 
happened in the actual world and all the closest possible worlds, represented by the innermost 
circle. As the exclusion argument suggests, there are two possible candidates for the cause of E: 
one is the higher-level property CH, and the other one is the lower-level property CL. This 
representation satisfies both supervenience and the closure principle in the exclusion argument. 





 The problem with the exclusion principle, List and Spiekermann argue, is that it leads us 
to identify the wrong property as the cause of the given effect. The higher-level property, CH, 
Figure 2, Represents List and 
Menzies example for the non-
reducibility of a higher level 
property as the cause to a lower 
level property, in a difference 
making sense.  
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leads to the effect, E, in all close possible worlds, and when it is not present, the effect is not 
present either. Thus, both the positive tracking and negative tracking conditions are satisfied. 
However, the lower-level property, CL, fails to satisfy one of the two conditions. Although the 
lower-level property, CL, exists in all close possible worlds in which the effect, E, is present, 
there exist some possible worlds in which the effect, E, is present and the lower-level property, 
CL, is not. Thus, the exclusion principle is false since even when the lower-level property, CL, is 
causally sufficient for E to exist, a distinct property, CH, can nonetheless be the cause of E in the 
difference-making sense.  
7. The Difference Making Response to the Dilemma 
The main concerns of the first horn of the grouping justification dilemma are the 
exclusion problem and the exclusion principle. List and Spiekermann reject the exclusion 
principle and thereby the exclusion argument by arguing that the proper way of thinking about 
causation is in difference-making terms. However, the problem is that the success of this 
argument is dependent on how the realizations for the cause and effect are grouped together. For 
instance, if we allow two kinds of realizers or possible worlds, one in which one kind of lower-
level cause and its corresponding effect are present and another in which the remaining kind and 
its corresponding effect coexist, then even the causation in the difference-making sense is subject 
to the exclusion argument.  
 If List and Spiekermann are right, the causally relevant justification for grouping the 
individual properties under a single social property is the robust regularity between the property 
and its effect. In other words, they introduce a new kind of causal relevancy by replacing 
sufficient cause with difference-making cause. However, that causally relevant justification in 
the difference-making sense can also exist at the lower level, which makes the social properties 
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disjunctive. In other words, lower-level properties can also have robust regularities when they 
are grouped accordingly. For instance, in Figure 2, CH seems to be just the disjunction of CL1 and 
CL2, and E is the disjunction of E1 and E2. If these disjunctions are based on causally relevant 
grouping in the difference making sense, then there is virtually no difference between difference 
making and sufficient causes in terms of grouping justifications. Although with respect to E, 
neither Cl1 nor Cl2 satisfies the negative tracking condition to be in a micro-realization robust 
regularity, with respect to E1 and E2, CL1 and CL2 are the difference-making causes, respectively. 
The cause and effect properties at the lower level, namely (Cl1, E1) and (Cl2, E2), satisfy both the 
positive and negative tracking conditions since CL1 is present in all possible worlds in which E1 
is present and CL2 is present in all possible worlds in which E2 is present. Also, neither E1 nor E2 
is present in possible worlds in which CL1 and CL2 are not.   
Any property can be a disjunctive kind if the only justification for grouping its realizers is 
a micro-realization robust regularity. Of course, there is nothing special about CL1 and CL2 in 
the way that was described in Figure 3. For instance, if we control for all the risk factors that 
explain the higher rate of cardiovascular problems and still membership in a low-income 
community is explanatorily relevant to the effect, then the unexplained part of such membership 
forms its own social property and micro-realization robust causal relationship. Thus, all that is 
needed to show that the difference-making cause happens at the lower level is one causally 
sufficient lower-level property that explains a subset of the effects. In these situations, even 
according to the modified version of the exclusion principle that List and Spiekermann use, it is 




Figure 3. Micro-realization robust causal regularities can be reducible to 
lower-level regularities if higher level properties are disjunctive.  
The exclusion principle indicates that “If a lower-level property C is the cause of E, no 
distinct higher-level property C* that supervenes on C can also be a cause of E” (p.23). 
However, I showed that if the only justification for grouping the properties is the robust 
regularity between the cause and effect, then for any CH and CL1 there will be a 
CL*={CL2…CLi}with robust regularities if we allow E to be the disjunction of E1…Ei. Also, the 
supervenience individualism and causal closure principles imply that any CH is equal to the 
disjunction of CL1…CLi that each have a micro-realization robust regularity with their 
corresponding E1…Ei. Therefore, the difference-making approach to causation faces a similar 
problem with any other approach to MR argument. The social properties seem to be redundant or 
causally ineffective if the effect(s) are explained by more than one non-identical property with 
causally relevant grouping justifications. In other words, the difference-making approach fails to 





According to the second horn of the dilemma and given the necessity for grouping 
justification, a general problem with MR is that the non-identity of social and individual 
properties can automatically deprive the social properties of any causal power. Given that kinds 
or properties are determined by their causal power and that such power is inherited from 
individual realizations, the non-identity of social and individual properties means that social 
properties do not have any causal power.  The only way that social properties can maintain 
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causal power is by the identity relationship between social and individual-level properties being 
endorsed. This identity is often assumed to be local and domain-specific and implies that the 
grouping of distinct individual properties under the social property lacks proper justification. 
This argument can be reconstructed by the following premises.  
P1. The units of analysis, which can be individual- or social-level entities, events, and 
processes, fall under a kind or share a property, insofar as they have similar causal 
powers.  
P2. The causal power of each instance of a social property is identical21 to the causal 
power of its individual-level realizations.22  
P3. Social properties are MR; therefore, social properties are not identical to any of their 
individual-level realizations.  
Conclusion: social properties do not have causal power.  
 
As I mentioned earlier in this section, the key move of the difference-making approach to 
MR is to distinguish the sufficient cause from the difference-making cause. For instance, List 
and Spiekermann (2013), following List and Menzies (2009), argue that although P1 and P2 are 
true, the causal power of each instance of social property in the difference-making sense is not 
identical to the causal power of its individual-level realizations (P4). That is so because the 
individual-level realizations do not satisfy the negative tracking conditions. Thus, the fact that 
social properties are MR and not identical to individual-level properties no longer implies that 
social properties cannot be causally effective. Indeed, social properties can have social power in 
 
21 Kim (1992) defines something very similar to this premise as the principle of causal individuation of kinds.  
22 Kim (1992) calls something very similar to this premise the causal inheritance principle. 
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the difference-making sense. However, the difference-making approach fails to provide an 
independent reason that justifies grouping the individual-level realizations under a social 
property.  
P4. The causal power in the difference-making sense of each instance of a social property 
is NOT identical to the causal power in the difference-making sense of its individual-
level realizations. (The negative tracking condition is not met by the lower-level 
properties.) 
Conclusion: Given P1-P4, social properties do have causal power in the difference-
making sense.  
In sum, similarity is a core idea for the notion of property or kinds of properties and is 
defined in terms of the causal power or the causal relationship between two properties. 
Moreover, any property can be re-described as a disjunction or conjunction of other properties. 
Thus, whether a property like E is disjunctive or not does not follow from the mere fact that E is 
a property or even a social property. Therefore, for the argument above to be valid, the social 
properties that stand as the cause and the effect cannot be disjunctive. That is to say that CH 
cannot be simply the disjunction of CL1 and CL2 and E cannot be the disjunction of E1 and E2. 
If they are disjunctive, then the micro-realization robust regularity between them is easily 
reducible to the robust regularities at the individual/lower level. To show that CH is not a 
disjunctive kind, however, the difference-making approach to MR arguments needs an 
independent reason. Manipulation is often a good reason to confirm that a given social property 
is not disjunctive. However, causation in the difference-making sense and its requirements are 
not successful under manipulations that aim to support the justification for grouping. I provide an 
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example in the next section that illustrates the weakness of the difference-making approach 
under manipulations that test the grouping justification.    
8. When Is Holistic Social Explanation Necessary? 
In what follows, I discuss an example of a group of studies that led to the broken window 
theory of policing in the United States. My goal by discussing this example is to highlight the 
importance of the grouping justification problem. Thus, first, I lay out the conditions that List 
and Spiekermann, based on their difference making approach, provide for the cases that mandate 
a holistic causal explanation. I use the broken window theory of policing to show that a micro-
realization robust regularity between two properties on its own does not justify grouping distinct 
realizers under a social property. More broadly, my goal is to show that like the reductionist 
approach to explanation that underlines and supports the research strategy of micro-reduction in 
modern theoretical science,23  the dominance of MR arguments underlies and supports some 
research strategies and creates its own blind spots.  
Based on their difference-making account of causation, List and Spiekermann offer three 
conditions for cases that mandate a holistic causal explanation: (i) multiple levels of description, 
(ii) multiple realizability of higher-level properties, and (iii) a micro-realization robust causal 
relationship. According to List and Spiekermann, the first condition is almost always met by 
social systems or phenomena. The requirement for grouping the higher-level properties is 
partially justified “many configurations of lower-level properties can instantiate the same higher-
level properties” (p. 639). Of course, the mere instantiation by different configurations of lower-
level properties is inadequate. But the final condition completes the justification for grouping, 
although List and Spiekermann do not frame it that way. The final condition is the presence of a 
 
23 You can find a very similar formulation in Kim’s (1984) work.  
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micro-realization robust causal relationship between the multiply realizable properties. A higher-
level property is micro-realization robust in a “difference-making cause” when it satisfies both 
the positive tracking and negative tracking conditions. In general, a causal relation is “micro-
realization robust: “if the effect property would continue to occur under at least some variations 
in the lower-level realization of its putative cause” (p. 639).  
 The broken window theory of policing shows that the existence of a micro-realization 
robust regularity cannot show that a social property is not disjunctive. The broken window 
theory of policing taps into a “folk wisdom,” namely that “serious street crime flourishes in areas 
in which disorderly behavior goes unchecked” (Wilson & Kelling, 1982, p. 9). This theory is 
built on a study that focuses on the social causes of vandalism and on other studies about the 
effect of the “Foot-Patrol Project” that helped cities “take police officers out of their patrol cars 
and assign them to walking beats” (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). The idea behind this theory of 
policing is that not only is there a link between disorder and crime but bringing back order to 
communities will also reduce the crime rate in those communities. The conclusion is police 
departments can and should oversee order maintenance, which started a long and politically 
laden history of efforts by police departments to “clean up cities” (Wilson & Kelling, 1982).  
The main thesis of the broken window thesis is powerful and simple: “once disorder 
begins, it doesn’t matter what the neighborhood is, things can begin to get out of control” 
(Wilson & Kelling, 1982). In other words, at the social/higher/community level, a disorderly 
community has a high crime rate, and no information about the kind of crime or individual or 
neighborhood characteristics would undermine such a link.24  The logical implication of this idea 
 
24 In an article in the Atlantic, Wilson and Kelling (1982) state “…at the community level, disorder and crime are 
usually inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence. Social psychologists and police officers tend to 
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is that order is linked to low crime rates and safety, which was supported by observations of 
positive instances.25 The researchers also did a follow-up study that showed that neighborhoods 
with a sharp increase in misdemeanor arrests had a sharp decline in their crime rate. 26 Thus, the 
link between disorder and crime satisfies the positive and negative tracking conditions. 
The broken window thesis suggests that disorder causes crime in a difference-making 
sense. Wherever disorderly behavior is common, the crime rate is high, and wherever the 
disorderly behavior is uncommon, the crime rate is low. However, critics of this thesis argue that 
the grouping of distinct features with problems of communities under disorder and crime was a 
significant mistake. For instance, criminologists argue that the broken window thesis grouped 
trivial “misbehavior” together with the early signs of much more serious problems all under 
“disorder” as a social property. This problem is exacerbated with MR assumptions, because 
“Definitions about what is orderly or disorderly or needs to be ticketed, etc. are often loaded—
racially loaded, culturally loaded, politically loaded” (Harcourt, 2005). Thus, the consequence of 
such bias in the definition of disorder means, in practice, an excuse for harassing and disturbing 
neighborhoods with a high concentration of poverty and/or immigrants. The harassment lowered 
the collaboration of these communities27 with the police and lead to many other problematic 
consequences. 
 
agree that if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken. 
This is as true in nice neighborhoods as in rundown ones”.  
25 Wilson and Kelling (1982) state that “In some station, it was found that as many as 1 in 10 people who were not 
paying the fare were either wanted on a warrant for a felony or were carrying an illegal weapon. Not all fare beaters 
were criminals, but a lot of criminals were fare beaters. It turns out that serious criminals are pretty busy. They 
commit minor offenses as well as major offenses.” 
26 This study is no longer well supported, mostly due to some other studies that show that cities like LA also had, 
with no change in their policing, a sharp decline in their crime rates around the same time. 
27 A study by Jacinta & Brunson (2010) supports this point.  
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Even at the level of social scientific studies, the grouping of heterogeneously disjunctive 
kinds is problematic. For instance, many studies show that although there is a direct relationship 
between disorder and a crime like robbery, the rates of homicide or predatory crimes are better 
explained with other social factors. For some crimes, although the presence of disorder is highly 
correlated with high crime rate and still satisfies the positive and negative tracking conditions, 
the neighborhood structural characteristics, such as poverty level, the concentration of 
immigrants, and prevalence of mixed land use, explain both disorder and higher crime rate. Thus, 
“cleaning up” neighborhoods without addressing poverty or other reasons that make immigrant 
communities vulnerable to such problems does not enhance the safety of residents, although it 
might change who is able and willing to live in those neighborhoods. In fact, an increase in 
misdemeanor arrests is often followed by real estate developments and gentrification.  
Another example of unjustified grouping in the broken window thesis is grouping places 
and their residents under the umbrella term of a neighborhood (Weisburd, 2015). Research on the 
geographic concentration of crime now shows that for instance gun violence incidents are often 
concentrated in less than 5 percent of a city’s blocks and streets. In fact, a small social network 
of individuals is responsible for most cases of homicide (Papachristos, Wildeman, & Roberto, 
2015). In other words, the causally irrelevant and conventional grouping of streets and their 
residents under a neighborhood name seriously lacks a plausible justification. Obviously, 
exposing every resident of these neighborhoods to constant harassment and fear of arrest also 
lack a moral justification.   
In sum, the disorder and crime relationship are an instance of a micro-realization robust 
regularity without a proper justification for grouping. The social properties like disorder, crime, 
and neighborhood satisfy all the conditions that mandates a social explanation. They are 
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obviously describable at multiple levels and can be realized by different configurations of 
individuals. More importantly, disorder and crime are linked in a way that is robust under 
individual variations. However, none of these conditions could justify the assumption that these 
properties are not disjunctive, and their realizations can be grouped together. The false 
assumption that they are social kinds that are robust under variations at least partially justified 
arrests and harassment that would not have taken place if otherwise.  
9. Emergence  
So far, I showed that MR arguments fail to show that social properties are causally 
effective. For social properties to be causally effective, they should not be identical to individual 
properties, which in part depends on the justification for grouping under social properties. 
Nevertheless, social properties seem to be causally effective and non-reducible to individual 
properties. Many recent studies on social networks as well as complex and dynamic social 
systems are evidence for the indispensability of social properties in social explanation. In this 
section, I sketch the alternative to MR arguments that can successfully reject the property 
identity thesis and avoids the grouping justification problem. The key to such an alternative is the 
notion of emergence. Following philosophers of complexity in biology, I provide below a 
scientifically plausible account of emergence to support causal explanatory holism.  
Although emergence is a key characteristic of complex dynamical systems, many social 
philosophers doubt the legitimacy of social explanations when they imply or assume the 
possibility of emergent systemic properties. To reject the property identity thesis, an alternative 
is to show that social properties are emergent in the sense that they are irreducibly novel 
properties of a system that are neither predictable nor explainable in terms of the properties of 
their constituents. Thus, emergentists deny reductionism or the idea that social phenomena are 
55 
 
reducible to individuals and their attributes, as well as social fact holism, or the claim that the 
social world has a completely independent nature from the individuals and their attributes.  
Four requirements are necessary for a scientifically plausible account of emergence. First, 
endorsing emergence should not require endorsing the existence of any supernatural power or 
unnatural entity. It is important to note that this criterion does not imply that the unit of analysis 
in social explanation ought to be individuals in a sense that excludes from the explanation their 
biology, their built and natural environment, their network, their organization, or their history. 
Second, emergence happens at the aggregate or system level and involves novel properties that 
are irreducible to the properties of individuals or components. Third, a systemic property is 
emergent if complete knowledge of the arrangements and the properties of the parts is inadequate 
to explain or predict novel properties at the system level (Boogerd et al., 2005) (Epstein, 1999). 
Fourth, a systemic property is emergent if, even in principle, it cannot be deduced from the 
behavior of the components in a simpler system.  
In sum, a proper definition of emergence would rely on deducibility instead of 
reducibility to show that reduction is in principle impossible. More importantly, a more useful 
definition draws a contrast between the properties of the components in two systems with 
different complexity levels. Given such definition, there are two logical possibilities or two 
conditions under which emergence is possible or under which a system-level property is, in 
principle, irreducible to the properties of the constituents. According to the first condition, 
emergence is possible when the system behavior is in principle not decomposable or analyzable 
in terms of the behavior of the constituents. According to the second condition, emergence is 
possible when the behavior of the components is highly dependent on the system of which they 
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are a part. Boogerd et al. (2005) call the former condition vertical and the latter condition 
horizontal.  
Satisfying the vertical condition of emergence implies a vertical non-identity between 
social and individual properties. The vertical condition of emergence is met when the deduction 
of emergent behavior from the constituent’s behavior is impossible. The idea is that when the 
behavior of a system is non-decomposable or unanalyzable in terms of the behavior of its 
subsystems or parts, it cannot be deduced from the behavior of the parts either. For a system to 
be decomposable, either it should be a product of minimally interactive subsystems or it should 
be a product of a linear sequence of events. However, complex and dynamic systems, by 
definition, violate both of these conditions. Complex systems are often described as well-
integrated systems that are composed of highly integrated components whose behavior 
continuously and mutually shapes and forms the behavior and even the structure of other 
components. Thus, the components can rarely be distinct and minimally interactive. For instance, 
the crime rate in a neighborhood is not independent of its poverty level, disinvestment, physical 
isolation from other wealthier neighborhoods, the attitudes of others to the members of a 
community because of their income, race, citizenship, and the like. Thus, if such an interrelation 
with other community-level elements is the case, then isolating the relationship between say 
disorder and crime without addressing other elements is a hopeless endeavor.  
Satisfying the horizontal condition of emergence implies a horizontal non-identity 
between two individual properties. The horizontal condition is met in the presence of radical and 
fundamental differences in the behavior of the components in two systems with different levels 
of complexity. According to the horizontal condition, the deduction is impossible when the 
behavior of the constituents is not predictable or deducible from their behavior in isolation or in 
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other systems. In other words, if the components are malleable to the point that not only their 
behavior but also their dispositions and to some extent their internal structure are dependent on 
the system of which they are a part, then they meet the horizontal condition of emergence. In a 
complex and highly integrated system, the operations of parts are interdependent; that is, they 
continuously influence each other’s operations. For instance, neurological and behavioral studies 
confirm a potent effect of early environment on individuals' “capacity of human skill 
development” (Kudson et al 2006, Heckman 2006). Thus, not only do the individuals shape the 
environment in which they live, the environment shapes their abilities, their needs, and their 
choices, which also shapes their environment.  
Emergence successfully contradicts property identity. By definition, a social property, S, 
of a complex social system R, is emergent when even complete information about the properties 
of the parts is insufficient to conclude that the system R has property S. For instance, even 
complete information about how individuals, normally, or rationally, or naturally behave is 
inadequate to explain how long a recession will last or whether another instance of police 
brutality would spark a social movement. Moreover, a social property, S, of a complex social 
system, R, is emergent when even in principle it does not follow from the individual’s properties 
in constellations different from R how they behave in R. For instance, it does not follow from the 
fact that members of community A are disturbed by graffiti and fear crime the members of 
community B would have the same response.  
 Denying the property identity thesis does not have a grouping justification problem 
either. Grouping justification is necessary to avoid domain-specific reduction. But emergent 
properties are not locally reducible since they only occur when the system has proved to be non-
decomposable. Another condition for emergence to occur is when the individual properties in the 
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systems with emergent properties are malleable enough that their properties or behavior in a 
given system is not deducible from the individual properties in other systems. Thus, when the 
malleability condition is met there is no space for domain-specific reduction. Moreover, 
methodologically, although the regularities are used to find the proper level of specification, and 
the proper properties, the justification for grouping the individual realizations is not about 
distinct causal kinds in very different systems. 
10. Conclusion 
 The kind of holistic explanation that was the focus of my attention is the one that 
suggests social properties are causally effective. This suggestion often requires rejecting the 
identity thesis or the idea that social properties are reducible to individual properties. I argued a 
class of arguments that rely on MR thesis, MR arguments, are not good candidates for supporting 
holistic explanation especially when it comes to the study of complex social systems in social 
sciences. I described the MR arguments and in particular a difference-making approach to MR 
arguments by List and Spiekermann.  
The conditions that List and Spiekermann provide for cases that mandate social 
explanation rely on a further assumption, namely that social properties in question are not 
heterogeneously disjunctive. However, we cannot assume a social property is not disjunctive 
merely because it is a property. Further reasoning is necessary to show that a social property is 
not reducible to individual properties in a domain-specific way. I argued that the difference-
making approach to MR arguments does not address this problem. I further explored an example 
of the negative consequences of such a lack of justification for grouping social properties.  
Finally, I provided an alternative approach to MR arguments that denies the property 
identity thesis without falling into the same problem with domain-specific reduction and 
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grouping justification. Emergence happens when deduction from constituents is impossible. 
When a complex and highly integrated system is non-decomposable, deduction becomes 
impossible because local reduction is not an option anymore. Non-decomposable systems are 
systems that are not composed of minimally interactive components or their process happens in a 
sequence of events, which implies that domain-specific reduction is not an issue. Thus, there is 
less urgency for justifying the grouping of the emergent properties. Complex systems often rely 
on alternative methods that would not require defining variables/properties at a higher level 
without information about their causal relations. In fact, the proper units of analysis in complex 
systems does cannot be intuitively chosen.  A proper specification can easily violate the normal 
and intuitive distinction between levels of analysis.  
 








In a philosophical debate between methodological individualists and holists, philosophers 
of race and gender usually lean towards holism for strong descriptive and normative reasons. 
Although advocates of methodological individualism consider this doctrine politically and 
ideologically neutral, its main commitments lead to consistently value-laden consequences (Heat, 
2015). For instance, these commitments imply that race or gender in social explanation is at least 
redundant and perhaps even a causal misattribution. The opponents argue that methodological 
individualism and its implications reduce the explanatory and predictive power of social 
explanation (Zahl, 2016). Moreover, feminist scholars argue that such implications have a 
normative dimension since they misguide our moral response to social problems (for examples 
see Haslanger, 2015; Cudd, 2006; and Young, 2012).   
Many believe that some forms of Durkheimian structural functionalism explain the 
inadequacy of methodological individualism. In this chapter, however, I focus on the account of 
explanation on which such a functionalist approach relies to support the explanatory relevance of 
social level properties and entities like race and gender. The fundamental tenet of functionalism 
is multiple realizability, which justifies abstracting away from anything that is irrelevant to the 
social order in question. However, I argue that multiple realizability and functionalist 
explanation, although successful in describing a particular kind of problem with organized 
complexities, rely on two assumptions that are simply not true in many social systems. First, this 
form of functionalism assumes and implies independence between different levels of 
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explanation. Second, functionalism relies on functional decomposition as a heuristic tool for 
analyzing complex social problems. I show that both these commitments are problematic not 
only on descriptive and explanatory grounds, but also on the grounds that they misguide our 
moral response to social problems.  
2. Methodological Individualism 
Before I address functionalism, it’s necessary to first revisit methodological 
individualism, because functionalism is often seen as an alternative to it.  In an episode of “The 
Dick Cavett Show,”28 a Yale philosophy professor, Paul Weiss, confronts James Baldwin’s 
claims about racial inequality. His argument is an example of a class of arguments that 
undermines the plausibility of such claims on the basis of their underlying account of 
explanation. The core of Weiss’s point is that claims of racial inequality are implausible because 
a plausible explanation of a given phenomenon should rely on individuals and their attributes and 
not abstract entities like race, gender, class, and the like. Weiss argues that Baldwin’s claims of 
racial injustice overlook something very important, namely that each of us is “terribly alone” and 
has a unique set of struggles. He concludes that the racial problems that Baldwin suggests only 
exist because Baldwin puts individuals into “groups to which they do not belong” based on the 
color of their skin. Weiss also states that not all White Americans are racist, signaling that there 
is no reason to believe that racial injustices are caused by the way Black Americans are treated. 
In a nutshell, the Weiss’s conclusion is that either there is no such problem that all Black 
Americans share, or even if there is, the cause of the problem is not race and racial 
discrimination.  
 
28 The show was produced in 1986.  
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Arguments that undermine claims of injustice by appealing to skepticism about the 
explanatory power of social groups are abundant in response to emancipatory movements and 
claims about social injustices. In fact, there is a history of mutual influence between what is 
understood to be a plausible approach to explanation in the sciences and social debates. One of 
the most interesting and still hot debates around the issue is between methodological 
individualism and holism. Both methodological individualism and holism come in a variety of 
forms, each with a list of commitments. However, there is a particular version of this debate that 
concerns whether social entities or properties like race and gender are causally relevant to the 
explanation of particular instances of social inequalities at the individual or aggregate levels.  
According to methodological individualism, every social phenomenon is in principle 
explicable in terms of individuals and their attributes. This reductive assumption is supported by, 
but not dependent on, the ontological commitment that only individuals and their actions are real 
and that entities like “society,” “economic system,” “capitalism,” “race,” and “class” are mere 
“abstractions” (for examples see Hayek, 1942 and Popper, 1944). Thus, since abstractions lack 
causal power, all explanatory work is done with the individuals and their attributes, as seen in 
claims like "social events are brought about by people" or "it is people who determine history” 
(Watkins J. W., 1955, p. 58). Such a lack of causal power makes higher-level macro phenomena 
like “race,” “class,” “systemic racism,” and “structural injustice” explanatorily redundant or 
epiphenomenal (Jackson, 1982).  
Although methodological individualism does not imply that the cause of a given Black 
person’s struggle in America is only himself and nothing else, it does make it easy for someone 
like Weiss to undermine Baldwin’s claim in a variety of ways. Weiss follows an individualistic 
research strategy that invites us to look at individuals and their attributes to explain their 
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misfortune. This invitation is supported by the claim that “real” or “rock-bottom” explanations 
are at the level of individuals. However, looking only at individuals generates a lot of noise, 
because all individuals are struggling one way or another and it can be hard to see the similarities 
or differences between individuals and their problems without any higher level information. 
Also, if these individuals share their environment, and if there is no obvious reason to believe 
that others treat them differently based on their skin color, then it is difficult to show that Black 
individuals have a unique set of struggles.  
 In a more systematic way, Weiss’s argument can be reconstructed in terms of the so-
called “exclusion argument.” This argument applies to any system that is describable at at least 
two levels. For example, in social systems, individuals and their attributes exist at the lower 
level, and anything beyond individuals, such as culture, inequality, race, and the like, are higher-
level entities, facts, events, etc. (see for example, List & Spiekermann, 2013; Kincaid, 1986; 
Zahl, 2016; and Jackson & Pettit, 1992). Examples of such higher-level properties are often 
categorized in four groups: aggregate, functional, structural, and contextual. According to the 
exclusion argument, the use of higher-level entities, properties, processes, etc. is unnecessary, 
and even a causal misattribution, if individual actions are sufficient for the explanation of social 
phenomena. Since methodological individualism and many contemporary philosophers and 
social scientists agree that individuals and their attributes are more basic than their aggregates, 
then the conclusion is often that social phenomena cannot be causally effective.  
 
The social scientific version of the debate between Weiss and Baldwin can be translated 
into two questions. Imagine for example a young Black man who is unemployed, call him 
Khalid. The first question is whether we should assign the cause Khalid’s unemployment to the 
lower-level description of a set of individual actions, beliefs, and attitudes or to the higher-level 
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description of matters such as the local or national unemployment rate for African Americans. In 
response to this methodological question, methodological individualists argue that the cause of 
Khalid’s unemployment must be a lower level property, like some individual actions or beliefs. 
The trouble is that without information about how Khalid’s environment distinguished him from 
others based on the color of his skin, it might look like Khalid’s biological, psychological, 
intentional, or dispositional attributes are the cause of his unemployment, in which case, there 
would be no need for intervention and no place for claims about racial injustice. Such 
information about Khalid’s unemployment comes either from the attitudes and beliefs of other 
individuals or from aggregate-level information. The former is very difficult to obtain, and the 
latter goes back to the claim that the real explanation comes from individuals and their attributes. 
The second methodological question regarding the exclusion argument is whether we 
should look for the cause of the high unemployment rate of African Americans in lower- or 
higher-level descriptions. In other words, the question is whether there is any higher-level 
property that is caused by another (higher-level) property. For instance, if individuals who lack 
skills or “work ethic” or others with racist and discriminatory behavior are responsible for the 
high unemployment rate, then the proper explanation relies on lower-level facts.  On this 
account, the causal connection lies, in fact, among individual actions, and the higher-level 
phenomenon is simply their aggregate. However, if the responsibility were at the level of 
structure, systems, etc., then the proper explanation would be at the higher level. Therefore, the 
exclusion argument implies that both Khalid’s unemployment and the high unemployment rate 
have a lower-level cause.  
Many have argued that insisting on individuals and their attributes and excluding higher-
level social entities from social explanation has important descriptive and normative problems. It 
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has a descriptive problem because it simply does not match with what social scientists observe,29 
and it has a normative problem because it misguides our moral response to social problems. For 
instance, Haslanger (2015) distinguishes three possible explanations for the economic disparity 
between men and women. First, the biological explanation is that their innate psychobiological 
traits put women in a disadvantaged position. Second, the individualistic explanation suggests 
that women have the disposition to spend time with children and that they make decisions that 
prevent their economic success. Third, the structural explanation brings in the constraints that are 
put on women from their environment that change their decisions. The same set of explanations 
can be and has been offered for Khalid’s unemployment. Even in contemporary debates, the 
biological explanation—the idea that members of different races have different IQ levels that 
explain their economic disadvantage—is still common (for example Herrnstein & Murray, 1994). 
The individualistic explanation blames the individual’s or the group’s decisions for their 
unemployment.30And finally, the structural explanation considers the social constraints that 
shapes the individual’s decisions and actions that lead to their unemployment. Thus, Haslanger 
(2015) and many others31 argue that limiting our focus to individual actions has descriptive and 
normative dimensions. In fact, no intervention seems morally necessary to change the 
unemployment rate if the cause is the decisions of the unemployed individuals.32   
 
29 For a more detailed discussion about this issue see Kincaid (1986).   
30 For examples see Mead (1986, 1992) and Murray (1985).  
31 For examples see Young (1980, 2012), Anderson (2010), and Cudd (2006).  
32 “Moreover, the explanation illuminates normative dimensions of the circumstances that would otherwise be missed. 
Given only the biologistic or individualistic explanations, the fact that women remain economically disadvantaged 
relative to men appears not to be a matter of moral or political concern: if the best explanation of women’s choices to 
forego economic success is that they, as individuals, desire to be caregivers of children (and the elderly), this is a 
choice we must respect. No intervention in the name of justice is called for, except possibly the gender disparity in 
wages that is built into the scenario. The structural explanation reveals, however, that there is a deeper problem than 





In response to Weiss, Baldwin argues that one does not need to know what “most white 
people in this country feel” to be able to believe the claims of racial injustice. He famously states 
that “I don’t know whether the labor unions and their bosses really hate me — that doesn’t 
matter — but I know I’m not in their union”33 (Baldwin, 1969). He suggests that individuals and 
their beliefs or desires will not add anything meaningful to the explanation of social inequalities 
when, at the aggregate level, the disparities are more than obvious. In other words, Baldwin 
argues that lack of access to individuals’ beliefs and attitudes is not a good excuse for 
undermining the reality of racial injustice. In fact, he would agree that having such information 
about what every individual feels or believes would not enhance the quality of explanation 
regardless of whether we are concerned with Khalid or with the higher unemployment rate 
among African Americans.  
 The focal point of Baldwin’s claim resonates with a long tradition of functionalism and 
functional explanation in philosophy of science, sociology, social philosophy, and philosophy of 
the social sciences. The main goal of functionalist explanation is to point to the “common 
denominator of a large number of apparently heterogenous social activity” (Levi-Strauss, 1949). 
The idea is that by describing functions, structures, or aggregate information “we abstract 
relational features from the totality of the perceived data, ignoring all that is not ‘order’ or 
‘arrangement’; in brief, we define the positions relative to one another of the component parts” 
(Nadel, 1957, p.7). The ubiquity of the functionalist explanation is due to the fact that it can 
explain the causal relevance of higher level entities in any hierarchical system. For instance, in 
its original form, functionalism in sociology mostly relies on the assumption that there is a “true 
 
33 He further adds that “I don’t know whether the real estate lobby has anything against black people, but I know the 
real estate lobby is keeping me in the ghetto. I don’t know if the board of education hates black people, but I know 
the textbooks they give my children to read and the schools we have to go to” (Baldwin, 1969).  
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correspondence between statistical analysis of the social organism in sociology and that of the 
individual organism in biology” (Comte 1851-1854, p. 239). However, the important point is that 
with such assumptions comes the realization that many systems are hierarchically ordered.  
Multiple realizability is a fundamental tenet of functionalism according to which social 
entities and events are to be identified in terms of their interactions with one another instead of 
by their constituents or content. As I explained in chapter two, functionalists rely on the idea of 
multiple realizability to reject the exclusion argument. They suggest that although reducing 
social phenomena to a configuration of individuals and their actions is possible in principle, it is 
impossible in practice, mainly because social phenomena are multiply realizable. A social 
phenomenon is multiply realizable when many individual level facts can realize the same social 
level phenomena.34 Functionalism and its implications can show why social entities like race and 
gender and their causal power are not explanatorily reducible to the actions or attributes of 
individuals.  
Functionalists argue that in order to arrive at any explanation at all, we need to rely on 
our observations as to the level of robust causal relationship, which can be at either an individual 
or group level. In other words, functionalism allows groups, in the form of group action, to be 
the unit of analysis without mandating that the causal explanation reduce such a group action to 
individual actions.  Consequently, race and gender can be properties of groups, thus having a 
causal role in social explanation. In sum, any phenomenon that is describable at more than one 
level is multiply realizable and has a robust causal relationship at the social level that requires a 
non-reductive explanation. As such, it is a candidate for functional analysis.   
 
34 This idea was first introduced by Hilary Putnam (1967) in Philosophy of Mind.  
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 In its most general use, functionalism refers to explanations of social phenomena “by 
means of their function” (Kincaid, 1990). For example, Kate Manne (2018) defines misogyny 
functionally and within the system of patriarchy. She states that “misogyny ought to be 
understood as the system that operates within a patriarchal social order to police and enforce 
women’s subordination and to uphold male dominance” (p. 18). She also argues that a sufficient 
condition for misogynistic hostilities is “their social-cum-structural explanation: roughly, they 
must be part of a system that polices, punishes, dominates, and condemns those women who are 
perceived as an enemy or threat to the patriarchy” (p. 34). Thus, according to Manne, misogyny 
"functions to enforce and police women's subordination and to uphold male dominance, against 
the backdrop of other intersecting systems of oppression and vulnerability, dominance and 
disadvantages, as well as disparate material resources, enabling and constraining social 
structures, institutions, bureaucratic mechanisms, and so on" (p. 19).   
In sum, functional analysis requires at least three preconditions (List & Spiekermann, 
2013). The first requirement is a phenomenon that is describable at more than one level, and the 
second is the presence of a robust causal relationship at one level. For instance, in Manne’s 
functional analysis of misogyny, there is a robust causal relationship between two higher level 
entities, misogyny and gender inequality: the reason for the persistence of one, misogyny, is that 
it causes the other, gender inequality. The third requirement is that the robustness of the entities 
and their causal relationship have some independence from the lower levels. In other words, the 
higher-level entity is multiply realizable. For example, in Manne’s account of misogyny, there is 
no logical limit on the content of hostilities towards women to make them misogynistic.35 
 
35 Examples for such independence of content for misogyny are abundant. For instance, in his New York Times 
opinion piece, David Brooks (2016) compares Trump’s misogyny with historical moralistic misogyny. According to 
him “Traditional misogyny blames women for the lustful, licentious and powerful urges that men sometimes feel in 
their presence. In this misogyny, women are the powerful, disgusting corrupters—the vixens, sirens and monsters” 
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4. Independent Levels 
Although the functionalist approach seems like a natural choice, it can be problematic, 
especially for discussions about broad and deep social phenomena like gender or racial 
inequality. Functionalism, with its reliance on multiple realizability, implies that no information 
about individuals’ attitudes and intentions, their history or biology, or their relationships would 
be particularly useful in the functional account of social phenomena like racism or sexism or any 
other kind of oppression in the presence of robust causal relationships at the group or social 
level.36 In fact, some advocates of multiple realizability and functionalism like Jerry Fodor 
(1975) explicitly contend that the study of lower level entities, like individuals, has not and will 
not enhance our understanding of the higher level and its functions. The same contention can be 
found in feminist and anti-racist analysis of oppression. For instance, as I mentioned in chapter 
one, Tommie Shelby defines racism functionally as a set of beliefs and attitudes that serves the 
function of maintaining racial inequality.37 Both these accounts contend that neither the content 
of sexist or racist attitudes nor the person who holds them is particularly important in the 
functional analysis of sexism or racism. However, I argue that assuming such independence 




(2016). In contrast, according to Manne (2016) the content of Trump’s misogyny is in the form of sexual harassment 
and belittling women who challenge him. The common feature between these two kinds of misogyny is misogyny’s 
effect of controlling women rather than its content. Thus, the content of misogyny is multiply realizable, and the 
causal relationship between misogyny and domination of women has some independence from the content. 
36 Bechtel & Mundale (1999) make this argument for functionalism in the context of biological explanation. 
However, their argument is applicable to any kind of explanation that is relying on the functionalist framework.  
37 Shelby (2014) employs functional analysis to define the ideology of racism. For Shelby, “Racism is a set of 
misleading beliefs and implicit attitudes about ‘races’ or race relations whose wide currency serves a hegemonic 
social function” (p. 66). He defines ideology functionally as well. According to Shelby, “An ideology is a widely 
held set of loosely associated beliefs and implicit judgments that misrepresent significant social realities and that 
function, through this distortion, to bring about or perpetuate unjust social relations” (p.66). 
70 
 
In functional explanation, the irreducibility of higher-level explanations is due to causal 
relationships at the group level that are robust to changes in their micro- or individual-level 
realizations. It is also important to note that this approach replaces individuals and their actions 
with groups and their actions because of its commitment to supervenience individualism. Thus, 
some form of reduction is in place. Instead of the reduction of higher level to individual level, 
functionalism reduces the description to one level, usually the higher level, which is causally 
independent of other levels. However, especially in the social world, the interdependence of 
levels is a common phenomenon. Thus, a proper social explanation should not take such 
independence for granted and should not only rely on a causal model that cannot account for 
such interdependency.38  
Functional explanation is only applicable to cases in which the levels of description are 
independent from one another. In other words, it only works when there is separation of behavior 
at lower and higher levels without any interaction among them (Bar-Yam, 2015).39 However, not 
all systems are like that. For instance, when we are interested in the behavior of a flock of birds 
or a group of individuals whose behavior is neither independent nor coherent, describing each 
individual’s actions is too much information while only describing their average behavior or 
action is too little.40 The assumption about levels fails to see that although the individual level 
differences matters, the group level properties in fact play a causal role in the explanation of 
 
38 For a detailed discussion of the levels of explanation see Potochnik (2010).  
39 For example, in molecular biology, the dynamics of the molecules can be described both at the molecular level 
and at the level of organism or cells. In thermodynamics, the temperature of a tank is the average energy of the 
molecules inside of it. Thus, we can describe the tank’s status both at the molecular level, the sum of molecular 
energy, and at the aggregate level, the overall temperature. In the molecular-level description, the behavior of each 
molecule is important. However, at the aggregate level, we can explain and predict the temperature without any 
information about the molecules. 
40 For instance, the mainstream conservative denial of race or gender related inequalities relies on the assumption 




individuals and groups. The best description is across scales and informed by the interactions and 
relations among the individuals and groups.  
We usually assume that levels are independent in the presence of two conditions: 
difference in order of magnitude and firmness of structure and boundaries (Bar-Yam, 2017). 
Difference in order of magnitude is the most common reason that we assume that the two levels 
are independent. For example, the stable unemployment rate among African Americans is not 
any different if Khalid finds a job. Whatever maintains such an unemployment rate, say the mix 
of a dysfunctional transportation system and discriminatory hiring practices, creates enough 
unemployed people like Khalid that his employment per se does not change anything. In other 
words, the change that each individual-level intervention can make at the higher level is 
negligible. Thus, there is a large enough difference in order of magnitude to justify thinking 
about the unemployment rate without considering individual-level information about the 
unemployment of Khalid and other members of his group. In this situation, the phenomenon of 
interest determines the right level of explanation.  
Firmness of structure and boundaries is another condition for the separation of scales. It 
requires the assumption that the components of a system are unchanging and have a distinct 
boundary between them.41 When we talk about the relationship between misogyny and 
patriarchy, racism and capitalism, or racism and homophobia, etc. as interacting systems, we 
assume that they each have distinct and independent internal structures. We also assume that we 
can describe each system in isolation and determine its effect on other systems or the 
 
41 The solar system, for example, is composed of celestial objects that each have a highly complex internal structure. 
But in large-scale description of Earth’s orbit around the sun, the details about what happens on earth are irrelevant. 
Earth’s and the other planets’ behavior is assumed to be unchanging, with a distinct and independent internal 
structure in the model that represents their orbit around the sun. Such a separation allows us to describe the planets 
in isolation and to determine the effect of external forces on their motion. Thus, we can predict how the whole 
system would behave if a new celestial body were added to it.   
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overarching system. We make the same move when we think about racism as the pervasive 
ideology that manifests itself in individuals’ minds. We assume that the racist beliefs of 
individuals can be studied and described in isolation. However, the validity of these moves and 
assumptions cannot be taken for granted. 
Social explanation cannot always assume the separation and independence of levels. 
When we look at population-level properties over time for cases in which interactions among 
individuals are significant, the causal relations cease to remain at one level. At this point, it is 
common knowledge that we cannot describe, explain, or predict the behavior of each individual 
based on their behavior in isolation (Longino, 2019). There are some behaviors that are socially 
contagious and some changes at the individual level that change population-level behavior over 
time. For instance, researchers show that in certain situations, the employment of one or just a 
few individuals in a network can connect the whole network to job opportunities that were 
formerly unknown to the members of the network (Calvo-Armengol & Zenou, 2005). This 
process relies on word of mouth and the building of social capital by the original employees. In 
Khalid’s case, although his employment does not change the overall unemployment rate, his 
employment status can have a contagious effect on others in his social network. Thus, if we don’t 
limit the study of the phenomenon in question to a short period of time and if we consider 
interactions among individuals, his employment can have a higher significance than we 
originally thought.42  
The firmness of the structures and boundaries is another element whose violation 
undermines the assumption of independence of levels. As I mentioned in chapter one, strong 
 
42 Thus, the proper unit of analysis is neither at the individual nor the group level. It exists across levels and requires 
individual-level description of Khalid’s employment status as well as group-level description of his network, 
including the urban environment that they live in, the technology available to them, the history of poverty and 
under-resourced families, etc. 
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forms of methodological individualism rely on the assumption that individuals are the atoms of 
the social world and that their internal structures and boundaries are unaffected. Similarly, 
functional accounts assume modules with firm boundaries and solid internal structures. 
However, such assumptions seem unfounded for both individuals and groups. For instance, 
following Merleau-Ponty (1962), who locates subjectivity not in the mind or consciousness but 
in the body, Iris Marion Young argues that living in a patriarchal society leaves its trace on one’s 
body and one’s perception of one’s body (Young, 1980). According to Young, the “process of 
growing up as a girl” to a great extent determines “the modalities of feminine bodily 
comportment, motility, and spatiality” (p. 153). Thus, it is in fact the case that most women in 
contemporary advanced industrial, urban, and commercial societies are so different from men 
that the “feminine” and “masculine” ways of throwing a ball are distinguishable. However, such 
a difference is not due to a mysterious feminine quality or essence common to all women by 
virtue of their sex; rather it is “a set of structures and conditions which delimits the typical 
situations of being a woman” (Young, 1980, p. 140). Similarly, one can trace the effect of 
interaction with the environment in a group, its internal relations, its available resources, etc.  
In sum, the interdependency of levels and components violates the assumptions of 
functional explanation. In the cases discussed above, assumptions about differences in order of 
magnitude cannot be taken for granted, especially over time. Also, the internal structure of the 
components—which can be either individuals or groups—can be relevant and important. The 
essential point is that seemingly random facts at different levels can cause significant effects at 
the level where the robust causal relationships are. For example, the employment of one or just a 
few individuals can change the unemployment rate in a situation in which the causal relationship 
between the unemployment and high-school-dropout rates satisfies all the conditions for a 
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successful functional analysis. In these situations, the best explanation is across levels and in a 
timescale that is also determined by the phenomenon of interest.   
5. Functional Decomposition 
Most holistic accounts of explanation—such as structuralism, materialism, systems theory, 
and even the causal aspect of the interpretive method of explanation—rely on functional 
decomposition as at least a heuristic tool. Functional decomposition allows us to divide a big 
system like patriarchy into smaller and more manageable systems and naturally comes with the 
assumption that a set of minimally interacting systems and functions produces the overarching 
phenomenon. Thus, functional decomposition is an extremely useful tool in the study of 
aggregative systems in which overall behavior is a simple addition of the behavior of the parts 
and their functions (Wimsatt, 1986). However, very few interesting dynamical systems are 
strictly aggregative. In fact, in societies and in nature, systems with self-organization and 
reinforcement loops that are far from aggregative systems are the norm rather than the exception 
(for examples see Kaufmann, 1993, 1995; Nicolis & Prigogine, 1989; and Strogatz, 2003). Even 
in simple and isolated social systems, when they are possible, only a rough approximation of 
such strict aggregation of functions is useful. The problem is that such approximation in well-
integrated systems either fails to explain a phenomenon altogether or leaves out very important 
components, thus making prediction or intervention very difficult if not impossible.   
Functional decomposition is an important tool for many forms of holistic explanation 
because it facilitates dividing a big system into smaller and more manageable subsystems or 
components. In other words, decomposition comes with the assumption that a big phenomenon 
like racial inequality is the product of a set of subordinate functions performed in the system. 
Moreover, decomposition assumes that a small number of “minimally interactive” or 
independent functions result in the phenomenon in question. However, the more individuals in a 
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society, or in the society’s systems and subsystems, affect each other, the less effective is 
functional decomposition, even as a heuristic tool. Systems with many interacting components 
that resist decomposition and/or localization are well-integrated in the sense that “the operations 
of different component parts are interdependent; that is, they more or less continuously impact 
each other’s operations” (Bechtel & Richardson, 1993, p. xxxiii). 
The success of functional decomposition is dependent on the presence of a sequence of 
events or operations. However, social systems often involve many causal loops in which 
something “feeds around” a hypothetical loop and “feeds back” to itself. Feedback loops are 
common in our explanation of the social world. For instance, Sally Haslanger (2012) argues that 
social practices consist of interdependent schemas and resources that mutually imply and sustain 
each other over time Similarly, Anderson argues that segregation and racial discrimination are 
mutually reinforcing (2010, p. 64).  
Systems with feedback loops resist decomposition or even “near-decomposition.” 
Feedback loops can be negative (self-regulating) or positive (reinforcing). Negative feedback 
loops are especially important for controlling systems that maintain stability. For example, it is a 
well-documented phenomenon that in response to policies that are “too liberal” relative to public 
opinion, the public perspective becomes more conservative. And when policies are “too 
conservative,” public opinion becomes more liberal (Erikson, Mackuen, & Stimson, 2001). Of 
course, when the general public is biased in respect to some issue, the “self-correcting” process 
will lead to a biased but stable equilibrium. Reactions and changes in public opinion around 
issues related to minority groups, immigrants, LGBTQ members, etc. are evidence for such a 
biased equilibrium and stabilizing feedback loop. In contrast to negative loops that resist change, 
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positive loops tend to amplify change and create instability.43 For example, a strong backlash 
from the general public to some social or political issue that is unrelated to an individual’s life or 
interest is an instance of such a feedback loop.44 Many interconnected balancing and reinforcing 
feedback loops create a web of interacting elements that lead to the reality of our social world. 
Such a web is not decomposable to distinct parts with minimum or no interaction such that their 
operation is describable in a sequence of events. 
Examples of well-integrated and non-decomposable systems are abundant in social 
philosophy and especially in feminist and anti-racist thought. For instance, intersectional 
feminists argue that the interacting effects of analytically distinct systems like racism and sexism 
are not necessarily decomposable in the study of oppression of Black women (for examples see 
Collins & Bilge, 2016; and Crenshaw, 1989). This insight has its echo in the work of economists 
and philosophers who emphasize the simultaneous and non-decomposable effect of economic 
systems and systems of oppression. For instance, socialist feminists have argued that because 
different forms of oppression are not distinct and independent, we ought to target capitalist 
patriarchy or capitalist white supremacist patriarchy rather than patriarchy (for examples see 
Young, 1990; Haslanger, 2018; and Jaggar, 1983). Even the dual system approaches45 to 
oppression, which assume that there are only two overarching interacting systems, endorse such 
non-decomposability. Advocates of these approaches argue that “patriarchy was a system for 
managing sex, reproduction and childcare that intersected with the capitalist economic system 
that managed labor and production” (Haslanger, 2020, p. 223).46 Therefore, they suggest that a 
 
43 For a complete analysis of feedback loops and their functions see Richardson (1991). 
44 This is what is commonly called the “band wagon” effect, referring to people who follow the first wagon in a 
circus just because there are others following it.  
45 The dual system approach is discussed in the work of Young (1990) and Fraser & Jaeggi (2018) and many others.  
46 Haslanger (2018) argues that the dual system model fails due to its biases.  
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proper explanation needs to encounter both systems simultaneously and that the systems are 
analytically and practically non-decomposable. 
6. Descriptive and Normative Problems of Functionalism 
What I call the descriptive problems of functional explanation manifest themselves as 
lack of explanatory and predictive power. Famously, economic theories that rely on functional 
decomposition fail to explain or predict financial crises or any other drastic transformation 
(Colander, 2011). Dismissing the interaction of individuals makes these theories incapable of 
explaining contagious behaviors, such as bank panic, that are often not in the self-interest of 
individuals.47 Moreover, social and political theories that do not allow flexible boundaries for 
individuals and social entities as well as mutual interaction between them fail to explain the 
“capacity to develop or change internal structure spontaneously and adaptively in order to cope 
with or manipulate the environment” (Cilliers, 1998, p. 90). In other words, the assumptions 
behind functional decomposition do not allow us to explain how individuals and groups 
transform themselves over time. Whatever the unit of analysis, whether individuals or groups, 
dismissing their path in time, their internal structures, and their interaction with the environment 
makes explaining change and predicting the future impossible.  
The use of functional explanation and decomposition has normative consequences as 
well. Functional explanation fails to guide our moral response to the phenomenon of interest 
either because of its level of abstraction or because of its presumptions about the system. If 
 
47 Bank panic refers to the situation in which a large number of people suddenly withdraw their money from banks 
because they fear their bank will run out of money, a fear that results from observing other people withdrawing their 
money. Hence, there is a reinforcing feedback loop that creates a snowball effect and can end up breaking the 
banking system. The more people fear losing their money, the more people withdraw their money from their banks. 
And as the number of people who withdraw increases, the more people panic. Of course, neither withdrawing the 
money nor causing their bank to default is in people’s self-interest. Also, there would be no snowball effect if 
individuals were not aware of each other’s fear. A similar story in terms of feedback loops can explain white flight 




higher level entities are abstractions in the way that List and Spiekermann (2013) suggest, then 
intervention is either impossible or requires identifying an infinite number of realizations. Thus, 
unless there is a unique and finite set of sequential causal relationships at the same level, 
intervention is not possible. Even in that case, at some point we need a lower level and concrete 
cause in order to change the higher-level phenomenon. However, functional explanation, by 
assuming multiple realizability and abstract higher-level entities, cannot provide guidance for 
what that lower level entity would be. Moreover, our assumptions about the decomposability of 
the system, the existence of robust causal relationships at one level, and the lack of self-
organization or a reinforcement loop can misidentify our target, misinform our intervention, or 
dismiss morally significant negative consequences.  
Assuming decomposability misguides our collective moral response. For instance, in 
response to the account of misogyny and patriarchy of Manne (2018), Haslanger (2020) argues 
that it is a mistake to call patriarchy the target of feminist collective action.  She says that we 
need to understand the oppressive system that controls women as both patriarchal and as 
“capitalist white supremacist nationalist ableist ageist heteronormative…etc.” (2020, p. 2). In 
other words, Haslanger endorses an analytical account of functionally identified patriarchy, but 
she argues that, in practice, patriarchy should not be feminists’ target. Although she does not 
mention it explicitly, Haslanger recognizes that the interrelations between different systems of 
oppression violate the minimal interaction assumption of decomposable or near-decomposable 
systems. Thus, focusing on one system without attending to the others is not only futile but can 
also lead to unintended negative consequences that have moral significance. For example, the 
interrelation between systems and individuals can recreate or transform the same oppressive 
system into some other form.  Haslanger argues that “there was a gendered division of labor 
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before capitalism, and capitalism appropriated it and created a new formation that divided care 
and wage work in a distinctive way” (2020, p. 7).48 
Targeting only one of many interacting systems can backfire or waste collective effort. 
For example, as some49 argue, controlling the means of production and controlling women in a 
society are interdependent. In other words, the economic system and patriarchy create a feedback 
loop in the sense that controlling women and their labor allows the control of the means of 
production and controlling the means of production creates a culture that controls women (for 
examples see Fraser & Jaeggi, 2018 and Young, 1990). In this situation, trying to liberate women 
without changing the economic system is futile, because the economic system recreates their 
domination repeatedly.50 Similarly, changing the economic system without addressing the 
oppression of women is ineffective, because the new economic system adopts and utilizes 
patriarchy as well.51 Such an attempt can backfire and harm women and their social network 
(Khader, 2019).  
To correct our target, Haslanger’s suggestion is to keep the big picture in mind and not 
assume that the analytical possibility for functional decomposition translates into a practical 
decomposition. The problem with this assumption is that it implies a relative independence of 
these oppressive systems from one another. Haslanger is right that “we are in this together” and 
that one cannot fight patriarchy without fighting racism and other forms of domination (p. 9). 
However, the level of complexity of the system can make it barely possible for individuals to 
 
48 Haslanger (2020) also argues that “Likewise the marginalization and exploitation of immigrant and captured 
others did not start with capitalism, but capitalism transformed those practices into a distinctive form of racial 
exploitation, expropriation, and forced relocation into chattel slavery”.  
49 For examples see Haslanger (2020), Fraser & Jaeggi (2018), and Young (1990).  
50 The same idea applies to other forms of domination. For instance, Tremain (2017) argues that the concepts of 
health and disability can be used by capitalism to medicalize disability and create a huge pharmaceutical market. 
51 As Haslanger (2020) suggests, “It is not an accident that mass incarceration disproportionately affects those of 
recent African descent and that females are disproportionately trafficked; there are forces in addition to the forces of 
capital that are responsible for these patterns” (p. 7) 
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rely on functional analysis while correcting its shortcomings by having the big picture in mind. 
Functional decomposition leaves to our intuition the matter of which system of oppression can be 
left out as the aim of our collective action.  
Haslanger argues that we ought to have the big picture in mind to avoid the risk of 
narrowing the proper target of our resistance. However, just having the big picture in mind will 
not solve the problem because there is a systemic trouble with our methodology. The 
disagreement between Black feminists and white feminists is an example of the general 
inadequacy of our intuition to understand the big picture and to correct the misguided 
assumptions of functional explanation. In fact, it is not clear how having the big picture in mind 
can correct issues like the centering of the experiences of relatively privileged members of an 
oppressed group in our analysis of separate oppressions. For instance, the Combahee River 
Collective (1986) argues that the very same analytic distinction that Haslanger offers between 
racial and gender oppression distorts their simultaneous operation in the lives of people who 
experience both.  
In addition to taking for granted decomposability, assuming a single-level causal 
relationship can make some interventions more appealing than others while in practice they are 
ineffective. While functional analysis can make targeting and implementing policies an 
appealing option, the history of social change suggests that without multi-level change, top-down 
policy intervention can be ineffective or even harmful. Policies do not change everything that 
needs to be changed, and they cause backlash or other controlling mechanisms to get activated. 
Some of these controlling mechanisms can stay dormant for many years. In the mainstream 
understanding of policy interventions, a group or institution--like government--is seen “as a 
singular actor and a policy as an action taken by this actor” (Morcol, 2014, p. 11). Thus, policy is 
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an object that has impacts on a target population to generate an outcome (Morcol, 2014). 
Therefore, we follow a sequence of events to see what policy we ought to use, and we follow the 
policy action to see whether it is in fact achieving the goal. However, neither the government nor 
the general population is a single actor that can just react to the policy. 
Policies are created, implemented, and come to effect in a series of interactions with 
many levels and many social and individual entities. During the history of the liberation of 
women and of African Americans, focusing on policy change proved necessary but insufficient. 
For instance, the attempt to implement color-blind policies included the assumption that 
changing this higher-level social entity could effectively remedy the problem of social inequality 
(Anderson, 2010). However, many scholars52 point out that policies are implemented by people 
in the context of culture and history with all its inequalities and prejudices. The high rate of 
incarceration of African Americans and coded crimes that disproportionally target this group are 
evidence of the scholars’ claims. Even worse can be the backlash from the general public in 
response to such policies. For instance, in response to some progress in integrating schools, more 
white middle class families moved out of the cities. This migration happened en masse because 
of the positive and negative feedback loops that effectively resisted top-down change. In 
response to not only this policy but also other implemented policies with different goals, the 
behavior of some families became socially contagious and created further advantages to moving 
and disadvantages to staying in the cities. The exodus of white middle-class families partially led 
to further mortgage discrimination, red-lining, and other discriminatory practices as well as to a 
permanent change in the structure of American cities, roads, public transportation, and other 
environmental factors. 
 
52 For example Anderson (2014) or Alexander (2010).  
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Such failed policy interventions relied on a robust causal relationship between 
segregation and racial inequality at the aggregate level. However, what these interventions failed 
to take into account was the interdependency of these inequalities with many other systems in 
which individuals are embedded. Such interdependency creates self-regulating and reinforcing 
feedback loops that make it almost impossible to engineer society through top-down policy 
implementation in isolation from other methods of intervention at other levels. Things need to 
change at many levels, and to both explain and prescribe social change, we need to consider the 
interdependency of the individual, groups, and other social entities with one another. Moreover, 
an individual’s preferences and decisions are not fixed and unaffected by their peers, their 
relations, their personal and historical paths, their culture, etc. If possible, a morally adequate 
intervention requires consideration of all these aspects so as to avoid unintended consequences. 
Thus, although the requirements for functional analysis are satisfied in the examples above, 
functional explanation has misguided our moral response or caused us to fail to see foreseeable 
negative consequences with moral significance.   
7. Reconciliation 
 Chronic and complex social inequalities are instances of a certain kind of problem that 
requires a unique set of tools to be correctly analyzed. So far, I have showed that functionalism 
can respond to the claim that social entities and properties cannot, in principle, be causally 
efficacious. However, I showed that in the study of at least some very interesting social 
problems, functionalism and its fundamental tenet, multiple realizability, have important 
descriptive and normative problems. In what follows, I distinguish three kinds of problems each 
in need of distinct set of tools to investigate. This distinction explains the success and 
shortcoming of a holistic account like structural functionalism. My goal is to show that although 
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this account is successful in analyzing one kind of problems, it leads to descriptive and 
normative problems when it is applied to other kinds.   
 In his classical paper, “Complexity in Science,” Warren Weaver (1948) distinguishes 
three kinds of problems: problems of simplicity, disorganized complexity, and organized 
complexity. The first, problems of simplicity, involve only a few variables and are describable at 
multiple independent levels. For instance, the growth of population over time only involves two 
variables and can be possibly described equally well at the individual and aggregate levels. The 
only variable involved at the individual level is existence and at the population level is simply 
the aggregate of the value for that variable. In contrast, the second, problems of disorganized 
complexity, can involve billions or trillions of variables at the lower or individual level. For this 
kind of problem, statistical techniques, or what Weaver calls “the science of averages,” are the 
most useful. However, for this kind of averaging to be meaningful, we should be able to assume 
that there is no interaction among the components or the variables that represent them. In this 
situation, the whole or the higher-level entities or properties are just the average of the parts.  
 Functionalism and the multiple realizability thesis are best used for explaining problems 
of simplicity and problems of disorganized complexity. In fact, for problems of simplicity, 
methodological individualism and functionalism lead to the same results. Focusing on these 
kinds of problems also helps us to see why methodological individualists are concerned with 
exclusion argument and the redundancy of higher-level or functional explanations. For the 
problems of disorganized complexity, however, it seems that functionalism has a big advantage. 
Averaging billions or trillions of variables to find some correlation or orderly behavior at the 
higher level seems to be the only way to land any kind of explanation. More importantly, finding 
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the relationship between the averages can be helpful in finding new instances of the same social 
property or entity.  
 Weaver’s third kind of problem, that of organized complexity, resembles neither of the 
other two kinds. A moderate number of variables are often involved in organized complexity 
problems. More importantly, there is a strong non-linear interaction among the variables and the 
components involved in such problems. Thus, no meaningful averaging can take place. These 
problems are often described in terms of their emergent properties since they involve a “sizable 
number of factors which are interrelated into an organic whole” (Weaver, 1948, p. 451). The 
organized complexity cases are the most interesting and relevant to the cases of social 
inequalities when organization emerges out of individuals’ interactions and without any 
centralized force. More importantly, organized complexity occurs when the collective whole 
finds ways to store information and process it without any of the individual components that 
have access to such information or history.  
The problems of organized complexity cannot be adequately addressed by statistical 
techniques and methods applicable to the other two kinds of problem.53 The reason for this is 
that averaging and treating social entities as abstract entities require the assumption that the 
levels of description are independent. They also require the social phenomena to be 
decomposable to minimally interactive components that allow meaningful averaging methods. 
Therefore, applying functionalism or multiple realizability to organized complexity problems is 
 
53 Weaver argues that “The problems…are just too complicated to yield to the old nineteenth century techniques 
which were so dramatically successful on two-, three-, or four-variable problems of simplicity. These new problems, 
moreover, cannot be handled with the statistical techniques so effective in describing average behavior in problems 




problematic even though these approaches are perfectly applicable to problems of simplicity or 
disorganized complexity.  
The alternative to functionalism or any kind of explanation that relies on functional 
decomposition is inspired by recent advances in computation and simulation modeling. The 
family of approaches that addresses the problems of organized complexity is known as complex 
dynamic systems theory, which brings in radically different assumptions about the plausible 
explanation for social phenomena. According to this approach, not only can social entities like 
race and gender be causally efficacious, but social systems can also have novel and emergent 
social properties and be capable of self-organization. In the next chapter, I explain the mechanics 
of such an approach and discuss its advantages over the traditional functionalist and structuralist 
approaches to explanation. It is also important to note that intersectionality in sociology shares 
its fundamental tenets with complex dynamic systems theory.  
8. Conclusion 
Claims of social inequality and injustice are often criticized on the grounds that a real and 
reliable social explanation would be describable in terms of individuals and their attributes rather 
than in abstract terms involving elements like race, gender, class, or the like. Such an 
individualistic approach is often used to show that either there are no such race-, gender-, or 
class-related inequalities or, if there are, then they cannot play any causal role in our explanation. 
In fact, the causal efficacy of such “abstractions” is the greatest challenge for any form of non-
reductive causal explanations. A functionalist approach to social explanation is one of the 
pioneering approaches to explanation that aims to address this challenge about causation at the 
higher level. Functionalists argue that higher level abstractions are realizable by a variety of 
individual level configurations; therefore, they are irreducible to a composition of individual-
level properties.  
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Functionalism and its fundamental tenet, multiple realizability, has been criticized on 
multiple grounds in favor of methodological individualism. However, in this chapter, I provided 
an alternative objection for multiple realizability that acknowledges the usefulness of such an 
approach to explanation in the social domain while pointing out its possible limitations. I showed 
that functionalism and its fundamental tenet, multiple realizability, rely on the assumption that 
levels of descriptions are independent of one another. However, there are a variety of interesting 
and relevant cases for which such an assumption is invalid. I also argued that functionalism, like 
many other non-reductive and holistic approaches to explanation, relies on functional 
decomposition as a holistic tool. Again, I showed that for some chronic and complex problems in 
a highly integrated social system functional decomposition is a misguiding tool. Moreover, I 
discussed the ways that the assumptions about the independent levels and decomposability can 
misguide our moral response to social problems. Finally, following Weaver (1948), I 
distinguished three kinds of problems that social explanation needs to address:  problems of 
simplicity, problems of disorganized complexity, and problems of organized complexity. 
Although functionalism seems to be very useful for problems of simplicity and disorganized 











Chapter Four: Complexity Theory and Social Change 
 
1. Introduction 
 A complete understanding of a phenomenon with moral significance or of a normative 
concept like oppression54  needs to account for not only its harms but also the causes of those 
harms (Cudd, 2005, p. 22). For instance, the causal explanation of the unemployment of Khalid, 
a young Black man, informs and constrains the proper moral evaluation of his situation. The 
moral status of Khalid’s unemployment is different if, on the one hand, the unemployment is 
voluntary and a matter of free and informed choice55 or, on the other, the result of the employer’s 
unfair discrimination against African Americans. Recognizing the appropriate moral response to 
a problem also requires a causal explanation that partially determines and constraints the options 
for intervention. Given that the causal explanation can be different depending on its underlying 
method of explanation and its underlying methodological and metaphysical assumptions, the 
conceptual explanatory framework that we use to inform our moral diagnosis and our moral 
response becomes significant. The aim of this chapter is to propose complexity theory as the 
proper framework for not only explaining a social phenomenon like oppression but also 
understanding the proper sites for social change.  
Examples of the indirect influence of an explanatory framework and method of 
explanation in determining proper moral response are abundant. For instance, liberal feminism, 
 
54 By oppression I mean a social circumstance that affects the oppressed life in a systemic and wrongful way. Such 
an effect can be persistent and present in nearly all domains of the individual life (Silvermint, 2013) 
55 This assumes that it is possible to choose freely.  
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which explains gender oppression by relying on individualistic methods of explanation and, at 
least to some extent, on methodological individualism, defines patriarchy as the discriminatory 
attitude of sexist men. Thus, the goal of liberal feminism is to change and replace the 
problematic attitudes that cause inequality and disadvantage for women. Marxist feminism and 
Marxist thought in general are known for their use of a functional model of explanation. For 
Marxist feminism, patriarchy should be seen and defined in its relation to class oppression. 
Hence, at least according to some Marxist feminists, the proper aim of feminist action is to 
participate in efforts to eliminate class oppression. Finally, socialist feminists rely on a systems 
account of explanation to argue that oppression should be understood as a system and that 
systems of oppression are interdependent.56 Thus, the proper target of feminist intervention 
cannot be just patriarchy or the system that oppresses and punishes women (Young, 1990, Ch. 1; 
also Jaggar, 1983).  
My goal in this chapter is to push the conversation about explanation one step further and 
argue that social systems in general are systems with distinctive features for which the general 
individualistic and functionalist frameworks—which I refer to as the traditional frameworks of 
explanation—are inadequate. In the previous chapter, I argued that the behavior of social 
systems violates the fundamental metaphysical and methodological assumptions of traditional 
frameworks of explanation. In what follows, I argue that the distinctive features of social systems 
match the three key characteristics of complex dynamic systems, namely well-integration, 
emergence, and self-organization.  
 
56 Although the interdependence of oppressive systems is a well-respected phenomenon, theorizing such an 
interdependence has proved to be difficult if not impossible (for example see Walby, 2007). I will discuss this issue 
later in this chapter.   
89 
 
In the first section of this chapter, I start with the assumption that social systems are or 
can be well-integrated since they exhibit the consequences of such well-integration. For instance, 
social systems are sensitive to heterogeneity, rely on stabilizing feedback loops to resist change, 
and involve reinforcing feedback loops when they do change, etc. I further show that centering 
the interdependence of components in our analysis justifies the need for the complex dynamic 
systems framework of explanation by showing how social systems can have emergent properties 
and self-organize. In sections two and three, I discuss various metaphysical and methodological 
objections to key characteristics of complex and dynamic systems, namely emergence and self-
organization.  
2. Society as a Well-Integrated System 
 My goal in this section is to show that the best conceptual framework to explain social 
change is complex dynamical systems theory. Thus, I argue that changing social systems have 
the three key characteristics57 of complex dynamical systems: they are well-integrated, they 
exhibit emergent behavior, and they can self-organize. I formerly58 argued that society can be an 
example of a well-integrated system because it exhibits the features of such a system. In this 
section, I argue that a proper account of social phenomena and social change needs to explain the 
consequences of such well-integration, including the importance of heterogeneity and feedback 
loops as well as the emergence of non-linearity and stochasticity in the behavior of such systems. 
I also argue that the right ratio between stabilizing and reinforcing feedback mechanisms in a 
well-integrated system explains the possibility for emergent behavior and self-organization.  
 
57 These characteristics are framed by Gallagher and Appenzeller (1999). 




Well-integrated systems are often heterogenous. An important shortcoming of the 
traditional frameworks that explain the behavior of systems with many interdependent causal 
components is in their treatment of heterogeneity. Take for instance their common assumption 
about independent levels. If levels are independent, then we can pick a unit of analysis at the 
individual or aggregate level and assume that the heterogeneities at the lower level are 
explanatory irrelevant. For example, according to the traditional frameworks, in the analysis of 
women’s oppression, we can assume that the differences among women’s experiences of 
oppression are either non-existent or explanatorily irrelevant.  
Although the homogeneity assumption allows us to distinguish relevant information from 
noise, there are many exceptions in which assuming homogeneity is not justified.  For instance, 
assuming a social group like women to be homogenous undermines the simultaneous effects of 
gender and racial inequalities on the lives of people who experience them (Combahee River 
Collective, 1986). Such variations of experience within social groups are the cause of their 
heterogeneity. The idea is that because individuals simultaneously belong to more than one 
group and are influenced by their various memberships, “No social group … is itself 
homogenous, but mirrors in its own differentiation many of the groups in the wider society” 
(Young, 1988, p. 273). More importantly, such variations are not static; in fact, “Patterns of 
group differentiation are fluid, often undergoing rapid change.” For instance, before the 
nineteenth century, “homosexuality did not serve as a basis of group ascription and 
identification” (Young, 1988, p. 273). 
It is important to note that the importance of heterogeneity in explaining complex 
phenomenon is not limited to social systems and groups. For instance, landline telephone circuits 
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convert the human voice into patterns of electric oscillation and reconvert the oscillation into a 
vibration of air at the end of the line. Through this process of conversion and reconversion, there 
are random oscillations of the wires’ and the amplifiers’ atoms, which create some noise and 
reduce the quality of the voice when it arrives at the receiver. Not only will we not lose any 
information by omitting the noise, but the quality of communication will be greater without it. In 
other words, a good telephone circuit, just like a good explanation, distinguishes noise from 
relevant information and deletes it through some averaging method, but as in audio feedback, 
deleting the noise can weaken our explanatory model. 
Sometimes, the very same averaging method that is helpful in one context means no 
explanation in another. For instance, in a process called audio feedback, noise is the most 
important causal element without which there is no explanation. Audio feedback refers to the 
phenomenon in which a subject hears a loud howling sound due to a feedback loop between a 
speaker and a microphone that are positioned close to one another. Examples of this 
phenomenon are abundant in public address systems or wherever a microphone and a speaker 
create a loop in which the sound keeps getting amplified. In such a case, a random variation from 
the average in the microphone is the cause of the phenomenon. Thus, if through a process of 
averaging, like the landline circuits, we eliminate such deviation from our model, there can be no 
explanation. In other words, assuming homogeneity is not always justified since sometimes the 
relevant piece of information is lost in this assumption. Similarly, in explanation of a social 
phenomenon, important information is lost if we assume, for instance, that every woman 
experiences inequality just like the most privileged individuals in the group—in this case white, 
middle-class, non-disabled, and cisgender women—or even like the majority of women 
experience them.  
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2.2 Feedback Loops 
Another important consequence of well-integration is feedback. We have a feedback loop 
whenever the output of a system loops back and becomes the input of the same system. In this 
situation, the causal chain forms a circuit or loop. Feedback loops are usually divided to two 
main groups: stabilizing or negative loops and reinforcing or positive loops. Negative loops are 
sources of stability and resistance to change (Meadows, 2008). In other words, negative feedback 
loops are a type of self-regulating mechanism that protects a system from perturbation and 
distress. On the other hand, positive feedback loops make systems unstable and are responsible 
for exponential growth. Individuals and entities can, for any particular purpose, be a part of a 
variety of balancing feedback loops. 
Contrary to negative feedback loops, positive feedback loops can make systems unstable. 
They can also increase complexity, diversity, and sophistication. In other words, these loops are 
self-enhancing and can lead to exponential growth (Finegood, 2011, p. 217). Audio feedback is 
an instance of a positive feedback loop in which a small cause can spontaneously have very large 
effects through magnifying heterogeneity. Another example of a positive feedback loop is when 
unripe apples on a tree ripen overnight. The process begins with the first ripened apple, which 
produces ethylene, a gas that causes other apples to ripen. Thus, the apples in the vicinity of the 
first apple ripen and produce ethylene, a process that continues until all the apples ripen. The 
ripening of apples is also an instance of a positive feedback loop since, similar to the audio 
feedback example, the output of the same ripening system or mechanism, namely ethylene, feeds 
into the same system and functions as the future input, the ethylene that is necessary to make the 




2.3 Dynamic, Non-linear, and Stochastic: Why Well-Integrated Systems are Dynamic and 
Complex  
Feedback loops explain why some systems are dynamic, non-linear, and complex and 
exhibit stochastic behavior. Well-integrated systems are dynamic since feedback loops connect 
their present state to their future in a way that is not possible to study a-temporally. This 
connection in time also explains why systems have non-linear behavior. A linear system is a 
system whose output is independent of its future input. For example, we can imagine that we 
need two units of ethylene for an apple to ripen. Thus, if we have a linear system that receives 
ethylene as input and gives ripened apples as output, we need 200 units of ethylene to produce 
100 ripe apples:  the input and output have a proportional or linear relationship. Also, the input 
and output are independent of one another in the sense that the present output, ripened apple, 
does not change the future input, or the amount of ethylene that is necessary to ripen the next 
apple. In such a system, the only natural and internal change that we can expect is decay or 
decrease in the efficiency of the ripening system.  
In contrast, the ripening apple system is non-linear if, instead of containing isolated 
apples with no interaction, the apples are in the vicinity of one another. Thus, when one apple 
ripens and produces ethylene, this causes other apples in its vicinity to ripen as well. Making the 
first apple ripen creates more ethylene and reduces the amount of ethylene that we need to make 
the next apples ripen. Thus, not only is the output no longer proportional to the input but also 
explaining the system requires observing its behavior over time. In sum, a system with a 
feedback loop exhibits dynamic and non-linear behavior: dynamic because time matters, and the 
proper explanation of the system’s behavior cannot be ahistorical and nonlinear because the 
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output of the system with non-isolated apples is not proportional to the input or the amount of 
ethylene that is necessary to ripen apples in isolation.  
Systems with many well-connected components involve many interrelated and 
sometimes accidental feedback loops, which make the systems complex and lead to stochastic 
behavior.  The difference between the linear and non-linear ripening system is in the level of 
connectivity among the apples. In the linear system, apples are fully isolated, so their behavior is 
independent of one another. In the non-linear system, however, their vicinity and sensitivity to 
each other’s behavior makes important differences. One of these differences is the likelihood of 
spontaneous feedback loops emerging that create a reinforcing network of ripening apples. Such 
a network is obviously sensitive to the heterogeneity of many components. For instance, the 
distance between the apples, amount of ethylene each produces or needs for ripening, and 
topography of the network can all change the length of time or amount of ethylene that the non-
linear system needs to ripen all the apples.  
A non-linear system like the ripening apples exhibits a somewhat stochastic or 
unpredictable behavior because there are many variables that are highly sensitive to 
heterogeneity, in other words, because the system is complex. The level of stochasticity can vary 
based on the number of elements that are relevant and the degree of connectivity among the 
components. For instance, if for some reason the apples were moving around randomly, their 
accidental connections and feedback loops would change. In this case, the overall ripening 
pattern would be, in principle, unpredictable and stochastic even if each apple followed a 
deterministic path to ripening.  
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2.4 Well-Integrated Systems at the Edge of Chaos 
The interconnected web of feedback loops is the most important feature of a “well-
integrated system,” in which “the operations of different component parts are interdependent; 
that is, they more or less continuously impact each other’s operations” (Bechtel & Richardson, 
1993). However, the complex behavior of some well-integrated systems has an important 
difference from other systems. A precise tension between amplifying and dampening feedback 
can put a well-integrated system at the edge of chaos, which is a state between order and disorder 
that has a high level of complexity. At this edge state, components neither resolve into a chaotic 
pattern of behavior nor lock themselves in a fully regular and ordered pattern.  
Also, at the edge of chaos, systems are adaptive and able to respond to both internal and 
external turbulence in a creative and unpredictable way. As I will explain shortly, the 
unpredictability of a system at the state between order and disorder is constructive and leads to 
more order and sophistication. Also, the amplifying and counteracting feedback loops lead to 
integration or diversification as well as to differentiation, all which increases complexity. In 
other words, systems in this critical state exhibit emergent properties and can self-organize.   
2.5 Complex Dynamic Systems  
Well-integrated systems are radically different from other systems, and the proper 
method of explanation for these systems is radically different as well. Complex dynamical 
systems theory is the alternative framework that is most compatible with the radical differences 
between well-integrated systems and other systems. Its emphasis on relationships and 
connectivity, networks, and dynamic patterns of behavior is fundamental to systems theory since 
investigation restricted to components and their properties has proven to have less use. In sum, 
the differences between well-integrated and less integrated systems justifies the need for a 
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distinct explanatory framework like complex dynamic systems theory or complexity theory for 
short.  
The importance of a framework based on complexity theory lies in its unique set of 
conceptual assumptions and the set of heuristic and justificatory tools on which it relies. The 
conceptual assumptions of complexity theory are different from traditional frameworks of 
explanation because in well-integrated systems, the unit of analysis, time frame, and preferred 
method of explanation cannot be assumed a priori. The heuristic methods are also different from 
those of traditional frameworks since well-integrated systems are non-decomposable.  
Well-integrated systems and complexity theory violate the fundamental assumptions of 
traditional frameworks of explanation.59 Since well-integrated systems violate the separation of 
levels, the unit of analysis often exists at multiple levels and involves heterogeneous and 
sometime unintuitive components. Thus, it is not possible to adequately describe the behavior of 
a system at only one level. In other words, in the explanation of many social phenomena, not 
individuals, nor their psychology, nor groups of individuals are the proper unit of analysis. For 
instance, Charles Tilly argues that the proper unit of analysis in social protests “often consist[s] 
not of (just) living breathing whole individuals but of groups, organizations, bundles of social 
ties, and social sites such as occupations and neighborhoods” (2005, p.61). Moreover, the 
dynamical nature of well-integrated systems, due to the influence of many interrelated feedback 
loops with many different time scales, explains the inadequacy of ahistorical models or models 
with limited time frames.  For instance, Khalid’s unemployment might in fact be due to his very 
limited education if we consider the boundaries of the relevant time frame to be limited to his job 
search process. However, in a longer time frame that includes the history of redlining, the proper 
 
59 In previous chapters, I discussed three fundamental assumptions of traditional frameworks of explanation: the unit 
of analysis, time frame, and reductive method of explanation. 
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causal explanation for his unemployment is likely to be different. Finally, reductive methods of 
explanation are insufficient to describe or predict important characteristics of the systems. The 
interrelation among the components of a well-integrated system resists such a reduction since 
reduction requires dismissing the interrelation among positive and negative feedback loops.   
Common heuristic tools are not useful for understanding well-integrated systems, which 
resist the decomposition and localization that are fundamental methods of discovery for most 
accounts of explanation. Assuming that a complex phenomenon is decomposable or near 
decomposable presupposes that it is the product of a set of subordinate functions. Such 
decomposition can happen at the level of individuals, groups, or systems and assumes a small 
number of “minimally interactive” or independent functions that explain the phenomenon in 
question. For instance, in the linear ripening system, we assume that the apples and their ripening 
pattern are fully independent of one another, which makes it easy to decompose the components 
of the system and localize the cause of each event. For example, we could have a line of apples 
in which each apple can only influence the ripening process of the apple that is next in line. In 
this case, the system is at least near-decomposable since we can still follow the sequence of 
events and decompose the whole process into smaller, minimally interactive parts.  However, if 
each apple can influence and be influenced by the ripening process of more than one apple, then 
the components are neither minimally interactive nor easily describable in a sequence of events. 
The higher the number of interrelations, the harder it is to decompose the system or localize the 
parts. In such a setting, all apples are or can be somewhat responsible in all steps. In sum, a 
complex network of connections can create a well-integrated system that is resistant to 
decomposition and localization.  
98 
 
Complexity theory requires a different set of conceptual, mathematical, and heuristic 
tools for explaining the behavior of well-integrated systems. Connectivity and relations are 
necessary for the emergence of well-integrated systems and their complex behavior. Thus, 
instead of understanding the features and attributes of the components—or, in social explanation, 
the individuals—and then adding them up to understand a social phenomenon, the focus of a 
proper method of explanation needs to be the relations and interactions among the components. 
This focus cannot be accompanied by a commitment to any a priori determined unit or level of 
explanation. Therefore, assuming units and understanding them is fruitless and potentially 
misleading. Complexity theory relies on alternative tools such as network theory, game theory, 
graph theory, fractal analysis, recurrence analysis, and the like that are capable of understanding 
the relational aspect of the system without assuming any level of explanation or unit of 
analysis.60 Complexity theory also does not make any commitment to the possibility of 
decomposition at any level or to any specific level of explanation.  
Although few and still limited, due to limited available data, there are strong and 
groundbreaking studies that rely on the complexity model to describe and predict system-level 
change related to social issues. For instance, Christakis and Fowler (2009) show that the growth 
of obesity in a community is best described through an interrelated network among individuals.61 
They evaluate a densely interconnected social network of more than 12,000 individuals over 32 
years period to see whether the number and nature of the individuals’ social ties can influence 
their likelihood of gaining weight. They show that obesity can spread like a disease from person 
 
60 For more information about fractal analysis and recurrence analysis, see Richardson & Chemero (2014). 




to person or through social ties.62Their study and many other studies63 show that elements other 
than the individuals’ eating habits or their genetic disposition play important roles in the obesity 
epidemic. Thus, the consensus is that the proper framework of explanation for understanding 
such an epidemic and finding the proper method of intervention needs to be complexity theory. 
Another example of recent use and success of this theory is the network approach to terrorism  
(Sageman , 2004). Network researchers suggest that understanding the dynamics of terrorist 
networks can guide effective intervention (for examples see Pedahzur & Perliger, 2006; Carley, 
2006; and Farley, 2003).   
So far, I have argued that social systems can be well-integrated systems mainly because of 
the level of connectivity among their components that creates a nexus of positive and negative 
feedback loops. However, endorsing the idea of society as a well-integrated, complex, and 
dynamic system has metaphysical and ontological implications, some of which have been greatly 
criticized in the philosophical literature related to social explanation. The emergence of system-
level properties that are not explainable in terms of the properties of the system’s components 
and the self-organization of systems without a central planner are among the highly controversial 
characteristics that raise metaphysical and ontological concerns. My goal in the next two sections 
is to show that both emergence and self-organization are possible in well-integrated systems like 
societies. Thus, there is at least not an a priori reason to reject a social explanation just because 
of its reliance on emergence and self-organization.  
 
62  “A person's chances of becoming obese increased by 57% (95% confidence interval [CI], 6 to 123) if he or she 
had a friend who became obese in a given interval. Among pairs of adult siblings, if one sibling became obese, the 
chance that the other would become obese increased by 40% (95% CI, 21 to 60). If one spouse became obese, the 
likelihood that the other spouse would become obese increased by 37% (95% CI, 7 to 73). These effects were not 
seen among neighbors in the immediate geographic location. Persons of the same sex had relatively greater 
influence on each other than those of the opposite sex” (Christakis & Fowler, 2007, p. 370) 
 




Discussion of the metaphysical possibility of emergent properties has a long history in both 
philosophy and the sciences. Although emergence is the second key characteristic of complex 
dynamical systems, many social philosophers doubt the legitimacy of social explanations when 
they imply or assume the possibility of emergent systemic properties. For instance, Cudd (2005) 
argues that Hegel’s recognition theory of oppression is untenable because of its reliance on 
emergence. According to Hegel, the struggle for recognition among different social groups is 
similar to the master/slave dialectic. Hegel recognizes a common pattern of struggle that explains 
how the dominated social group gains recognition. He suggests that usually a dominant social 
group exploits and disrespects a dominated social group. This domination leads to a life-and-
death struggle between the social groups that ultimately forces the dominant one to recognize the 
dominated, changes the class structure in society, and creates a new structure and/or form of 
domination.  
Cudd (2005) argues that Hegel’s recognition theory is problematic since it “posits forces at 
the social level that are emergent from the individual level; that is, there is no posited causal 
connection between the social force of the struggle for recognition and the individuals that 
compose the society” (2005, p. 40). According to Cudd, the explanations that rely on an 
“emergent social force are ruled out by the ontological criterion of causal fundamentalism” 
(2005, p. 41). This criterion, also called supervenience individualism, is the idea that individuals 
and their attributes exhaust and determine the social world.64  
Cudd (2005) is not the only one who considers theories that rely on emergence to be 
metaphysically untenable.65 In fact, her reservation about the legitimacy of emergence in social 
 
64 Cudd (2005) defines this criterion as: “macro-level causes supervene on micro-level ones” (p. 38).  
65 For a more in depth discussion about this topic, see Elster (1983).  
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explanation is rooted in a metaphysical and ontological concern. Kim (1999) artfully formulates 
this sort of metaphysical concern about emergence in the form of a dilemma, according to which, 
emergent properties are irreducibly novel properties of a system that are neither predictable nor 
explainable in terms of the properties of their constituents. Thus, Kim argues that the 
metaphysical position of emergence is unstable because it exists in the middle of two 
contradictory positions. For instance, in the philosophy of mind, emergentists deny reductivism, 
or the idea that mind is reducible to the body, as well as dualism, or the claim that mind and body 
have completely independent natures.  
Emergentists need to show that there is a stable position between reductivism and dualism 
while they endorse physicalism,66 which assumes that physical components exhaust and 
determine the mind and mental activity.  However, Kim argues that if, on the one hand, 
emergentists stay committed to physicalism, they must also endorse reductivism because if the 
mind is physical, then it is governed by physical laws and reductively explicable. But, on the 
other hand, if they deny physicalism, then they must endorse some form of metaphysical 
dualism, which implies that the nature of the mind is not physical. The first horn of the dilemma 
contradicts the definition of emergence, and the second horn is metaphysically untenable.  
In social explanation, the parallel dilemma is to find a stable metaphysical position between 
reductive individualism and some kind of dualism, which assumes that social entities are fully 
independent of individuals and their attributes. For instance, in the discussion of social change, 
on one side, the reductionists argue that culture, ideology, and social structure are nothing above 
and beyond common attitudes and beliefs that are explainable in terms of individual attributes 





culture, for example, in social explanation since it is already accounted for when we consider 
individual attributes. On the other side, advocates of cultural analysis and critique argue that 
culture plays a constitutive role in the explanation of the existence and persistence of social 
problems. However, they argue that culture is not explicable in terms of individuals’ beliefs, 
attitudes, and/or organization. In other words, their general idea is that “culture matters, and 
further, culture is not just a matter of individual psychology or political institutions” (Cohen, 
1978/2000, p. 10). From this approach, culture is a net of “semiotic relations” that enables and 
constrains coordination within and between human as well as non-human social groups (for 
examples see Haslanger, 2020; Sewell, 2005). Individuals and their interactions, then, are the 
generators and creators of culture, while without culture, individuals’ interactions and 
coordination would be impossible. Thus, the dilemma is to show that culture is irreducible to 
individuals and their attributes without assuming some form of dualism about culture.  
In respect to the dilemma Kim formulates, a plausible account of emergence needs to satisfy 
three related conditions. First, endorsing emergence should not require endorsing the existence of 
any supernatural power or unnatural entity. It is important to note that this criterion does not 
imply that the unit of analysis in social explanation ought to be individuals in a sense that 
excludes from the explanation their biology, their built and natural environment, their network, 
or their history. This condition also rules out accounts that assume mind-body dualism or, at the 
social level, assume a super-individual with intention, desires, or needs similar to those of 
individuals. Second, emergence happens at the aggregate or system level and involves novel 
properties that are irreducible to the properties of individuals or components. Third, emergence 
involves synchronic determination67 in the sense that a difference in the system’s properties 
 
67 This is stronger than supervenience individualism since it assumes a causal dependence in synchronic 
determination, as Boogerd et. al, (2005) argues.   
103 
 
cannot exist without a difference in the properties of individuals and their organization. Although 
synchronic determination is a condition that guarantees dependence between levels, it is not quite 
the same as supervenience individualism or the idea that individuals and their attributes exhaust 
and determine the social world. Thus, a systemic property is emergent if complete knowledge of 
the arrangements and the properties of the parts is inadequate to explain or predict novel 
properties at the system level (Boogerd et al., 2005). 
An account of emergence that avoids the metaphysical dilemma and satisfies the conditions 
of plausibility needs to expand the definition of emergence beyond the abstract relationship 
between behavior of the system and its components. For instance, in his definition of emergence, 
C. D. Broad provides an alternative account of emergence and reducibility that involves 
contrasting the behavior of the components in the system and their behavior in isolation or in 
simpler systems. According to Broad, “A collective disposition is reducible if the presence of 
this property in a compound substance is logically entailed by the dispositions which its 
constituents manifest in other circumstances and the special relations which they stand to each 
other in this substance” (1925, p. 268). Thus, a systemic property is emergent if, even in 
principle, it cannot be deduced from the behavior of the components in a simpler system. The 
emphasis is on comparing the actual system with a simpler system of which the components 
could be a part. This definition is especially useful in social explanation because the abstract 
metaphysical relationship between components presupposes their existence outside of any 
system. However, there is no such a thing as individuals in absolute isolation. This is because 
first, if we reject dualism, an embodied individual cannot exist without a body or an environment 
that nourishes the body. The coupling of the body, environment, and the whatever we define as 
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the individual is,68 or at least can be, a system. Second, an individual without any other human 
interaction barely behaves in the way that we expect in order to explain how our social systems 
work (Longino, 2019).69 Thus, the most explanatorily useful definition of emergence would 
compare the individual’s behavior in different systems with different levels of complexity 
because individuals only exist in systems. 
Relying on Broad’s account of emergence and reducibility, Boogerd et al. (2005) argue that 
there are two conditions under which emergence is metaphysically possible. Meeting either of 
these two conditions can potentially refute the first horn of the metaphysical dilemma, the idea 
that emergent properties are explicable in terms of the properties of the constituents. As 
mentioned above, the more useful definition of emergence defines irreducibility in terms of 
logical deduction of the emergent property from the properties of the components in simpler 
systems. This definition replaces irreducibility with non-deducibility since the latter is sufficient 
to obtain the former. Moreover, the more useful definition draws a contrast between the 
properties of the components in two systems with different complexity levels. Thus, there are 
two logical possibilities or two conditions under which emergence is possible or under which a 
system-level property is irreducible to the properties of the constituents. According to the first 
condition, emergence is possible when the system behavior is in principle not decomposable or 
analyzable in terms of the behavior of the constituents. According to the second condition, 
emergence is possible when the behavior of the components is highly dependent on the system of 
which they are a part. Boogerd et al. (2005) call the former condition vertical and the latter 
condition horizontal. The vertical condition of emergence is met when deduction of emergent 
 
68 For a detailed explanation of such coupling see (Chemero, 2009, 2018; and Richardson & Chemero 2014).   
69 Moreover, the non-linear and stochastic behavior of social systems makes it in principle impossible to rely on the 
individual’s behavior in the actual system in order to explain the emergent properties. 
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behavior from the constituent’s behavior is impossible. The idea is that when the behavior of a 
system is non-decomposable or unanalyzable in terms of the behavior of its subsystems or parts, 
it cannot be deduced from the behavior of the parts either. Thus, since well-integrated systems 
and some of their system level properties are in principle non-decomposable or unanalyzable, 
they can meet the vertical condition.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, decomposition is an important tool for analyzing 
complicated systems because it allows us to divide a system into smaller and more manageable 
parts. Thus, a system is decomposable when it meets two conditions. First, the behavior of the 
system must be a product of a set of subordinate functions or subsystems that have minimal or no 
interaction. However, by definition, well-integrated systems are composed of well-integrated 
components whose behavior continuously and mutually shapes and forms the behavior and even 
the structure of other components. Thus, the components can rarely be distinct and minimally 
interactive. Second, in a decomposable system, the effect of the components needs to be 
describable in terms of a roughly linear sequence of events. However, as I previously explained, 
the many interconnected feedback loops in a well-integrated system create a nexus of 
components and relations that engage with many components all at once. In other words, the 
change in well-integrated systems through time is not in principle describable in terms of change 
or activity in distinct parts that happen in a linear sequence.70 
Meeting the horizontal condition requires a radical and fundamental difference in behavior of 
the components in two systems with different levels of complexity. According to the horizontal 
condition, deduction is impossible when the behavior of the constituents is not predictable or 
deducible from their behavior in isolation or in other systems. In other words, if the components 
 
70 The comparison between simple and more complicated domino examples can be illuminating for understanding 
the importance of sequence in explanation.  
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are malleable to the point that not only their behavior but their dispositions and to some extent 
their internal structure are dependent on the system of which they are a part, then they meet the 
horizontal condition of emergence. In well-integrated systems, “the operations of different 
component parts are interdependent; that is, they more or less continuously impact each other’s 
operations” (Bechtel & Richardson, 1993, p. xxxiii). Thus, the number of influencing 
components and degree of connectivity partially explain the behavior of the components, their 
affordances, and at least to some extent, their internal structures.  
Culture can be a candidate for emergent behavior in a social system and a potential site for 
social change. Haslanger argues that since coordination across highly variable circumstances is 
cognitively too demanding, humans need to rely on tools and methods that make coordination in 
and between social groups possible. Moreover, she argues that these tools require “social 
learning, reliable cross-generational transmission, material and technological resources to build 
on what came before” (2020, p. 8). Thus, according to Haslanger, humans and other social 
animals rely on culture to enable coordination in a social group and to provide incentives for 
members of the group to act in accordance with terms of coordination. Such coordination can 
happen at the level of groups, institutions, or nations and also from interaction among these 
levels. In fact, according to Haslanger, culture is the basis for interpersonal connection and can 
be understood as a network of interrelated cultural practices.71These practices are the products of 
social interaction and social learning and evolve through responsiveness to both each other and 
the material world.  
Culture satisfies the vertical condition because, by definition, it is non-decomposable or 
unanalyzable in terms of the behavior and function of its components. Culture is a network of 
 
71 According to Haslanger (2020), social structures also consist of interconnected practices.  
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interrelated meaning that guides individual action, but individuals are not its passive recipients. 
In fact, there is a mutual dependency relationship between individual and culture. A network of 
interrelated practices that involve relations among individuals and with the material world is in 
principle non-decomposable since it can rarely have completely distinct and minimally 
interactive components. For instance, Haslanger states that “It is not hard to see how the practice 
of distributing knowledge through academic lectures is connected to the construction of 
universities, the employment of professor, the matriculation of students, the provisions of room 
and board, the funding for research and study, and the rest” (2020, p. 246).  
Moreover, practices are the result of a looping effect or feedback loops among individuals, 
their resources, and the social meaning that assigns values to objects and activities. Thus, it is 
impossible to describe the emergence of culture or cultural practices in a linear sequence of 
events, which is another requirement for decomposability in a system. It is important to note that 
physical, social, and spatial segregation of people or resources can potentially group sections of 
the society together in such a way that their interaction can be describable in a sequence. 
However, such instances are the exception not the norm, and the decomposability conditions, 
namely minimal interaction and sequentiality, will not last for long.  
The influence of culture on an individual’s action satisfies the horizontal condition as well. 
Culture exhibit something like downward causation, which implies that the behavior of the 
system’s components is partially dependent on the system of which they are a part. In other 
words, “People become people only when they enter into culture” (Balkin, 1998, p. 18). 
Similarly, Haslanger (2020) elaborates the mechanism by which individuals and their behavior 
change through their involvement in a network of cultural practices or in a social system. Such a 
network is causally significant since it influences action by shaping the individual’s tools, habits, 
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skills, and to some extent, “strategies of action.” In other words, although people use their 
intelligence to collectively create tools, culture, or terms of coordination to interact with the 
world, “these tools simultaneously endow their users with new kinds of intelligence” (Haslanger, 
2020, p. 12). New tools or different cultures allow users to experience and interact with the 
world differently, which can shape and change the users as well.  
It is important to note that beyond changing strategies of action, culture can change the 
concrete and material existence of components. For instance, Iris Young argues that the culture 
that emerges in contemporary, advanced, industrial, urban, and commercial societies defines the 
feminine and masculine ways of being in ways that leave their traces on “the modalities of 
feminine bodily comportment, motility, and spatiality” (1980, p. 153). Her idea is that contrary 
to other social systems in which women’s manual labor is part of their gender role, the social 
practices that define gender roles in modern and industrial societies change and police women’s 
bodies in a way that shapes their bodies differently from others. Culture can and does influence 
the physical and natural environment as well. For instance, cultures that value sedentary 
lifestyles and office jobs invest less to make their environment walkable and rely more on 
motorized transportation. Disinvestment in making sidewalks or places to walk and relying on 
motorized vehicles create a feedback loop that is both enforced by culture and also changes the 
culture. But it also changes the physical environment, city planning, etc., as well as contributes to 
the obesity epidemic (Finegood, 2011).  
Understanding culture as an emergent property has many important consequences, especially 
when we consider culture as a potential site for social change. For instance, culture is an 
emergent property of social systems, so any change in culture will accompany change in 
individuals’ beliefs and attitudes and vice versa. In other words, the relationship between 
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individuals’ attributes and culture is a synchronic determination. However, a society in which 
individuals realize misinformed and wrong beliefs and attitudes about, say, race and racial 
differences, cannot achieve a healthy or unproblematic culture from such a realization. 
Moreover, the interrelated nexus of cultural practices allows racism and race related injustices to 
shape virtually all social and cultural practices in the society. As a result, there may not be any 
innocent social or cultural practice that is not influenced by racism, racial discrimination, or 
racial inequality. 
Understanding culture as an emergent property allows us to see the interdependency and 
interwovenness of culture with many other aspects of the social world, and we can see that 
culture cannot be an isolated component that can be altered to achieve progress in social change. 
Thus, especially for social issues related to gender and race, because of their long history and 
deep influence on culture and cultural practices, an update to all or many aspects of culture, 
social structures, and social systems, as well as to everyday life, might be necessary. For 
instance, we need to realize that making positive change in culture might not be possible without 
changing housing and school segregation, the criminal justice system, the economic system, etc. 
It might also not be possible without changing norms about beauty, strength, excellence, etc.  
4. Self-Organization 
Self-organization is the third key characteristic of complex dynamical systems. Although the 
existence and emergence of self-organization is not news for many scholars who are concerned 
with complex systems like ecology, the economic system, society, and the like, traditional 
methods of explanation, especially in analytical social philosophy, categorically dismiss the 
legitimacy of accounts that rely on self-organization. The problem is that understanding self-
organization through the lens of methods that cannot adequately capture complexity and dynamic 
interactions and relations among the components is quite counter-intuitive. For instance, the 
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claim of self-organization is similar to the claim that a set of scattered dominos in a room can 
gradually and without any external force put themselves into a line and preserve energy. It is also 
like the claim that a spring can stay compressed without any external force that compresses the 
spring. In other words, self-organization implies that systems can get more ordered without any 
external force or entity to impose that order, as in the domino case, and that they can exist far 
from their equilibrium state, as in the spring case. Of course, self-organization in social systems 
is different from dominos or the spring example because of the high level of complexity of 
individuals and the capabilities. However, my goal is to show that if self-organization is possible 
in much simpler systems than society, then there is good reason to believe that it is possible in 
social systems as well.     
Since dominos do not get more ordered on their own and springs don’t stay compressed 
without an external force, many social philosophers are skeptical about the idea of self-
organization. For instance, John Elster (1983) argues against Foucault’s explanation for the 
maintenance of social discipline by means of penal systems. Foucault argues that penal systems 
divide the society into people with and without criminal charges, a division that remains even 
after the sentence is served. Such a grouping is, according to Foucault, causally important to 
maintain discipline in society. However, Elster argues that since there is no agent who designed 
the system to have such a consequence and that the consequence is explaining its own 
persistence, Foucault’s account is problematic. In other words, Elster argues that self-
organization or the emergence of order without any external or central planner is not possible. 
Similarly, Cudd (2005) suggests that the problem with Foucault’s account is that it assumes 
“some lurking social force involved, yet of indeterminate origin and grain” (2005, p. 40). My 
goal in this section is to show that without any lurking or unnatural force, self-organization is 
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possible in some well-integrated systems. Therefore, it is not plausible to categorically rule out 
the plausibility of an explanation because of its reliance on self-organization. 
Well-integrated systems that exhibit self-organizing behavior have at least three common 
features. First, they are open in the sense that there is a flow of energy, matter, or other relevant 
elements to the system from the environment. Fully closed systems decay, so they lose order 
over time and all the components become homogenous. For instance, someone’s footprint on the 
beach will gradually decay and the grains of sand go back to a homogenous distribution if no 
external force maintains their order or, in this case, pattern.   
Second, these systems with self-organizing behavior have the right level of connectivity that 
can translate into the right ratio between the stabilizing and reinforcing feedback loops. This 
ratio puts the system far away from equilibrium because of the positive feedback loops while 
maintaining some level of order due to the negative feedback loops. Third, these systems can 
exhibit regularities that arise, without a leader or plan, from the interactions among the 
components of the system. For instance, when hundreds, or thousands, of birds fly in coordinated 
but complicated patterns through the sky, their system is self-organizing.72 Although the 
movement of each bird is clearly dependent on the others, no bird determines the movement of 
the group.  
The self-organizing ability in a flock of birds is dependent on their mutually responsive 
interaction in the sense that birds follow each other but, at the same time, constrain and correct 
each other’s movements. In other words, the movements of a flock of birds is a more advanced 
and complex version of the non-linear system of ripening apples. Because they follow each 
other, a random or whimsical move of one bird to the right, for instance, can make a subgroup of 
 
72 A flying group of birds is obviously not an example of a closed system.  
112 
 
birds move to the right. In a sense, there are positive feedback loops that magnify the random 
deviation to the left from the average move of the whole group. In other words, the spontaneous 
grouping is the result of positive feedback loops that magnify heterogeneity. Moreover, for the 
very same reason, namely their mutual responsiveness, many random deviations from the 
average movements will be masked and counteracted. For instance, if a bird or a subgroup of 
birds moves to the right while the whole group continues to the left, the bird or subgroup corrects 
their movement and returns to the larger group. In other words, the overall grouping of the birds 
is maintained by negative feedback loops that counteract heterogeneity in the birds’ movements.  
If self-organization is possible in a flock of birds, there is no reason to believe that it is 
impossible in a human social system with the right conditions. In fact, important elements of the 
murmuration of birds are similar to “how coordinated social behavior can result spontaneously 
from the interactions of agents” (Richardson & Chemero, 2014, p. 40). First of all, social systems 
are not and cannot be completely closed. Not only do they rely on environmental and natural 
resources, they also usually rely on material and information, as well as on human, social, and 
cultural capital that exceed the boundary of their social group.  
Second, with the right level of connectivity among components or individuals, social systems 
can create a well-integrated system that exists at the edge of chaos. Environmental, political, 
technological, and many other factors can externally or internally alter the level of connectivity 
in a social system or among members of a social group. But with the right level of connection, 
social groups have dynamic, non-linear, and unpredictable behavior. Finally, and most 
importantly, social systems can self-organize or coordinate their interactions without an 
individual, a group of individuals, or a plan to guide them.  
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Examples of self-organization without a central organizer are abundant in social systems and 
social groups. For instance, when individuals navigate through a crowd, we often see 
spontaneous groupings that make their navigation easier. Tasks that are even more complicated 
than wayfinding in a crowded space can be easier to finish when individuals group together. For 
instance, scientific communities coordinate and cooperate to solve complex problems without a 
central organizer to decide which group should work on which aspect. In fact, since the 
epistemic landscape is unknown to the scientists, it is not possible to have a central organizer 
who divides the cognitive labor among the groups (Weisberg & Muldoon, 2009). Instead, there 
are interpersonal and intergroup mechanisms that facilitate groupings that allow the groups to 
solve complex problems and finish complicated tasks. Such mechanisms utilize the resources 
and the interpersonal ties between the individuals and groups. They also rely on a culture in 
scientific communities that praises certain strategies, such as investing in projects with very high 
impact but low chance of success.  
In sum, self-organization in social systems is not only possible but also plays an important 
role in social explanation and social change. In fact, cultural practices that enable and constrain 
individuals’ interactions emerge from the decentralized coordination of individuals in those 
interactions. For instance, Bourdieu argues that practices “can be objectively ‘regulated’ and 
’regular’ without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, [and] objectively adapted to 
their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the 
operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the 
product of the orchestrating action of a conductor” (1972/1977, p. 72). Similarly, Haslanger 
(2020) argues that although none of us designed or created the cultural narrative of the gendered 
division of labor, the division enables us to coordinate our actions in raising children. Thus, 
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social systems self-organize to make complicated tasks possible. Such self-organization can 
group individuals with their race, gender, class, etc. or change their biological or psychological 
abilities to the point that their individual differences reinforce the organizations and groupings. 
Thus, it is necessary to consider the possibility of self-organization not only to explain how 
systems exist or persist but also why individuals develop different traits or features. Moreover, to 
obviate wide-spread social problems, it is sometimes necessary to address the social and cultural 
practices that enforce the groupings of individuals and their related advantages or disadvantages.  
5. Conclusion 
 
Complex dynamic systems theory, which is often called complexity theory, provides an 
approach to explanation that is quite distinct from the traditional structural functional approach 
or systems theory. For one, the complexity approach avoids over-generalizations by assuming 
homogeneity. Theorizing the divisions within the category “women” by class, race, ethnicity, 
and their relevance is possible in the complexity framework of explanation (Walby, 2007). 
Complexity theory further challenges the traditional approaches to systems theory by providing 
the ability to theorize far from equilibrium states. It is no longer necessary to stick with stable 
pattern of aggregate behavior or law-like generalizations to explain any social phenomenon. In 
fact, the notion of equilibrium states in which most deviations from the norm would be 
counteracted via a negative feedback loops are no longer necessary for social theorizing. This 
challenge for the traditional explanatory frameworks is mostly because of the discover of 
positive feedback loops that keep systems far from equilibrium states (see Arthur 1994; David 
1985).  
Complexity theory with the aid of positive feedback loops allows us to theorize social 
change. Such social change can spring from within social groups and societies in the same way 
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that social movements can start from small and unorganized deviations from the norm and create 
long lasting effects. In fact, complexity theory is in a unique position to theorize how small 
changes when a system is far from equilibrium can have substantial effects. In the next chapter, I 
argue that social movements put well-integrated systems in such a critical point at which change 








Chapter Five: Complexity Theory, Social Movements, and The 
Imperative of Participation 
 
1. Introduction 
The notions of networks, complexity, emergence, and self-organization are new but 
important concepts for theorizing social change. In fact, many73 scholars acknowledge the 
“obvious potential presented by theories of complexity, emergence, and self-organization” 
(Escobar, 2017, p. 334). These concepts represent the key characteristics of complex dynamical 
systems theory, which I call complexity theory for short. The fundamental question of 
complexity theory is “How does order emerge out of dynamic unfolding of materiality through 
processes that cannot be comprehended by simply understanding the properties of the elements 
making up the entity of system in question?” (p.334). Complexity theory is particularly valuable 
for understanding change through alternative forms of intervention like social movements. 
Escobar defines complexity theory as “the science of emergent forms, how these acquire 
coherence and consistency, the dance between order and disorder” (p. 334).  
In this chapter, I use complexity theory to make a rather controversial claim: that 
participating in social movements is a moral imperative. I argue that participating in social 
movements is the proper moral response to oppression. In what follows, I first show that the 
traditional approaches to explaining oppression and social progress are unhelpful and that their 
emphasis on equilibrium states in social theorizing leads to moral paralysis. As an example of 
such a paralysis, I use Manne’s systems approach to misogyny and patriarchy. I show that her 
approach leads to a moral dilemma when it comes to resisting oppression and fighting for social 
 
73 Also see Walby (2007).  
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change. I also argue that the underlying assumptions behind Manne’s system’s approach about 
the importance of equilibrium states makes resisting oppression seem morally irresponsible 
while she agrees that resistance is a moral imperative.  
Second, I generalize the scope of this dilemma to any theory of oppression and inequality 
that dismisses the possibility for change by overemphasizing the role of stabilizing mechanisms 
and equilibrium states. Third, I argue that a paradigm shift in our theory of explanation towards 
complexity theory can (1) resolve the dilemma, (2) explain the role of social movements in social 
change, and (3) show that in response to the harms of oppression, participating in a social 
movement is the only morally plausible options.  
2. Theorizing Social Change 
Talk of systems is very common in the theorizing of social inequalities and different 
forms of oppression.74 In fact, the systems approach to explanation is particularly useful when 
we ask why oppression persists despite individuals’ active resistance. This approach to 
explanation has important similarities with the structural functional approach. Not only does it 
rely on similar tools like functional decomposition, but it is often understood to be a powerful 
extension for the structural functional framework in explaining control and resistance to change. 
Sally Haslanger’s account of structural explanation is a good example of such a connection 
between the structural and systems approaches to explanation. Haslanger (2015) defines systems 
as a collection of components with certain stable relations and behaviors. In her account, 
structures are just the abstract form of such systems.  
Predictably, the systems approach to explanation and structural functionalism share some 
of their most important problems. For instance, as I mentioned in Chapter 3, these explanatory 
 
74 For example, see Young (1988), Combahee River Collective (1986), Crenshaw (1989), and Cudd (2005, 2006).   
118 
 
frameworks assume minimally interactive and enclosed systems that only involve one set of 
social relations and that suggest a “nested hierarchy.”75 However, in the presence of such 
hierarchy, reduction becomes the norm. For instance, in theorizing social oppressions from a 
Marxist lens, often all non-class social relations become theoretically subordinated to class 
relations.76 Moreover, as intersectional feminists point out, such a nested hierarchy and its 
tendency for reduction undermine the simultaneous and equally significant effect of various 
inequalities.77 In previous chapters, I have touched on the descriptive and normative problems of 
reduction and the decomposability assumption which are common among the traditional 
approaches to explanation, including the systems approach and structural functionalism. My 
focus here, however, is another common problem of traditional frameworks to explanation: their 
inability to explain social change.   
The systems theory in its original form is inapt for explaining social change because of its 
presumption of a tendency toward equilibrium and its emphasis on negative feedback loops.78 
However, later approaches to systems—such as complexity theory, the focus of this chapter—
include and emphasize positive as well as negative feedback to avoid this problem (Walby, 
2007). The combination of positive/reinforcing and negative/stabilizing feedback loops allows us 
to understand and theorize change and what it takes to have a stable system that exists far from 
equilibrium.  
Negative feedback is important for social theorizing. The stabilizing feedback loops make 
social inequalities persistent. Such stabilizing feedback loops can explain why changing the 
 
75 See for example Walby (2007) 
76 See discussions about dual systems theory Nancy Fraser (1985) and Iris Young (1997).   
77 For similar discussions see Walby (2007) and Crenshaw (1989).  
78 For a similar argument see Sewell (1992) and Propora (1989).  
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social order is so difficult and why society and its individual members are resistance to change. 
The first reason is because the interrelated web of feedback loops makes it costly for individuals 
to change. In other words, everyone might benefit in one way or another from maintaining the 
social order since solving one problem can lead to disturbance of other systems or orders upon 
which the individual’s survival depends. The second reason is because the existence of feedback 
loops make backlash in response to effective change likely.  
Stabilizing feedback loops make social systems in general, and oppressive systems in 
particular, resistant to change. For instance, relying on a systems account of explanation, Manne 
(2017) defines misogyny as a system that stabilizes the patriarchal social order and domination 
over women. She argues that “we should think of misogyny as serving to uphold patriarchal 
order, understood as one strand among various similar systems of domination” (p.13). Thus, 
there are elements of the “misogynistic environment” that maintain patriarchy by counteracting 
individuals’ attempts to change. Manne argues that maintaining such order happens “by visiting 
hostile or adverse social consequences on a certain (more or less circumscribed) class of girls or 
women to enforce and police social norms that are gendered either in theory (i.e., content) or in 
practice (i.e., norm enforcement mechanisms)” (2017, p. 13).  
The maldistribution of penalties and rewards explains why women also contribute to the 
perpetuation of patriarchal social hierarchy. Women are prone to guilt and shame when they 
violate norms, police themselves and other women’s bodies and behavior, distance themselves 
from “bad” women who do not abide by patriarchal norms, and try to excel at the standards 
created by the patriarchal social order (Manne, 2017, pp. 192, 256, 263-266, 19). In sum, the 
feedback loops that punish women for violation of patriarchal norms give women a good 
rationale and adaptive reasons to remain in their undesirable position. Thus, the patriarchal and 
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oppressive system is resistant to change because of the feedback mechanisms that correct 
deviation from expected behavior.  
In addition to interpersonal causes, there are collective mechanisms that make change 
difficult. In fact, disturbing controlling systems or systems with stabilizing feedback loops can 
lead to backlash. In the most mechanical sense, backlash happens when there is a gap between 
different parts of the system. For instance, in a rolling mill or printing press, the driving member 
(motor) of the system is not directly connected to the driven member (load). Thus, the load can 
sometimes fail to be in exactly the right place at the right time. Such failure happens when there 
is a disturbance in the load and, in response, the motor takes corrective action in the opposite 
direction to bring the load back to its proper place. When the corrective action is successful, the 
system is back to its stable state. When unsuccessful, however, the corrective action can cause 
damage to the system. Thus, the way to keep the system well-functioning and efficient is to 
avoid backlash. In social explanation, a similar idea underlies the social response to effective or 
widespread change. If society is a system with interacting parts, then unmet expectations can 
cause disturbance to the system. Thus, backlash in social context is a strong “corrective” action 
in the opposite direction of the change responsible for unmet expectations.  
In her book Backlash: The Undeclared War against American Women, Susan Faludi (1991) 
defines backlash as a politically conservative reaction to progressive social change. Of course, 
judging a series of social events as examples of backlash has both descriptive and normative 
elements and needs to take into account concepts such as “equality, oppression, and social 
progress” ( Superson & Cudd, 2002, p. 3). But, regardless of our criteria for the correct use of the 
term “backlash,” in the context of social change, backlash has distinctive qualities that reoccur in 
some paradigmatic cases. For example, backlash exhibits a reactionary quality in eras of 
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widespread social change, for instance in the violent treatment of Blacks in the Jim Crow South 
following Reconstruction ( Superson & Cudd, 2002).  
Another distinctive quality of backlash has to do with its strong reversal of progress. For 
instance, the Taliban movement in Afghanistan increased restrictions on women by eliminating 
their ability to work, restricting their freedom of movement and speech, and controlling their 
ability to influence public opinion. Finally, backlash often involves widespread abuse of power 
by a group of actors. For instance, in the 1980s and 90s, following the progress of women’s 
movements and the resulting increase in female labor force participation, there was widespread 
increase in violence against women by male strangers and known others (Xie, Heimer, & 
Lauritsen, 2012).  
In sum, social systems involve negative feedback loops because they include mechanisms 
that maintain their stability. These mechanisms can make a system resistant to change by 
counteracting heterogeneity or correcting any deviation from the norm. The high possibility of 
backlash also increases the cost of intervention. Therefore, we want our explanatory framework 
to account for stabilizing feedback loops that create and maintain equilibrium states. However, in 
addition to explaining equilibrium, we need positive feedback to explain how small deviations 
from the norm can lead to system level change.  
Reinforcing (positive) feedback loops make endogenous change possible. Take for instance 
Rosa Parks’ refusal to obey racist norms or Alicia Garza’s expression of frustration by tweeting 
#BlackLivesMatter. Parks endured sanctions and punishment for her action. But she also gained 
recognition for a problem that was salient to her. In fact, her action launched a series of 
reinforcing events that lead to the Civil Rights movement and addressed many problems and 
inequalities. However, such a chain of events would not have happened if Parks had stood her 
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ground in isolation. Rosa Parks was embedded in a tight-knit and well-connected network of 
individuals that amplified the consequences of her resistance. In fact, she was a seasoned 
community leader and connected to various Civil Rights activists and labor leaders (Polletta, 
2002).  
A proper framework for explaining social change must show how meaningful change is 
possible despite the existence of negative and stabilizing feedback loops. In other words, a strong 
explanatory framework considers two kinds of mechanisms: ones that make systems stable and 
ones that allow systems to change. Together these two mechanisms can create adaptive systems.  
As Escobar argues, the complexity framework is a particularly apt framework for not only 
explaining social change but also guiding our moral response to social problems.  
The important features of the complexity framework in explaining social change are the 
positive feedback loops, heterogeneity, and the dynamic network of social connections. Positive 
feedback loops are necessary to explain change from within. The growth and spread of social 
movements, which are arguably the engine of many important social changes, resemble the 
structure of positive and reinforcing feedback loops. For instance, for protesters, “Any 
spectacular victory of the rebellious have-nots in any one place would activate their 
consciousness and their rebellion in other places" (Marcuse, 1966, p. 67). At this stage “what is 
happening is the formation of still relatively small and weakly organized (often disorganized) 
groups which, by virtue of their consciousness and their needs, function as potential catalysts of 
rebellion within the majorities to which, by their class origin, they belong” (Marcuse, 1972, p. 
50). In these protests, through a reinforcing feedback mechanism, the victory of a small and 
unorganized group activates larger and larger protests which, after some time, turn into well-
organized and massive protests that can demand and bring about social change. For instance, 
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“Slave revolts spread throughout the Caribbean in the early nineteenth century…revolts of 
industrial workers expanded throughout Europe and North America in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century…and guerilla and anticolonial struggles blossomed across Asia, Africa, 
Latin America in the mid-twentieth century” (Hardt & Negri, 2005, p. 213). 
Heterogeneity is another necessary concept for explaining endogenous change. For 
instance, Haslanger (2017) and others79 argue that new experiments in living lead to 
heterogeneity in the cultural hegemony by creating subcultures. These subcultures and their 
corresponding network of individuals create a base for demanding broad structural change in 
society (2017). The new experiments in living, however, can only lead to social change when 
they can escape mechanisms that counteract deviation. Haslanger (2017) argues that ideology or 
cultural hegemonies can filter our experiences. Escaping mechanisms that counteract new 
experiments in living or social change also requires reinforcement or intensification through sub-
cultures or networks of somewhat like-minded individuals who give meaning to those 
experiences. These reinforcing networks can grow and ultimately lead to broad and multilevel 
social change.  
Positive feedback and heterogeneity are salient features of any endogenous change. 
However, neither of these features would be relevant if individuals were acting in isolation and 
independently of one another. Therefore, attention to the dynamics network of social relations in 
terms of its connectivity level or to the distribution of its relations and interactions is crucial. Not 
only can we not explain a wide range of social phenomena without attention to such a network, 
 
79 For example, Felski (1989) and Fraser (1990) argue that counter publics are necessary for finding the new ways of 
living together. Also, Anderson (1991, 2014), Fine (1998), and Pappas (2016) argue that the experiments in living 
constitute an important element for social change.  
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but our moral evaluation of such phenomena will also be misguided. In the following section, I 
provide an example of such misguided evaluation.   
3. Systems Theory, Misogyny, and a Moral Dilemma 
A liberatory analysis of oppression should not lead to moral paralysis and stagnation. 
However, the systems theory approach and its focus on equilibrium states not only makes it 
impossible to theorize change, but also it leads to moral paralysis. Take for instance Manne’s 
(2018) systems approach to misogyny according to which resisting misogyny and not resisting it 
are both morally problematic. According to her, although resisting a patriarchal social order is a 
moral imperative, there are strong self- and other-oriented moral reasons to avoid resistance. In 
fact, Manne argues that resisting through moral claim-making is like feeding a fire and concludes 
that we need to “give up” (2018, p. 300).  
Manne is right to argue that resisting oppressive systems is costly and that sometimes the 
burden of such resistance falls on the shoulder of the most vulnerable. According to Manne, 
given the logic of misogyny, a misogynistic backlash, in the face of attempts to achieve gender 
equality, is foreseeable and even inevitable. In fact, understanding misogyny as a system 
composed of stabilizing feedback loops implies that any success in achieving gender equality 
will be followed by an inevitable recoil. She argues that even in ostensibly progressive regimes 
or when feminist progress is rapid and impressive, we see a rise in misogynistic backlash.80  
Manne identifies various mechanisms that make backlash likely. For example, latent or 
dormant misogyny within a culture “may manifest itself when women’s capabilities become 
 
80Manne argues that “This helps to explain why misogyny is both prevalent in ostensibly oppressive regimes and 
why we have also been seeing a good deal of it coming to the surface in the United States lately. Feminist progress 
has been rapid and impressive in many ways. But this has led to resentment, anxiety, and misogynistic backlash. We 
see this coming out under the mantle of moralism, as well as under the cover of anonymity, as in Internet comments 
sections” (p. 101). 
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more salient and hence demoralizing or threatening” (2018, p. 101). This can happen because of 
a sense of competition that “will often result in the hitherto dominant being surpassed by those 
they tacitly expected to be in social positions beneath them, and [so] you have a recipe for 
resentment and a sense of ‘aggrieved entitlement’” (Manne, 2018, p. 156). Violating 
expectations is another trigger for backlash. For instance, Manne argues that even women calling 
out misogynistic behavior can be a violation of patriarchal norms since women are supposed to 
be “moral listeners” (p. 289).   
In addition to explaining the resistance of social oppression, Manne’s systemic analysis 
highlights the cost of change. Unfortunately, Manne remains mostly silent about interacting 
social oppressions. However, her focus on the cost for change and deviation from oppressive 
norms is in harmony with the work of many others who highlight ways in which progress for a 
group with legitimate moral concerns can be a regressive burden for their more vulnerable 
members.81 Moreover, dismissing such burdens in our analysis of oppression can create 
incentives for abuse. For instance, a large body of scholarship on Muslim women argues that 
imperialism coopts feminist sentiments to advance its dominance over Muslims by portraying 
these women as oppressed by a barbaric and medieval religion.82 Such cooptation has been used 
to support different forms of intervention “ranging from war to the marginalization of Muslim 
population in the West” (Khader, 2016). And it has led to the false conclusion that “freedom” 
from such an “oppressive religion” is worth the exposure to war or further marginalization for 
these women and their communities.  
 
81 For example, see Ortega (2006). 
82  See for example Hirschkind and Mahmood (2002), Mahmood (2005), Alexander (2006), Razakh (2008), Gurel 
(2009), Maira (2009), and Volpp (2011).  
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Despite the advantages of a systemic approach to oppression, this explanatory framework 
has an intolerable problem. Such an approach often implies that meaningful, sustainable, and 
progressive change from within is impossible. It implies that change requires either an external 
intervention or a revolution. Manne’s systemic approach to misogyny and patriarchy is not 
immune to this problem either. In fact, her analysis of patriarchal oppression leads to a moral 
dilemma83and moral paralysis. 
On the one hand, “misogyny ought to be opposed,”84and individuals have reasons and 
obligations to resist the patriarchal social order. There are a variety of arguments for the 
obligation to resist oppression. For example, Hay (2013) argues that “people have an obligation 
to resist their own oppression and that this obligation is rooted in an obligation to protect their 
rational nature” (2013, p. 118). Another argument in support of such obligation relies on the 
adverse effect of oppression on the individual’s well-being and the obligation to resist such an 
effect for oneself or for others (Silvermint, 2013). In sum, there are individuals or groups that 
might not have any other moral or practical choice other than resistance. On the other hand, 
fighting the system can lead to more violent or harsher reactions for individuals and can 
disproportionately affect vulnerable populations. The reactions can also have a regressive effect 
for everyone and can undo progress. Therefore, neither appeasing misogynists to avoid backlash 
nor fighting back seems to be a morally unproblematic option.  
Manne explicitly argues that “trying to fight misogyny primarily using juridical moral 
notions is a bit like trying to fight fire with oxygen” (2018, p. 28). Even if we manage to control 
the situation at a small scale, “when we try to scale up the strategy, it is liable to backfire” (p. 
28). Our attempts to address the moral wrong doings are futile because we are feeding into the 
 
83 For a detailed account of such dilemma for Manne’s approach see Lopes (2018). 
84 Kate Manne, Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 28. 
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fire by even trying to call it out or to stop it. That is why Manne suggests that maybe the solution 
is to just “give up” (p. 300).  Manne explicitly argues that resisting only through moral claim 
making is fruitless. However, it is plausible to say that considering her systemic account of 
misogyny, any kind of resistance can face the same moral dilemma.  
Despite what the systems theory approach to oppression predicts, there are ways out of an 
oppressive and dysfunctional equilibrium. In fact, the history of social movements shows that 
persistent moral claim making is an important way to achieve broad structural change. For 
instance, the Civil Rights Movement faced a violent and direct form of backlash. Given the 
equilibrium-based conception of oppressive systems, the backlash should only have functioned 
to dampen the momentum of the movement and undo the progress it had made. However, many 
scholars pointed out that “As Martin Luther King well knew, the image of Bull Connor’s police 
force using fire hoses and dogs against civil rights marchers in Birmingham was a major turning 
point in enlisting the sympathy of northern liberals for the civil right fighters” (Mansbridge & 
Shames, 2008, p. 630). In other words, the force exerted in a racist or misogynistic backlash can 
be and has been used to make subsequent growth and progress possible. More subtle strategies 
have also been used to turn the momentum that a backlash creates toward a movement’s goals. 
For example, the leaders of the women’s suffrage movement responded to the claim with 
backlash-like quality that “suffrage would erase the differences between women and men” by 
suggesting that women’s “superior moral nature” makes them the best candidate for “municipal 
housekeeping.” Thus, they called women to “clean the public house” (Mansbridge & Shames, 
2008; Also see Kraditor, 1965).  
Enlisting both the sympathy of northern liberals and the solidarity of the general public that 
buys into women’s superior moral nature serve a function in changing the structure of social 
128 
 
relations. These actions lead to the creation of weak but influential relations of empathy and trust 
that changes the fabric of society and destabilizes the unjust social order. The new networks of 
trust and empathy create further opportunity spaces for cooperation and communication. 
However, there is no place in the systems approach to explanation either for the role of such 
weak ties or for their effect on reinforcing and amplifying moral demands. I explain these points 
in detail shortly.   
In sum, the problem with the systems approach to oppression in general, and with Manne’s 
account of misogyny, is that if it were true, progress would never be possible. Manne’s account 
of misogyny relies on a system’s framework of explanation that is neither complex nor quite 
dynamic in the sense that it can capture the stochasticity and non-linearity of social systems. 
Moreover, without complexity, or without considering the interrelated network of social ties and 
social interactions, her account fails to capture the possibility of novel system-level properties, or 
emergence, and of self-organization. Manne’s account describes society in a patriarchal 
equilibrium in which not only do individuals not have incentives to resist but they face 
punishment and backlash if they try.  
4. The Alternative Approach: Complexity Theory 
The moral dilemma inherent to resisting oppression is less of an issue if there are ways to 
effectively resist and support social progress without “sacrificing anything of comparable moral 
importance” (Singer, 1972, p. 231). However, resolving this dilemma requires that our explanatory 
frameworks for complexity theory undergo a paradigm shift. Such a shift breaks the false 
dichotomy between individuals and collectives or between individuals and social structures and 
allows us to see the interaction between the two. It can distinguish Rosa Parks’ resistance 
embedded in a network of social actors from uncoordinated and independent actors who face 
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punishment without any progress. This distinction provides an alternative form of resistance that 
leads to progressive change without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. 
Thereby, this kind of paradigm shift can resolve the moral dilemma.  
Complexity theory can also explain why among all possible methods of intervention, social 
movements are at least sometimes the most successful. In addition to explaining channels of 
amplification and dissemination of information, social movements can explain individuals’ 
contributions to change. In particular, complexity theory explains why a proper moral response 
to some social problems can be simply joining a movement. Movements create novel system-
level properties like subcultures in which new norms emerge. As I discussed in chapter four, the 
key to the emergence of such alternative cultures and norms is changing the network of social 
relations. Such a change creates new possibility spaces in which individuals have rational 
reasons to deviate from mainstream norms with minimal repercussions.   
The key contribution of social movements is that they transform the network of social 
interaction. Such a transformation provides a different set of incentives that can make formerly 
costly deviations from the mainstream norms beneficial. Moreover, through self-organization, 
movements can find complicated solutions to complicated problems. Unlike systems theory and 
structural explanation, complexity theory allows us to theorize informal interactions and weak 
and contingent ties.  
5. Resolving the Dilemma 
 As I argued before in this chapter, Rosa Parks’ successful resistance to oppression would 
have led to different outcomes if she had not been embedded in a well-integrated network of 
activists and allies. Moreover, the possibility of successful resistance needs to bear at least some 
importance in evaluating individuals’ moral obligations. In what follows, I argue that neither 
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resisting by independent and uncoordinated individual action, nor expecting only top-down 
interventions to resolve social inequalities, is a morally viable option. I conclude that resisting 
oppression is only possible and morally permissible when conducted in coordination with others 
and that the only moral prescription to make for individuals is for them to join a movement.  
Similar to Manne’s analysis of patriarchy, Anderson’s “economic” framework of 
culture85, centers an equilibrium state to explain different aspects of durable and categorical 
inequalities (Anderson E. , 2010). In Anderson’s account, culture is “the equilibrium of individual 
strategic responses to each other’s conduct, within the constraints of their resources and 
opportunities” (2010, p. 78). According to this understanding of culture, individuals have rational 
reasons to remain within the scope of the equilibrium and avoid any deviation. In other words, 
such equilibrium states are like attractors in dynamical systems toward which a social system 
tends to evolve. For a variety of starting conditions and when the system is close enough to an 
attractor, no relatively small disturbance can cause the system to remain far from the equilibrium.  
Moving away from the equilibrium states through independent and uncoordinated 
individual actions is theoretically and practically impossible. In fact, one way to interpret the 
cultural equilibrium or attractors as a set of norms, laws, conventions, and practices through 
which (1) coordination and collaboration are possible, and (2) everyone is better off by obeying 
these norms rather than violating them. These equilibrium states and the conventions that make 
them possible often organically emerge out of many interactions among individuals with 
different resources and opportunities (Vanderschraaf, 2019). The mechanisms that keep social 
systems close to their equilibrium states involve various forms of negative feedback loops. Thus, 
 
85 I discussed this approach in more detail in Chapter 1.  
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uncoordinated and independent deviation from the conventions and norms clearly and only leads 
to sanctions on the individuals, and virtually no positive outcome can be expected.86   
The influence of feedback loops at the social level in terms of backlash can make top-
down interventions risky as well. As I discussed in chapter two, relying on top-down intervention 
to change problematic norms and practices through governmental regulation or policy change 
can be futile or even harmful. The problem is that when individuals have independent reasons to 
stick to the same norms of cooperation, they resist change. With enough people resisting the 
change we have collective resentment and backlash. Moreover, the information necessary to 
create conventions that optimally addresses the needs of everyone is often radically disseminated 
among the actors. Thus, it is likely that no central force can analyze such radically disseminated 
information that involves the lived experience of individuals from all walks of life. Thus, for 
many chronic and complex problems, it is likely to result in with bad or ineffective policies. 
Moreover, the interdependency of conventions and norms makes it even more complicated to 
figure out the right intervention with minimal disruptions.  
 Thinking of culture as an equilibrium state leads to a moral dilemma similar to Manne’s 
account of misogyny: resisting dysfunctional norms can be costly and even harmful, while not 
resisting is also morally problematic. The solution to this dilemma relies on a distinction between 
effective and ineffective resistance. At least for some problems, especially ones that are 
interrelated to many other problems and norms that perpetuate them, neither uncoordinated 
individual action nor top-down interventions (on their own) are effective forms of resistance. 
However, the obligation to resist oppression assumes that the resistance has some positive effect. 
 
86 Some might argue that an individual’s sense of integrity or the psychological harms that one goes through to 
endure oppression is enough to resist. However, for any given form of marginalization there will be at least some 
norms from which violation is sufficiently costly that keeping a sense of integrity or protection from psychological 
harms will not suffice to justify unsuccessful resistance. For examples see Medina (2013).  
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Thus, without such an effect, there is no obligation and no dilemma. If there are alternative forms 
of resistance that can somehow take society far from equilibrium states without sacrificing 
anything of comparable moral importance, then an obligation to resist will be meaningful. In the 
next section, I argue that there is such an alternative. I show that individual resistance when in 
coordination with others has different outcomes and therefore can be morally required.  
6. Coordination and the Structure of Social Interactions 
The structure of social networks at least partially determines the equilibrium states in 
which we find ourselves. They can explain the emergence of dysfunctional cultures and 
equilibrium states that are hard to dismantle. Thus, examining the network of social interactions 
can provide insight for progressive and sustainable social change that can mediate the emergent 
inequalities. For example, complexity theory and the potential for self-organization in well 
integrated systems imply that networks of interaction and cooperation are not evenly distributed. 
They are patchy and involve parts with higher and lower density. Sometimes these patches of 
lower and higher connectivity trace social categories and explain the relevant inequalities 
between groups. In other words, the patchiness is due to the network of relations that members of 
a group create to maintain their domination over scarce or important resources.  
Oppression is a form of group inequality (Cudd, 2005). In other words, individuals are 
oppressed only in virtue of their group memberships. One way to understand groups is in terms 
of modes of socializing that create clusters of individuals with different degrees of connectivity. 
Such groups are heterogenous and very fluid. However, there are chronic, complex, and stable 
social inequalities around the world that trace specific kinds of group identities like race, gender, 
class, ethnicity, religion, caste, nationality, etc. Thus, we have clusters of social relations that 
become more stable over time and causally relevant to the explanation of different forms of 
“durable inequalities” (Tilly C. , 1998). Such inequalities persist because individuals use their 
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networks of social relations to preserve their advantages across generations. Practices like 
“monopolistic control of higher education, class segregated housing, norms against 
intermarriage, and exclusionary rules of etiquette” efficiently preserve advantages for a few 
(Anderson E. , 2010, p. 8). But the efficiency of these practices is dependent on cooperation and 
mutual expectations of the members of a network to ensure that others cannot use their resources.  
As Max Weber argues, members of a group secure their dominance over important 
resources like land, education, military power, etc. by closing their ranks to outsiders (Weber, 
1978). Thus, although members of the dominant group allow a relatively free circulation of 
resources within their network, they heavily regulate transactions with outgroup members. In 
other words, the members of the group coordinate their actions to create and enforce norms and 
practices that facilitate access for in-group and limit the ingress for the outgroup members. 
Similarly, Tilly argues that the members of dominant groups create practices to “hoard 
opportunities” and exploit the out-groups by depriving them from the benefits of their resources 
(Tilly, 1998). The “old boys’ networks” that limit access to business deals and executive 
positions for anyone outside of their social circles is an example of such active cooperation to 
maintain power and hoard opportunities (Anderson, 2010). The very low compensation and hard 
work of the undocumented immigrants in the United States is an example of such exploitation 
(Bales, Fletcher, & Stover, 2004).  
Once durable inequalities, especially ones that trace social identities, get established in 
one domain, they spread through new domains and turn into a pervasive problem. Tilly explains 
such a spread through the mechanisms of emulation and adaptation. Different organizations and 
networks emulate the well-stablished inequalities and exclusionary practices mainly because they 
are beneficial. When other organizations successfully copy the existing models of domination, 
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the exclusionary practices spread even in the absence of any hostile attitude towards the 
dominated group. For instance, capitalism copies the division of labor and exploitation of women 
of earlier economic systems. And the work force assigns “inferior” jobs to women that require 
care-taking with low compensation. Moreover, we adapt to such unequal positions by creating 
habits that allow us to interact and cooperate with others. Then, we carry these habits to new 
domains and recreate the same inequalities.  
Neither preserving domination nor the spread of durable inequalities through different 
domains would be possible without fragmentation in the networks of social relations. In a sense, 
the exclusion or inclusion of individuals in parts of the network with clusters that involve 
relations of trust, cooperation, communication, etc. create different social groups and define 
different identities. The exclusionary practices that allow members of one group to hoard 
opportunities deprive others of resources and make them vulnerable to exploitation. Thus, an 
effective way to address durable inequalities is by transforming the structure of social relations. 
Such a transformation can be boosted by top-down interventions, like busing students so as to 
integrate schools or attempt to integrate neighborhoods. But sustainable progress cannot be 
achieved without inclusion of individuals in resource-rich networks of trust and cooperation.  
7. Social Movements 
Admittedly changing social and moral norms is very difficult. But as history testifies, this 
kind of change is clearly possible. In fact, Anderson is among the most well-known theorizers of 
social moral progress even though her economic approach to culture cannot capture change 
(Anderson E. , 2014). Anderson famously argues that a particular mode of contentious politics, 
namely social movements, can lead to progressive moral transformation. In her account, the 
importance of social movements in social change stems from the movements ability to correct a 
principal source of moral bias, namely “the tendency of the powerful to shape and uphold moral 
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norms that confuse the right with what the powerful desires for themselves” (2014, p. 15). In 
what follows, I briefly explain Anderson’s defense of social movements and raise four questions 
that this defense fails to address.  
According to Anderson, social movements are particularly apt to be vehicles of moral 
transformation because they can undertake three important tasks: (1) allowing people to inform 
the powerful “how the needs and interest of the less powerful are ill-served by reigning norms,” 
(2) allowing people to demonstrate their moral worth and commitment, and thereby bolstering 
the moral authority of their claim-making, and (3) holding the powerful accountable. Anderson 
also adds that social movements provide alternatives to the norms they challenge. However, the 
ultimate test of moral progress and the success of social movements is the lived experience of 
“those living under the new norms that an effective social movement establishes” (2014, p. 15). 
For Anderson, moral norms resemble various social norms because they facilitate 
cooperation and coordination and because they are “largely sustained through shared 
expectations of conditional conformity, backed up by expectations of sanctions” (2014, p. 4). 87 
These norms can contribute to the normalization and rationalization of different aspects of 
oppression. Anderson argues that social movements are necessary for making moral progress 
because they can create alternative norms and disvalue the old ones. Movements engage more 
people who can express their opposition and motivation, so the support and strength of old norms 
 
87She further explains the nature of social norms as follows: “Humans are social beings, who cannot survive or 
achieve their ends without assistance from, and cooperation with, others. The need for assistance, cooperation, and 
coordination is so constant that it cannot be secured by ad hoc arrangements. People institute riles of conduct—
embodied in conventions, customs, norms, and laws—to secure regular assistance, cooperation, and coordination 
from each other. Conventions, customs, and non-moral norms are sustained by mutual expectations of conditional 
conformity—shared understandings of most people’s disposition to conform to the rules on condition that others do, 
too. People may also apply sanctions to nonconformists, and some of the motivation to comply may be to avoid 




decline. Thus, movements take away the power of old norms in claim-making and impose a 
moral cost on those who insist on upholding the challenged norms.  
Anderson is right that social movements have been and can be important engines for social 
change. However, if, all things considered, everyone has a rational reason to abide by unjust 
practices of oppression and domination, her account fails to show how individuals join a 
movement and why they should. In other words, looking at social movements as an aggregate-
level phenomenon explains the positive role they play in progressive social change. But at the 
individual level, there seems to be no reason for why an individual should support a movement 
in the first place. Moreover, the unpredictable nature of collective action implies that one might 
join a movement that just goads society into another dysfunctional equilibrium.  
In sum, Anderson’s argument for the role of social movements for social progress fails to 
address four concerns. The first concern concerns sustainability. In other words, Anderson’s 
argument does not explain how progress is not followed by regress. The emergence of social and 
moral norms is dependent on many material and interdependent social factors. Therefore, if 
everything remains the same, then the dysfunctional norms will be recreated over and over again 
but just in new forms and ways. Thus, moral progress is doomed to regress if the causal 
mechanisms that maintain inequality are untouched. Second, by definition, social systems cannot 
last far from equilibrium states. In fact, in Anderson’s economic approach to culture, the 
equilibrium states maximize utility for everyone involved. Thus, there is no incentive to move 
away from them especially when there are reasons to believe that deviations will be 
counteracted. Third, Anderson’s argument remains silent about how movements create better 
alternatives and avoid inferior ones. Fourth, she does not explain whether individuals have any 
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moral responsibility towards movements and for moral progress. In the following sections, I rely 
on a complexity framework to address all these concerns.  
7.1. First Concern: sustainability.  
The first concern about Anderson’s argument involves how progress is sustainable if all other 
aspects of the society remain the same. Let’s assume that a movement successfully corrects the 
principal source of moral bias while leaving everything else that leads to power and authority 
untouched. It is hard to see why individuals in the position of power would not just find 
alternative moral norms that serve a similar function and that confuse the right. Addressing this 
concern requires moving away from the traditional frameworks and toward a complexity 
approach. Such a move allows us to see that movements in fact alter an important feature of the 
society, something that disrupts the mechanisms through which power is maintained: networks 
of interaction. These networks play an important role in the evolution of movements, and 
movements alter the network of social relations.  The former effect allows movement to amplify 
and engage a wider portion of the society. The latter effect allows movements to fill the 
structural holes and disrupt the networks of social relations through which the powerful maintain 
their dominance and exclude others from access to resources.  
Some scholars view social movements as a particular form of social organization that 
emerges out of repeated and patterned interactions between multiple actors (Mische 2008, Diani 
2015). This approach to social movements avoids treating collective phenomena as aggregates of 
the properties of their individual compositions and allows for a relational and interactive view of 
collective action processes (Crossley, 2011). The strength of this approach to social movements 
is in its ability to trace the ways in which social movements transform social networks and create 
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sustainable social change. Instead of focusing on well-stablished social roles88in assigning 
responsibility for social change, this approach to movements and relations highlights the role of 
contingent interactions as well as well-established and institutionalized social relations. In fact, 
in the context of social change, focusing on the dynamic nature of social relations becomes very 
important. The reason is that one of the most important effects of social movements is their 
ability to “destabilize a given situation and contribute to reorganization of positions and relations 
within a field” (Diani & Mische, 2015, p. 3). Social movements facilitate social change by 
creating a higher likelihood for contingent interactions. In other words, social movements change 
the level of integration in the society.   
By participating in a movement, individuals provide the movement an access to their 
extended social network. The importance of such access is particularly evident in the process of 
recruitment and coalition building that builds on pre-existing networks. Movements also change 
the network of social relations for their participants. For instance, joining movements allows 
individuals to come into contact with previously unknown people, ideas, tactics, and networks. 
In fact, social movements are particularly effective at increasing the number of weak ties that 
helps to “bridge structural and cultural holes” (Diani & Mische, 2015, p. 13). Such restructuring 
of social relations provides opportunities for coalition building across social groups and networks 
that were not in contact before (McCammon and van Dyke 2010). Social movements are also 
effective in creating strong ties that persist over a long time and can be highly emotionally 
charged. McAdam (1988) documents various forms of such strong ties that emerge out of shared 
struggles, such as those that bound participants in Freedom Summer.  
 
88 For a similar argument see Haslanger (2017) and Zheng (2018).   
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The networks of social relations change even within a course of a movement. For 
instance, “During the early stages of an emerging protest cycle, as a protest begins to shift in 
scale and generates an exuberant intermingling of people, groups, and slogans the potential for 
expansion of weak ties is probably at its height” (Diani & Mische, 2015, p. 14). At this stage 
strong ties are not likely, but nevertheless, “they may forge new connections and the beginnings 
of shared stories, which might become activated or expanded in future encounters” (Diani & 
Mische, 2015, p. 14). This is often known as the “amplification stage” because “weak ties and 
loose chains of connections span structural holes” and we may be witnessing a growth of 
“coalitional” patterns, in which “multiple collaborations develop, yet on what is still largely an 
ad hoc, issue-related basis” (Diani & Mische, 2015, p. 14). 
In later stages of the movement, stronger ties are formed that cross the “structural holes” 
and break down the categorical cultural boundaries. These ties can generate new and alternative 
networks of cooperation and communication between individuals and groups. This 
“consolidation” stage of the movement creates cross-network negotiation and coordination. In 
other words, the change in the structure of social network in the society disrupts the preexisting 
norms of collaboration and coordination. Formerly excluded individuals can gain access to 
various resources through their newly made connections or through the connections that people 
in their networks have formed with others. Such connections change the fabric of the society and 
provide personal and structural incentives for individuals to endorse alternative modes of 
interaction and cooperation. In sum, cultural change follows the change in social networks, not 
vice versa. A progress that follows such a change in networks will be sustainable. 
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7.2. Second Concern: moving away from an equilibrium. 
The second concern is whether moving away from an equilibrium is possible in the first 
place. In the previous section, I argued that social movements alter the networks of social 
relations and change individuals’ connectivity level. However, higher connectivity can put a very 
stable system at a critical point in which change is possible. In other words, social movements 
can put oppressive systems at the edge of chaos, the state between order and disorder with a high 
level of complexity. Oppressive systems at this state can move from one local equilibrium to 
another without damaging the fabric of society or leading to backlash. In fact, such a move 
happens in many regards on regular basis with technological and other forms of change. In other 
words, social systems at this state are less resistant to change and are more adaptive.  
Ecosystems, societies, and economic systems are examples of systems that can evolve 
when they exist at the edge of chaos. It is true that nothing novel can emerge from stable social 
systems close to an equilibrium state. In fact, such systems are very resistant to change. It is also 
not possible to make progress in completely chaotic systems or societies that are filled with riots, 
rage, and chaos as such systems are too formless to preserve positive changes. Thus, a particular 
balance between the destabilizing and accountability mechanisms is necessary for the emergence 
of new social and moral norms. Such new norms can guide us to a new equilibrium state.  
Progress happens somewhere in the boundary between complete order and complete 
chaos (Henry, 1991-2006, p. 246). Thus, a complete understanding of social phenomena that 
incorporates social change requires a framework of explanation that is compatible with the 
features of a well-integrated system at the edge of chaos. As mentioned in Chapter 3, “The edge 
of chaos is where new ideas and innovative genotypes are forever nibbling away at the edge of 
the status quo, and where most entrenched old guard will eventually be overthrown” (Waldrop, 
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1992, p. 12). It is also where “centuries of slavery and segregation suddenly give way to the civil 
rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s; where seventy years of Soviet communism suddenly 
give way to political turmoil and ferment; where eons of evolutionary stability suddenly give 
way to wholesale species of transformation. The edge is the constantly shifting battle zone 
between stagnation and anarchy, the one place where complex systems can be spontaneous, 
adaptive and alive” (Waldrop, 1992, p. 12). In sum, a proper method for explaining social change 
should at least be open to the possibility of there being well-integrated systems at the edge of 
chaos.  
The key to understanding how systems can move away from equilibrium states is the level of 
connectivity. A paradigm example of a complex and dynamic systems is Stuart Kaufman’s 
(1991) famous NK model. This model shows how a system can move away from an equilibrium 
state with the right level of connectivity among individuals. In Kaufman’s NK model, N 
elements, say individuals, contribute to the average fitness of their population. Let me assume 
that the fitness here is optimized when we have an equilibrium of “individual strategic response 
to each other’s conduct, within the constraints of their resources and opportunities” (Anderson, 
2010, p. 78). In this model, K represents the number of individual connections.  
In the NK model, when no one in the system is connected to anyone else, K is equal to zero. 
In such a system, the contribution of everyone to the overall fitness is very minimal and 
negligible. However, when every agent is connected to at least two or three other agents, the 
system becomes nearly decomposable in the sense that it is unclear which contributing 
component has changed the fitness of the system. In fact, the individuals’ contributions are 
heavily interdependent. As K grows larger, the system becomes more and more interconnected.  
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A fully connected system, when N=K or when every component is connected to every other 
component, is chaotic and unpredictable. A good example of such a high level of connectivity 
and unpredictable outcome is a revolution and the period of chaos and terror that follows it. 
However, with the right proportion between N and K, Kaufman and his model show that the 
system can be self-organizing.89 In other words, with the right level of connectivity the internal 
organization is sufficient to generate considerable order (cf. Burian and Richardson, 1990). At 
this level of connectivity, the system is at the edge of chaos.  
At the edge of chaos, the system can move away from one equilibrium state to the other. 
Figure 4 represents various paths that the system can take to move from one local equilibrium to 
the other on the fitness landscape. However, such a landscape is not known to any of the 
individuals or to them as a group. So it becomes particularly difficult to determine the “right” or 
optimal path or direction. Some paths can lead to resistance, because of their worst outcomes for 
everyone or for the more powerful. The most successful social movements are the ones that can 
navigate such paths by bringing in the lived experience of many people from different walks of 
life. I explain this point in the following section.  
 




Figure 4. The fitness landscape for cultural norms and practices. The vertical axis represents the fitness, and the two horizontal 
axes are two variables that contribute to the fitness of the system or population. Adapted from “Visualization of two dimensions 
of an NK fitness landscape,” by Randy Olson, 2013, January 10.90 
 
7.3. Third Concern: Finding Alternatives 
  In addition to destabilizing dysfunctional social norms, social movements are venues for 
collective complex problem solving. When they are successful and lead to progress, it is often 
because they created a right path that leads to a better equilibrium state. However, not all 
movements are successful and not all their alternative equilibriums are better than the current 
state of affairs, all things considered. So why should one support a movement when there is such 
a risk for ending up in new but nevertheless dysfunctional equilibrium states. Perhaps social 
epistemology has a lot to teach us about the virtues of organizations that in fact get things right 
(Anderson E. , 2012). However, my focus here is on the structure of dynamic social networks 
that increase our chance to get to a better equilibrium state and improve our fitness.  
Without a doubt, communication is necessary for collaboration and collective problem 
solving. Thus, it should come with no surprise that the structure of communication networks 
among actors affects the performance of systems. The problem is that higher connectivity in 
 





social movements makes communication more efficient but lowers the quality of collective 
solutions. For instance, David Lazer and Allan Friedman (2007) show that in “dealing with 
complex problems, the more efficient the network at disseminating information, the better the 
short-run but the lower the long-run performance of the system” (p. 667). The efficiency in their 
model is determined by the degree of connectivity. Higher efficiency networks have a higher 
degree of connectivity, and a lower efficiency network has a lower number of connections 
between individuals. In other words, very well-connected networks can disseminate information 
faster, but individuals stop their search earlier when they hear about a slightly better solution.  
The best structure for collective problem solving involves a combination of higher and 
lower efficiency networks. Such a combination in fact resembles the structure of the most 
successful social movements, namely grassroots, chapter based, and leaderful movements 
(Crutchfield, 2018). In her book, How Change Happens: Why Some Social Movements Succeed 
While Others Don’t, Crutchfield discusses various successful movements in the last decades in 
the United States, such as Marriage Equality, Mothers Against Drunk Driving, and Tobacco 
Control, and shows that the success of these movements is due to their chapter based, grass roots, 
and leaderful organization. Computational simulation and empirical studies also support this 
claim (for examples see Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003; Sunstein, 2003; Uzzi & Spiro, 2005; 
Kollman & Miller, 2000; and Oh, Chung, & Labianca, 2004). In fact, chapter based, grassroots 
movements have the most effective structure of collective complex problem solving. With 
democratic and inclusive ideals, such movements can bring in the lived experience of many 
individuals from different walks of life to find the closest best alternatives and the path to 
achieve them.  
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7.4. Fourth Concern: The Imperative of Participation 
In his famous paper, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," Peter Singer (1972) provides a 
simple and powerful argument that relies on an intuitively obvious fact and a fundamental moral 
principle. He argues that it is a fact that dying from hunger and lack of shelter is bad. And he 
offers the “uncontroversial” principle that if someone can prevent something bad from happening 
without sacrificing anything with a comparable moral value, one ought to do it. Thus, if, for 
example, one is passing by a shallow pond in which a child is drowning, and if the only sacrifice 
that one needs to make to save the child is one’s shoes, then one ought to save the child. In what 
follows, I use a similar argument to address the fourth concern about our moral responsibility to 
participate in a social movement. My goal is to show that participating in a movement is 
something we can do to prevent something bad from happening and participating does not 
require sacrificing anything with comparable moral importance. I conclude that supporting some 
social movements is a moral imperative.  
Oppression is bad. Oppression is a result of fragmentation in the network of social 
relations. Therefore, a fragmentation in social relations that allows members of one group to 
dominate another and make the dominated group vulnerable to unjust harms, such as 
“exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence,”91 is also bad. 
Social movements fill the structural holes and disrupt the networks of social relations through 
which the powerful maintain their dominance and exclude others from access to resources. 
Filling the structural holes and disrupting the networks of social relations that maintain power are 
not possible through other ways of intervention, such as independent individual action or top-
 
91 Iris Marion Young, “Five Faces of Oppression” (1988), p. 270.  
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down interventions.92 In fact, without addressing the structural fragmentations and disrupting the 
networks of dominance, long term progress is not possible and even where it is, it will not be 
sustainable.  
Recall the principle that, as Singer puts it, “if it is in our power to prevent something bad 
from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we 
ought, morally, to do it” (1972, p. 231). In this chapter, I showed that social movements are 
effective vehicles for progressive social change. Their effectiveness can undo the harms of top-
down interventions, which I discussed in Chapter 3, and even make the short-term progress made 
by such interventions more sustainable.93 Thus, it is natural to conclude that if one’s support of a 
movement helps its cause, and if one would not sacrifice anything of any moral importance in 
doing so, one ought to support the movement. Nevertheless, a few clarifications are necessary to 
draw this conclusion.  
Social movements have the power of effectively resisting oppression and dismantling the 
oppressive social order by changing the network of social relations. Moreover, even small 
contributions to a movement can have significant effects. By supporting a movement, individuals 
provide access to their extensive network for cooperation, communication, and building respect 
and trust. Although supporting a movement can mean different things in different contexts, at the 
 
92 By emphasizing the importance of coordinated individual action I do not mean to undermine the importance of 
policy and top-down intervention. In fact, for some problems top-down interventions are absolutely necessary. But 
they are not sufficient when we need coordinated change at all levels. Thus, the importance of movements should 
not be an excuse for governments to abstain from what they are socially and morally obligated to contribute. This 
importance is also definitely not an excuse to abuse the contributions of activists and organizers that make change 
possible either. For examples of such an abuse by a government to put the responsibility for effective intervention on 
activists and especially on women, see Lind (2007). 
93 A very famous example of the complementary effect of top-down intervention and grass roots organizing is the 




very least it requires refusing to remain neutral when a crisis is evident and connecting to others 
who are better positioned to figure out which course of action is necessary.  
The simple act of reorienting our connections and our moral stance can transform our 
social networks and thereby destabilize the oppressive social order. One prominent example of 
such an effective change through the transformation of trust networks is the #metoo movement. 
MacKinnon (2019) argues that although “the legal, political, and conceptual innovations of the 
1970s”  were necessary for change, “it is the collective social intervention of the #MeToo 
movement”  that transformed the culture around sexual harassment (p. 2). Empirical evidence 
shows individuals are more willing to report instances of sexual abuse after the #MeToo 
movement.94 The victims of abuse gained trust in their network to not retaliate against their 
report and will stand with them in solidarity. Data also suggests that, after the movement, a 
higher rate of such reports has led to actual arrests (Levy & Mattsson, 2019). 
The public attention that movements bring to an issue is, on its own, inadequate to 
explain the movement’s effectiveness. In fact, changes in local networks directly affect the 
responsiveness of authority to oppressive harms. For instance, a study finds that in places with 
the most active participants in the Black Lives Matter movement, the uses of body-cameras and 
community policing increased significantly after the Black Lives Matter protests in the Summer 
of 2020. Compared with census locations with a lower rate of protests and organizing activity, 
active locations had an additional 15% to 20% decrease in police homicide before and after the 
Black Lives Matter protests (Campbell, 2021). The larger and more frequent the protests were, 
 
94 According to Levy & Mattsson (2019) was an increase in reporting of sexual crimes by 10% in the first six 




the wider the gap was between the homicide rates before and after the protests (Campbell, 
2021).  
The #MeToo and Black Lives Matter movements' success shows that participating in 
social movements gives us the power to stop bad things like sexual harassment or police 
homicide from happening. They also show that preventing these bad things from happening 
requires intervention at both local and higher levels. Although demonstrations at the national and 
global levels provide momentum and visibility for a movement's concerns, individuals need to 
hold one another accountable in their immediate environment for change to be possible and 
sustainable. Thus, individuals have a moral obligation to support the movement when they are 
aware it is likely to be effective in remediating or preventing harms. However, this conclusion 
requires some clarifications.  
The first point in need of clarification is that Singer’s principle only requires us to 
prevent something bad from happening, not promote something good. For social movements, 
however, preventing the bad and promoting the good must come together. Otherwise, we will 
have what Melo Lopes (2019) calls “meaning vertigo,” which is “a form of anxiety about social 
meanings and social coordination” (p. 2519). Such meaning vertigo can lead to distinctive moral 
harms. For example, Melo Lopes argues that although gender norms are increasingly contested, 
the lack of alternative concepts has led to a “rise of women-led movements reinstating 
patriarchal practice in the name of feminism” (2019, p. 2517). But this meaning vertigo is in 
itself bad and requires prevention. Thus, the use of Singer’s principle is legitimate for social 
movement participation.  
The second point in need of clarification is that social movements can be very 
demanding. In fact, behind every successful movement that only requires a post on social media 
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or a few hours of protest in the street, there are many activists and community organizers who 
have dedicated their lives to the cause. They make many sacrifices, and their lives are riddled 
with difficult choices that they need to make under pressure and with high uncertainty. Singer’s 
principle is not particularly useful in discussing this kind of sacrifice. However, activists and 
organizers are not the only ones who are necessary for social progress. Movements need a 
massive body of people standing in solidarity and providing support in everyday and mundane 
ways. Thus, the weaker version of Singer’s principle is enough to make a claim about the 
imperative of participation or support: “if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from 
happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it” 
(1972, p. 231).95  
For most people, supporting a movement in a minimal way requires sacrificing hardly 
anything of moral significance. Arguably, even more active engagement with social movements 
does not require much sacrifice either. The transformation of social networks for the participants 
of a movement does not require membership in an organization. As scholars of social 
movements argue, “By going to places, being connected to several groups or associations, 
patronizing specific venues, cafes, or bookshops, individuals create and reproduce dense webs of 
informal exchange” (Della Porta & Diani, 2020, p. 130). That is how informal social networks 
constitute subcultures of oppositional dynamics, which help keep collective identities alive even 
without any overt opposition to authority. Such informal networks also create “opportunity 
spaces” for people who were not formerly well-connected. Such interaction spaces allow holders 
of specific worldviews to reinforce their mutual solidarity and create alternative lived 
experiences (see Creasap 2012; Haunss and Leach 2009).  
 
95 My emphasis.  
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The importance of distance in Singer’s principle is the third point that needs to be 
clarified. Singer’s principle famously takes “no account of proximity or distance” (p. 231). He 
uses this principle to argue that we have the same obligation to someone who is thousands of 
miles away as we do to someone in front of us. However, from a relational perspective, Singer’s 
principle has another implication. We should consider that geographical proximity does not 
always correlate with the “shortest path length”96 that connects two individuals or their 
fragmented networks. For instance, if Uighurs or Palestinians were Christians instead of Muslim, 
the powerful Western countries' response might have been different from what it is now 
regardless of their distance. Similarly, if George Floyd—the Black man who lost his life to the 
unnecessary and excessive force used by a police officer in daylight in a public place—was not 
Black, maybe he would still be alive.97 In the former case, the difference in path length, or the 
fragmentation and isolation of the Muslim community from the network of power and care in the 
Western world seems to be the real cause of neglect, not the actual geographical distance. 
Similarly, the bystanders' insensitivity to the way that a Black man is treated because of the 
marginalization and fragmentation of his group is more relevant than his proximity to people 
who witness his death.  
In regard to both Muslims and Black men, powerful bystanders fail to see the victims as 
members of their trust or care network. Even if there is some sympathy, it is sporadic and not 
organized or coordinated enough to stop the violence. In other words, the average path length 
 
96 The shortest path length and average path length are two of the most important measures to determine the 
networks topology. For instance, the average number of clicks that gets us from one website to another determines 
the average path length between two websites. Similarly, the average number of people who one has to 
communicate through to contact a complete stranger represent the average path length for the cluster of the network 
the one is a part. Fragmentation increases the path length when individuals belong to different clusters. It also 
happens when an individual is not well-connected, and her connections are not well-connected either.  
97 For the empirical data on the likelihood of getting killed in interaction with police based on age, race-ethnicity, 
and sex see Edwards, Lee, & Esposito (2019).  
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between any given person in the network of power is too long to extend empathy and care to the 
victims. Moreover, the more fragmented a network is and the longer the average path length, the 
more important it is to make connections. The reason is that the very same fragmentation that 
represents itself in terms of path length between individuals is the cause of the oppression and its 
distinctive harms. Attending only to people closer to oneself in the network of social relations 
will perpetuate the oppressive social order.  
Although reorienting resources to powerful networks is problematic, connecting to 
people outside of one’s network is not always harmless or easy. Thus, perhaps the most minimal 
requirement is to ask people to connect to those in one’s network who have the smallest overlap 
in their connections. This strategy can have the additional advantage of using local knowledge 
held and produced by people in a cluster that allows them to address their problems effectively 
without ignoring other clusters. As I explained in this chapter, chapter-based and grassroots 
social movements benefit from such simple acts or reconnections.  
The last point in need of clarification about the implications of Singer’s principle is 
whether number of participants affects one’s obligation to support a movement. Singer argues, 
“the fact that there are millions of other people in the same position, in respect to Bengali 
refugees, as I am, does not make the situation significantly different from a situation in which I 
am the only person who can prevent something bad from occurring” (p. 232). However, the 
relational feature of social movements again leads to a different conclusion. When more people 
in one’s network join a movement, the more the responsibility to participate grows, not 
diminishes. Not only does the cost of participation start diminishing, but more participation in 
collaborative problem-solving increases the efficiency and quality of results (Lazer & Friedman, 
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2007). Moreover, people's lived experiences from all walks of life are necessary so as to arrive at 
the best possible results.  
The fact that a movement is necessary to make change possible is another reason to 
believe that individuals’ obligation to resist does not increase when not enough people are 
involved. In this situation, supporting a fringe or an isolated and thereby extremist movement can 
resemble uncoordinated individual action: high in cost with a negligible positive outcome. 
However, for a growing movement that has already entered one’s social network and demands 
minimal sacrifice, Singer’s principle is sufficient to show that there is no excuse to abstain from 
engagement.  
It is neither possible nor necessary to determine how much sacrifice is “little sacrifice” 
because the fluidity of the network dynamic changes what individuals are willing to or can 
contribute. For example, speaking up against sexual harassment does not have the same outcome 
as it used to in many social circles. Based on who we believe and why, speaking up can have 
different consequences. With broader support, speaking up or supporting women who speak up, 
all things considered, is more, not less, of an obligation than it used to be. Therefore, there is a 
dynamic threshold after which, all things considered, supporting a movement is a moral 
obligation. However, below such a threshold and for movements that are still in early stages and 










Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
My goal in this dissertation was to show that a paradigm shift in our theory of 
explanation towards complexity theory can justify resisting oppression through participation in 
social movements. I also used Singer’s argument to show that participating in social movements 
is a moral imperative. I started with the assumption that being oppressed is bad and leads to 
various moral harms. I argued that individuals bear the harms of oppression in virtue of their 
membership in different social groups. However, in Chapter 2, I showed that groups are not just 
the aggregate of individuals shared properties. In Chapter 3, I argued that such notion of groups 
or justification for grouping individuals based on a common feature has serious descriptive and 
normative problems. I showed that the dominant explanatory frameworks of explanation, namely 
methodological and various forms of non-reductive explanation that deny the mutual dependency 
between individuals and groups fail to provide an adequate justification or criteria for grouping 
individuals.  
In Chapter 4, I showed that the interconnection and malleability of individuals and their 
attributes explains the social world’s complex and dynamic nature. Thus, I argued that the proper 
framework of explanation for problems that involve such interconnection and malleability—
problems that involve well-integrated systems—is complexity theory because social systems are 
complex dynamical systems. I also showed that interconnection and malleability explain the 
importance of heterogeneity, positive and negative feedback loops, non-linearity and 
stochasticity. I further discussed the importance and legitimacy of emergence and self-
organization when social systems exist at a critical state: at the edge of chaos. Finally, I showed 
the strength of complexity theory in theorizing social change in Chapter 5. In what follows, I 
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briefly sketch how complexity theory can justify grouping individuals based on features like race 
and gender to theorize oppression. I also show how such justification can guide our moral 
response to the harms of oppression.  
From the complexity standpoint, a social group is a collective of individuals 
differentiated from other collectives by various cultural practices. These collectives are clusters 
of interacting individuals that fragment the social relations network. I showed that the cultural 
practices that differentiate groups maintain the fragmentation in the network of social relations. 
Moreover, following Weber, Tilly, and Anderson, I showed that such fragmentation in the 
network of trust, communication, and interaction is a central feature of an oppressive social 
system.  
According to Singer’s argument, the duty to prevent something bad from happening is 
dependent on whether anything of comparable moral importance needs to be sacrificed. By 
sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, he means causing something equally bad 
to happen, or “doing something that is wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral good, 
comparable in significance to the bad thing that we can prevent” (1972, p.231). In Chapter 5, 
however, I argued that resisting oppression requires sacrificing things of moral importance, given 
the systemic approach to oppression. Thus, even if we accept that resisting oppression is a moral 
imperative, we will end up with a dilemma at best. According to this dilemma, neither resisting 
nor enduring oppression is morally right. Two categories of reasons can be identified against 
resisting oppression: one relates to causal explanation and another to moral justification. These 
reasons undermine the moral permissibility of resisting oppression by any means. However, I 
showed that such a resistance is not only permissible but also an obligation.  
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The causal explanatory reasons include concerns about the sustainability of progress and 
its possibility. The dysfunctional norms and practices that maintain an oppressive social order 
involve stabilizing mechanisms. Furthermore, these mechanisms create an equilibrium state that 
everyone benefits from maintaining. Thus, the concern is that progress will not be sustainable or 
even possible given such stabilizing mechanisms and equilibrium states. However, I have argued 
that a paradigm shift towards complexity theory addresses these concerns.  
I have also showed that sustainable progress is possible when it follows a change in 
social relations networks. The emergence of new connections across the social network creates 
new opportunities and incentives that make progress sustainable. Also, new norms of 
collaboration emerge out of the new bonds in the network. These new norms further stabilize the 
connections and provide incentives for maintaining them. I also showed that progress is possible 
even though individuals at the equilibrium states have incentives to maintain the existing social 
order. Such incentives can be to the benefit of exploitation or fear of retaliation. However, either 
way, all things considered, individuals would be better off remaining within the scope of the 
equilibrium.  
The equilibrium states are states in which deviation is costly for everyone. But this cost 
changes when features of the interaction networks change. For example, when the 
fragmentations and connectivity level between different clusters change, individuals often move 
smoothly from one equilibrium to another. New norms of collaboration emerge that involve the 
lived experience of the marginalized and their dynamic heterogeneity. New connections 
destabilize the fragmentations and allow for new and possibly more democratic forms of self-
organization, with less exploitative clusters. These connections put the system in a critical state 
in which moving from one local equilibrium to another does not require great sacrifices.  
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The critical takeaway here is that social movements are in a privileged position to make 
sustainable progress possible. In this sense, social movements are a particular form of social 
organization that emerges from repeated and patterned interactions and coordination between 
multiple actors. Such an organization involves weak and dynamic ties that allow the network to 
grow in already existing networks. This growth is responsible for destabilizing the fragmented 
networks and providing incentives for individuals to connect and act differently. These new 
norms and incentives can make a progressive change sustainable. The same cannot be said about 
uncoordinated and isolated individual actions or top-down interventions. In sum, resisting 
oppression in coordination with many others through a social network can make progressive 
social change possible. Moreover, the distinction between resistance in cooperation and 
resistance in isolation or top-down intervention addresses the causal explanatory concern.   
Even if sustainable progress is possible, it is not guaranteed. The non-linear and 
stochastic nature of complex and dynamic systems can make the perspective of movements 
uncertain and undermine the moral justification of supporting movements in the first place. For 
example, movements are prone to the bandwagon effect or moral hazard. The bandwagon effect 
refers to the widespread adoption of a norm or act, just because everyone else seems to be doing 
it, even though the norm is dysfunctional or the act is problematic. Various psychological, social, 
and economic factors account for this effect. A famous example of this effect is when people 
vote for a political candidate who appears to have the most support. The individual rationale can 
be wanting to be part of the majority, but this line of thinking can undermine the efficiency of 
democratic decision-making and lead to the election of unqualified candidates. Movements are 
also prone to creating opportunities for abuse, a phenomenon known as "moral hazard" in 
behavioral science.  
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Considering the problems that movements can introduce to social change, one might 
argue that supporting social movements is not morally justified. However, distinguishing 
different forms of collective actions and their structural networks can show that not all 
movements suffer from problems like the bandwagon effect, moral hazard, or even backlash to 
the same extent. Empirical studies show that the decentralized, chapter-based, leaderful, and 
grass-roots organization of social networks minimizes the risk of such problems. For example, 
decentralization in networks allows them to control the local level's bandwagon effect and 
prevent it from spreading. This kind of decentralization that typically exists in a chapter-based 
organization can be conductive to resolving problems at the local level while coordinating and 
communicating with other chapters (Crutchfield, 2018). Such organization slows down 
communication speed and the increase the time individuals and local chapters have to explore 
their options before becoming convinced that others have a better answer than theirs.  
In addition to democratic ideals, the grassroots organization of leaderful movements can 
minimize the risk of problems like moral hazard. Such movements use interpersonal and 
psychological mechanisms that protect against the more privileged members of a movement 
seizing the opportunity to replace the old, oppressive order with a new one. Although such 
seizure is still possible in such movements, it is less likely to occur, more likely to get corrected, 
and less destructive because of its limited scope. Comparing grassroots, chapter-based, and 
leaderful movements with hierarchal movements shows the former's success in controlling and 
minimizing adverse effects (Crutchfield, 2018).  
Progressive social change is possible and requires our support of social movements. I 
have showed that supporting movements is morally justified and constitutes an effective way to 
resist oppression and its resulting harms. I also argued that very little is needed of most 
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participants in a movement to make change possible. Therefore, it is not necessary to sacrifice 
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